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General Summary and Conclusions
The passage of the Local Government (Planning and
Development) Act in 1963 heralded a substantially increased
degree of intervention by government into decisions concern-
ing how land is used. We describe the form which this inter-
vention took over the subsequent 20 years and analyse its
implications. We do so in three phases. First we present the
legislative, administrative and analytic framework, then we
discuss some elements of the planning process and finish with
some conclusions.
The Framework
Legislation: The Local Government (Planning and Develop-
ment) Act, 1963 comprises the legislative core of the Irish
land use planning system. It has two main provisions: it
requires local authorities to prepare a development plan, and
it gives them power to decide -- over a wide range of "non-
exempted" development- whether and/or what form of
development is permitted. Exempted development under the
act includes agriculture, forestry, most wild and wetlands and
work by local authorities themselves. The development plan
"will help to prevent disorder and waste in development and
to protect the public interest against damaging development",
according to the explanatory leaflet issued by the Department
of Local Government (now Environment). In urban areas, the
plan must show objectives for land-use, transportation,
redevelopment and the preservation and development of
amenities. In rural areas it must include objectives for the
extension of water and sewerage services. A wide range of
"optional" objectives may be included.
Planning permission decisions at the local level can be
appealed to An Bord Pleamila which was established under
provisions of the Local Government (Planning and Develop-
ment) Act, 1976, and re-structured under provisions of the
Local Government (Planning and Development) Act, 1983.
In most instances, the Board is the final arbiter, but there is
provision for recourse to the courts. The latter, however,
typically confine their purview to matters of interpretation
and procedure.
Under the Housing Act, 1969, permission must be obtained
for developments which involve the demolition of a habitable
house, or a change to some Other use. There are by-laws con-
cerning structural safety, fire regulations, etc., which must
also be complied with. These are embodied in draft Building
Regulations; the Minister for the Environment has requested
local authorities to use the draft as if it had the force of law.
Administration: At the local level, the two main actors in
the decision-making system are the elected council members
and the executive, the latter comprising the manager and his
or her staff. The elected members are responsible for preparing
the development plan and providing overall policy structure.
Individual planning decisions are made by the manager, in the
context of the zoning provisions and objectives of the plan,
unless directed by the council -under Section 4 of the City
and County Management Amendment Act, 1955 -- to take a
specific action. If a planning permission is to be made which
significantly contravenes the provisions of the development
plan, a "material contravention" must be approved by council
members.
There is provision for public comment in the preparation
of the development plan and requests forplanning permission
must be advertised in a paper which circulates in the area.
Any member of the public can comment on such a request.
After a decision has been made at the local level, it can be
appealed to An Bord Plean~ila by anybody within three weeks.
The applicant for planning permission can also appeal the
decision and has one month within which to do so. The
Board employs inspectors who report to it on the merits of
the appeals. At its discretion, the Board may conduct an oral
hearing. The Board’s decision need not conform with the
provisions of the relevant local area development plan, and
there are no time limits within which decisions must be made.
The Minister can (and does) provide policy guidelines to be
followed by the Board in making decisions.
The Minister for the Environment is a critically important
element in the decision-making process. He provides policy
guidance to An Bord Plean(da, sets the legislative agenda
which defines the authorities and responsibilities of the local
authorities, and allocates funds for major infrastructural
investments.
Analytical Framework: We attempt to go beyond simply
describing the mechanics of the system, to discover its under-
lying dynamics: in doing so we focus especially on the
implications in practice for the efficient use of resources, and
for the distribution of opportunities and costs.
Elements of the Planning Process
Distribution of Gains and Losses: The 1963 Act specifies
(Section 56(1)) the conditions under which compensation is
not payable for refusing planning permission. These include
developments which involve changing the use of an existing
building, and those which: are judged to be premature in
relation to deficiencies in water supplies or sewerage facilities;
would endanger public safety because of traffic hazard or
obstruction, or would create serious traffic congestion;
would injure the amenities, or depreciate the value, of pro-
perty in the vicinity. Proposed developments where refusal is
necessary in order to preserve "any view or prospect of
special amenity value or special interest", or to which a special
amenity area order applies, can likewise be rejected without
incurring liability for compensation. These conditions define
the circumstances where the private landowners must in
effect sacrifice their pecuniary interests to that of the common
good. When the appropriate conditions do not obtain, then
liability to pay compensation arises. The most common
instance arises when development is proposed for bare
land, such as the fields of a sports club or a convent within a
built-up area. If a local authority wants to keep such sites
underdeveloped, it will either have to buy them, or pay com-
pensation. If land is zoned "agricultural", so that there is no
intention to provide services to it, and. therefore prospective
development cannot be classed as "premature", then liability
to compensation .can arise if none of the other conditions
outlined above (traffic hazard, serious congestion, etc.) are
met. Liability to pay compensation can be avoided if a’Special
Amenity Area Order has been made and received Ministerial
approval. However none have yet been approved.
The development process resultsin substantial appreciation
in land value:
Increase m sem~ed increase
Permd ~nd va~e, Co. Dublin Consumer Prices
% %
1963-1971 530 64
1975-1980 700 98
Landowners Who are fortunate enough to own property
which goes into development can capture very large gains.
Some of the gain should acrue to the state: since 1982 a
capital gains tax of 60 per Cent has applied to’ all gains when
the period of ownership is less than one year, falling to 50
per cent ,for periods greater than a year. There are very
restrictive terms conceming indexation,i so that, in a period
of relatively high inflation and modest growth in land values,
the real (net of inflation) tax rate will be much higher than
50 per cent.
Procedural Controls: We have seen that local authorities have
considerable statutory authority to shape the location and
nature of development. However, this power is mitigated by
the liability to pay compensation which is incurred under
certain conditions--mainly related to the maintenance of
open space - if development is prohibited. In addition to its
statutory powers, the local authority can impose delays (time
1Adjusting the base-value to account for price inflation.
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costs) which give it a negotiating "margin"; in 1981, 18 per
cent of appeals to An Bord Plean~la took six months or more
to process. In addition, some developers looking to the future
may feel that indulging the desires of the council beyond
what is statutorily required in one instance will help assure a
more sympathetic (or less hostile) reception for future pro-
ject proposals.
The Appeals System: An Bord Plean~a hears about 3,000
appeals per annum. In 1980, 22 per cent of the appeals were
by third parties. Somewhat over half of the decisions of the
local authorities are confirmed, about a quarter are reversed,
and the balance are varied. In 1981 the response time was as
follows:
Response time
Percentage of
total appeals
Less than 3 months 48.7
3-6 months 33.5
6-9 months 11.9
Over 9 months 5.9
100.0
There is tremendous regional variation in the susceptibility
to appeal, rangingin 1981 from 2.55 per cent of local authority
decision in Donegal to 25.86 per cent in Dun Laoghaire.
In the nature of things, most decisions of any significance
get shifted upwards to An Bord Plean~.la. With regard to
policy, the Board receives sporadic policy directives from the
Minister, and the general directive in making decisions to
consider (Section 19 of the Local Government (Planning and
Development) Act, 1983):
The proper planning and development of the area of the relevant
planning authority (including the preservation and improvement
of the amenities thereof), regard being had to the provisions of
the development plan, the provision of any special amenity area
order relating to the said area, the terms of any previous permission
considered by the Board to be relevant...
The Board makes decisions on substance, and must therefore
be a setter or at least a clarifier of policy in the land-use area.
However, this role, which is inherent in the position of the
organisation at the apex of the decision-making system, is not
adequately reorganised.
Pricing and Payment for Infrastructural Services: We have the
choices of having the costs of development-related infra-
structural services provided by taxpayers in general, borne by
the development, or some combination. If the full long-run
additional costs of services -water, sewer, roads, gas, tele-
phone, electricity, etc.,- are not assessed against develop-
ment, then: development in areas which are costly to service
will be encouraged, sprawl will be facilitated, resources will
be transferred from the Citizenry in general to those individuals
and regions where development is concentrated, and rationing
of services will be done on a political/administrative dis-
cretionary basis, rather than through the use of market-clearing
prices. Thus, charging devel9pment: the long-run marginal
costs will encourage both efficient use of resources and good
environmental management.
Pricing can also be used to reinforce, or take the Place of,
regulatory approaches in other areas. For example, charges
on derelict sites, strip development, high-rises,-etc., could be
designed to achieve performance in these regards which is in
the general interest. Conversely, subsidies can be used to
encourage particular forms,: of structural conservation and
development.
In 1981, County Cork charged development £2,500 per
acre for water, £2,500 for sewers, and also an occasional
extra charge for roads, with some variation by area. Counties
Dublin and Kildare charged a fiat per acre develop-
ment fee of £4,000 and £1,500 respectively. In the case of
Dublin, the charged level has been set so as to recover the
local authority share of the relevant costs; the Department of
¯ the Environment supplies the balance required.
There is now a statutory basis- the Local Government
Financial Provisions (No. 2) ACt, 1983 --for the application
of a comprehensive range of local charges.
Conclusions
The system has undoubtedly achieved some successes in
terms of protecting community interests, but in our view it
will not deliver in the future what was expected of it at the
time the planning legislation was passed, or what is aspired
to in most development plans. This is so for a number of
reasons: the system depends almost exclusively on adminis-
trative and regulatory powers, backed up by legal sanctions;
these are difficult to enforce and are inappropriate for a
people with post-colonial traditions of individualism. The
gains from development are so large, and the situation con-
ceming compensation so ambiguous (at best), that channelling
infrastructural investment in a cost-effective fashion, and
preserving environmental amenities, are both becoming
increasingly difficult. Developments do not, in general, carry
their full associated infrastructural investment costs, and
funds to undertake these from government are very scarce.
As a result, there is a tendency in some areas to "build-ill"
planning permissions and by-law approvals, a requirement that
infrastructural work be undertaken which is not necessarily
directly germane to the development in question. While this
could be justified if it were done in a predictable and equitable
fashion, such is not the case. Some developments get heavily
penalised in this respect, while nothing is demanded of others.
If it is desired to retain present open spaces near cities,
maintain distinct suburban town centres and prevent ribbon
development, some major reallocations of property rights are
a necessary condition. The current "successes" in these
matters rest largely on public rights, given effect through the
bargaining power of local authorities, which can create trans-
action costs for developers. These transaction costs will be
insufficient to counteract future development pressure, as
benefits from appeals become Imore profitable. The rights
created by the present requirement to pay compensation in
some circumstances if development of open land is refused
will be more decisive than the rights created by the adminis-
trative power to impose cost creating conditions and delays
in appeal. So if citizens are pleased with results so far, they
should not assume that the status quo will persist as relative
prices change.
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If a substantial portion of the rising land value appreciation
were to be ca16tured by the public, it might retain the exist-
ing balance between the cost of appealing denials of planning
permission on open space lands and the net gains from
development. But if the public~does not capture part of the
appreciation gain, then the necessity to pay compensation
for refusing development will have to be eliminated if open
spaces are to be preserved in rapidly growing urban areas.
The present control of open space development cannot be
maintained in the fut6re without substantial changes in
property rights, in one form or another.
Incentives tend to be negativeand penalty oriented, rather
than positive and reward oriented. Thus, buildings of some
distinction can be listed and demolition forbidden, but few
rewards are available to maintain them.
The policy and decision-making environment is very com-
plex, with a profusion of often conflicting forces involved.
On preliminary examination it resembles a patient in traction,
being pulled in all directions, but going nowhere. However,
closer examination shows that a troika of forces are pivotal in
shaping system directionand performance; these are the local
authority managers, An Bord Plean~la and the Department of
the Environment. There is a very heavy emphasis on dis-
cretionary regulation and negative sanctions in the planning
permission process. The regulatory powers come both from
statutory provisions and the ability to impose procedural
requirements --:’ mainly delay -- on developers.
Very large revenue gains accrue as a consequence of the
process of develOpment, and these in the past have been
captured mainly by landowners and intermediaries. Since
huge capital gains and losses hang on planning decisions, the
political pressure is great, and there is a potential for bribery.
We wish to emphasise again here that there is no evidence
available to indicate that bribery has been a problem in the
past. Furthermore, the potential in this respect is not confined
to planning permission decisions; it arises in all Situations
where substantial funds are allocated on a discretionary basis.
Nevertheless, we feel that it is worth addressing as a prospect
tive problem in the domain of land-use planning for the
following reasons:
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(i) In instances where the government makes discretion-
ary grants, e.g., the IDA grants to industry, the
amounts and purposes of such grants are carefully
recorded, subject to public audit and in some cases
are published. This makes the contribution explicit,
and its efficiency can be monitored. This contrasts
with the situations with regard to planning permission
decisions, where the gain (or loss) is implicit and not
readily subject to systematic audit and public scrutiny.
(ii) In most cases where the government is awarding finan-
cial gain to individuals, this decision in the specific
is delegated to officials; the political involvement is
mainly at the policy-setting stage. In the planning
system, both through the use of Section 4 powers and
zoning decisions, there is a direct involvement by
politicians in the creation of large capital gains and
losses for specific individuals.
(iii) In the majority of cases where government makes
grants, the number of officials directly involved is
quite small, operating within long established statutes
and procedures. However, in the planning and by-law
process, there can be substantial numbers of individuals
from a variety of professional backgrounds involved
at the local and appeals level, and this makes the
system more susceptible.
Liability of local authorities to pay compensation is a
major factor influencing the decisions of local authorities
vis-?l-vis open space preservation. There is iome ambivalence
concerning the role of the general public in the planning
process. In some respects it is indulged and encouraged, while
in others it is not.
There is a rising sense of frustration with the existing land-
use planning system, and it is shared by planning officials,
developers, architects, surveyors, conservation groups and the
general public. We believe that the answer is not to promul-
gate more laws, regulations, provide more supervisory staff,
etc. We need a fundamental reorientation in the manner in
which the system is designed, characterised by four inter-
dependent elements: adjust incentives so that, for both private
and public decision makers, there is a closer coincidence of
interest betweer~ their own and that of the community’s;
secondly, capture for the public a significant proportion of
the surplus resulting from development; thirdly, encourage
initiative and excellence in the design and execution Of
developments; and fourthly, reduce the level of uncertainty
which characterises the environment faced by both public
and private decision makers.
Adjust Incentives: With regard to the first element, we
suggest charging to developments the long-run marginal
costs of their infrastructural services, and imposing additional
charges when they infringe on social and environmental
amenities, as, for example, in the case of derelict sites. Plan-
ning applications should bear the full costs of their review.
With the resources thereby made available, infrastructural
investments and planning permissions could and should be
carried out in an efficient and timely fashion, with minim~
delay. Incentives, such as grants, should also be provided to
owners to maintain old housing stock, and to preserve build-
ings of distinction, maintaining thereby the character of areas.
Capturing the Surplus: We estimated very tentatively2 that
the annual surplus (rent) yielded to landowners and inter-
mediaries by new development amounted to about £84
million in 1980; this is the return generated over and above
the minimum return needed to keep the land in question in
its highest revenue-yielding use. We feel that if development
is to be channelled ina socially desirable fashion, in the sense
that infrastructure is used efficiently and environmental and
social considerations are given due regard, the great incentive
which has existed for landowners in some areas to achieve
zoning changes and/or planning permission must be sub-
stantially dampened (but not eliminated). If such is not done,
the benefits for some landowners of non-compliance will be
2The data base available to derive such estimates is inadequate in the extreme.
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so great that the pressure for change from these interested
parties will prove impossible to resist. In addition to this
efficiency aspect, there is also an equity dimension. There is
constant pressure on the public exchequer to assist those who
are victims of change which is not of their own making.
Farmers and the unemployed come to mind in the 1983
context. It seems to us that there is a parallel argument in
equity that the fortunate beneficiaries of change should
contribute some share of their gain to the common fund.
We reviewed three broad approaches- compulsory pur-
chase in designated areas at use values plus some premium,
capital gains tax, a direct tax on sales and/or on land being
zoned for development- to capturing the surplus. They
each have advantages and disadvantages. We feel that the
problems associated with the compulsory purchase of land in
designated areas are likely to be substantial, and that, if this
approach is adopted, local authorities will get involved in
price control of housing. For these reasons we do not recom-
mend that this (Kenny) approach be adopted to capturing
the surplus at this time. We recommend that a combination
of capital gain and sales tax be used to this end, with the
amounts collected being published, and the impacts on land
prices and other variables being clearly monitored. The
capital gains tax of 50 per cent - which has been in effect
since 1982- comprises a useful basis from which to start.
Since indexation- adjusting the base for the effects of
inflation- is not permitted for traders in land, the "real"
tax rates could be considerably in excess of 50 per cent. For
example, if land were purchased for £100,000 and sold three
years later for £250,000, the tax payable would be 0.5 X
150,000, or £75,000. However, if the average annual rate of
inflation over the period were 12 per cent, then the real (net
of’inflation) gain would amount to 250,000 - 100,000 ×
(1.12)3 = £109,507, so that the effective tax rate would be
73 per cent.
We would prefer to apply the tax only to this real gain,
i.e., to allow indexation of the base. If such is not allowed,
then the effective tax rate could in some instances equal or
exceed 100 per cent, and the transfer of land into develop-
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ment will be inhibited. Thus, in theory, a higher.rate of tax
-say 75 per cent applied only to the real gain, will en-
courage more efficient allocation of resources than a relatively
lower rate applied to nominal gains. However, we recognise
that allowing indexation may provide more scope for tax
avoidance and, therefore, make collection more difficult. We
recommend that the implications of the current capital gains
tax system for efficient land allocation be carefully monitored,
and adjusted if necessary to reflect "real" rather than nominal
gains.
If it is clear that it is impossible to prevent widespread tax
evasion with the capital gains approach, then the designated
area scheme deserves consideration. It is essential that land-
owners should expect whatever is proposed to be continued
in the future, with only incremental adjustments. If they
expect that the taxes will be eliminated in the future, they
will defer sales where possible, supply of land will fall, and
land prices will escalate. Whichever option is adopted, we are
strongly against imposing price control on housing, as sug-
gested by the majority report of the Kenny committee. The
long-term effects of such a policy, especially in an industry
which is competitive, will be perverse and not in the societal
interest.
Encouraging Excellence: Adjusting incentives and capturing
some of the surplus, as we propose, will move systemperfor-
mance in a desirable direction, by simultaneously encourag-
ing actions which are in the general interest, and by providing
revenue to facilitate this end. HOwever, something further is
required, and is in many ways the most difficult to achieve,
namely, the encouragement of excellence at every leVel in the
system, and the creative use of the various talents available.
The present arrangements encourage the achievement of
certain minima vis-a-vis safety in use and environmental
quality. However, conscious, positive efforts must be made
to encourage excellence, because the tendency of the pre-
sent system is to reduce all activity to a (low) common
denominator. The following are among the suggestions we
make to this end: achievement of any improvement in office
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block design depends fundamentally on the central govern-
ment; as the major renter in Dublin, it should announce its
intention, in the case of future requirements, to seek out
buildings of distinction, to avoid the reverse, and then to act
on this decision. The government is also the key to moving
such activity to the north side of the city.
A special unit should be established in the larger local
authorities to encourage innovation in building design and
scheme layout, which would provide encouragement, advice
and a "fast-track" through the planning permission process
for those proposals judged to be especially distinctive. Com-
petitions and awards for creativity should be utilised more
frequently than heretofore, and the names of developers,
builders, architects and the planning permission history
should be permanently and prominently displayed for each
major scheme.
Reducing Uncertainty: The preparation of the development
plan provides local authorities with the opportunity to
articulate alternatives, explore policy choices and costs, and
to involve the public in this process. Putting more effort
than heretofore into deciding what the community wants in
certain localities, and the means of their achievement, would
allow local authorities to provide developers with much more
guidance as to what is likely to be acceptable, and would
also provide An Bord Pleanfila with a good basis for making
decisions. This should reduce the number of planning appli-
cations which are rejected at the local level, and increase the
proportion of cases on appeal in which the decision of the
local authority is sustained.
The Development Plan should be a realistic medium-term
investment programme with a clear presentation of costs
and the origin of funds. It should not be an unrealistic
"wish list".
In the case of individual applications for planning per-
mission, potential objectors could be more positively involved
by being brought together with the applicant in the pre-
permission stage to explore means of reconciling differences.
This would give the local authority additional information in
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making its decision, and should reduce the number of third
party appeals.
The policy-setting role of An Bord Plean~ila, in conjunction
with the Minister for the Environment, should be frankly
recognised. This is inherent in their responsibilities to under-
take substantive review, and the criteria which guide their
decisions should be made available. This would provide a
focus for the land-use debate, and also reduce uncertainty
for both local authorities and developers.
What we propose is, we believe, realistic, achievable and
desirable. Unlike many other policy proposals, it should be
self-financing, since pricing is a central element, and it will
not involve an increase in regulation indeed the converse
is more likely. However, itdoes represent a significant change
from our present incremental, regulatory approach, and it
would take a firm political commitment, backed by leader-
ship from the Department Of the Environment, to bring it
about.
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PART I INTRODUCTION
Introduction
The Local Government (Planning and Development) Act,
1963, provides the basic legislative framework for the regula-
tion by government of most non-agricultural land-uses in
Ireland. Prior to its passage, such regulation had been at the
discretion of the local authorities. Some elements in the 1963
Act were modified in the Local Government (Planning and
Development) Act, 1976. Eighteen years have elapsed since
the government in Ireland decided to take a central role in
decisions concerning the use of privately owned land.
Objectives
We decided that it was timely to review the implementation
of these acts with a view to:
(i) Describing how they work in practice. There are descrip-
tions available of the provisions of the acts, and the steps to
be followed in their implementation; we are not aware of any
comprehensive attempt to elucidate the underlying dynamics
of the land-use planning process as it is actually applied in
Ireland.s
(ii) Identifying who gets to make decisions in different
sets of circumstances. The distribution of decision-making
authority is central to what takes place on the ground, who
captures benefits and who bears costs.
It is clear that there are conflicting interest groups in the
land-use planning arena, and thus there is less than unanimity
$When this report was in final draft form, a very helpful guide to planning was
published (Shaffrey, 1983) and Grist (1983) provided and evaluative overview.
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on planning objectives. Among the interest groups are the
immediate occupants and neighbours of residential, office
and commercial space, developers, architects, planners, en-
vironmentalists and landowners, to name only the most
obvious. This report will further identify and illustrate these
interests and describe results in a variety of termswhich we
hope will be relevant to them.
We hope that this report will inform various groups as to
the relationship between the formal law, the process of its use
and administration and performance outcomes in several
dimensions. It is not our intent to become a partisan for any
particular point of view.
(iii) Identifying issues and aspects of the system which, on
the basis of our preliminary analysis, hold possibilities for
improvement. This was our primary objective.
While we do makesome suggestions for improvement which
we feel are worth considering, we do so rather tentatively.
Many of the issues which we touch on would each require a
detailed study before definitive conclusions could be reached.
We had altogether less than a man-year to devote to this pro-
ject. Our report is intended primarily as an effort to improve
understanding of the Irish land~use planning system, especially
as it functions in urban areas, and to clarify the issues involved.
¯ Study Justification
The provisions concerning land-use planning, and the
manner of their implementation, are pervasive in their effects.
They influence: the quality of our physical and social environ-
ment; thenature and extent of activity in the construction
and related sectors; the location and size Of expenditures on
transportation, communications, energy supply, water supply,
sewage disposal and treatment, etc.; the distribution of gains
and losses resulting from land-use changes; the extent to which
the participants and the citizenry at large feel that their
affairs are being dealt with fairly and expeditiously.
Given the magnitude of the resources (broadly defined)
influenced by the planning process, it is clear that a small
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improvement proportionate to the total resources engaged
could be of substantial benefit. We hope that, by clarifying
the issues involved, we can convey some sense of where the
most promising opportunities for such improvement are to
be found. As will become clear in subsequent discussion, the
plethora of often conflicting interests involved result in a
very constrained policy system, in the sense that counter-
vailing forces make change difficult to accomplish. It is all
the more useful in such circumstances to be able to identify
the most fruitful opportunities for improvement.
Criteria
(i) Economic Efficiency
It is difficult to apply conventional economic efficiency
tests in many land-use situations. For example, it is difficult
to discern the willingness of the benefiting public to pay to
have a Georgian-style exterior on a particular building or
block (or, to learn what they would be willing to accept to
forgo this benefit), in order to compare it with the opportunity
costs (in terms of reduced space or utility thereof) of this
provision. There are, furthermore, major distributional
implications involved in such decisions. What happens will
depend significantly on where the property rights (the rights
to make decisions in relation to property) reside. Where they
"should" reside is a fundamental consideration.
However, there are categories of land-use choice where
economic efficiency tests can be applied to advantage. For
example, assume that the cost of servicing land for house-
building in area A is £3,000 per house, and £8,000 in area B,
and prospective purchasers are indifferent as to location. Then,
other things being equal, given that serviced land is to be pro-
vided, and assuming that these are the only such areas available,
area A is clearly the more economically efficient choice.
Similarly, if improvements in the planning system allow
developers more flexibility - and therefore allow them to use
their resources more efficiently - while not imposing environ-
mental or other costs elsewhere, this too is an improvement
in economic efficiency. In the terminology of economics,
19
this is called a "pure" Pareto,improvement; some are made
better off and no one is made worse off. A change which
reduced the time involved in getting planning permission while
not imposing additional costs elsewhere would also be of this
genre.
(ii)Consistency of Performance with stated Goals
In those many cases where it is difficult or impossible to
apply the economic efficiency criterion, it is useful to deter-
mine the extent to which the planning system achieves in
practice what "we" say that we want. This too is difficult to
apply, because defining "we" in this context is problematic,
and distinguishing "real" goals from rhetorical flourishes and
deliberate obfuscation is likewise not easy. We relied on the
objectives and aspirations stated in various development plans
as our primary source of information in this regard, cognisant
of their deficiencies for this purpose.We sidestep the problem
of divining real intentions on the bases of stated objectives
by, instead, using the conditional: "If purpose X is an objec-
tive, the planning system does (or does not) deliver, to the
following extent...".
(iii) Administrative Feasibility
The ease (cost) with which changes can be handled adminis~
tratively is an important consideration.
(iv) Equity
The attractiveness of proposals will turn in part on the
extent to which they are judged to be ’flair". Fairness is a
difficult concept to quantify; it oftenhas both symbolic and
substantive dimensions. It has to do with people’s sense that
they are not required to make Sacrifices while others make
windfall gains. AlthOugh it is hard to evaluate the fairness of
a change, it is so fundamental to the acceptability of same
that we do address this aspect.
These are the criteria which inform our analysis. For pur-
poses of exposition we have presented them separately here.
However, in our study we do not always follow such an
explicit pattern; the criteria are often treated implicitly in the
discussion. 20
The Audience
This report is directed at a rather heterogeneous and general
audience, including politicians, developers, planners, archi-
tects, community groups, officials in central government
departments and development agencies, members of conserva-
tion groups, economic geographers, economists and interested
members of the general public. Because of this wide spread of
interests, much of what we present will appear trite and un-
original to specialists in the various fields, but we hope that
there will be something in our perspective which will be of
interest to all. We have tried to keep technical terms to the
irreducible minimum.
Methodology
We have used an intellectual framework derived from wel-
fare and public choice economics (see Chapter 1).
We reviewed the Planning Laws and the literature pertaining
thereto. Since our primary interest is in the workings of the
land-use planning process in practice, we devoted much of
our attention to the practitioners. We interviewed planners at
the city and county levels in Dublin, Kildare and Cork. We
discussed planning with a range of developers who are involved
in all types, phases and scales of development. We met with
architects, planning consultants, and central government
officials and members of conservation groups. We identified
many contemporary cases from newspaper articles, and also
attended appeal hearings and public meetings. From these
we provided a distillation of the nature and extent of the
issues we discuss in subsequent chapters. There is very little
serious, published, analytically oriented research on the land-
use planning system in Ireland. As a consequence, much of
our discussion is based on newspaper stories, magazine articles
and material deriving from interviews. While this is clearly
unsatisfactory, we felt that it would be useful to make a start
using such sources, as a prelude to what we hope will be more
rigorously based analyses.
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Outline
In writing this report, we have attempted to make each
section self-contained: for example, the reader whose primary
interest is the policy choices and suggestions can turn directly
to the appropriate material without reviewing the preceding
material. Because of the variety of interested parties and the
heterogeneous nature of the subject matter, we felt that this
was desirable. However, since some elements- such as the
liability of local authorities to pay compensation, and the role
of An Bord PleanAia- aregermane to a number of issues,
this involved some repetition.
In the framework section (Part II), we first present a brief
discussion of the concepts in economic theory which we
regard as being most germane in the analysis of land-use
planning. We then outline the legislative background, the
administrative procedures followed and the issues involved
in compensation.
In the next section we address a variety of aspects of the
land-use planning process in Ireland, ranging from procedural
controls and public participation to the pricing and allocation
of land-related services.
In Part IV we trace the outcomes which result from the
system described in Parts II and III and in Part V some policy
choices are outlined.
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PART II FRAMEWORK
Chapter 1
Economic Concepts
The maximum price which prospective purchasers are
willing to pay for land is a residual; it is the risk-adjusted
discounted present value of the net income (including re-sale
value) expected to be yielded by the land over time. Thus,
taking an individual and highly simplified case, when land is
being purchased for housing, the developer estimates the price
he can get for the houses, deducts all costs of construction
and servicing, including an allowance for profit, and arrives at
the maximum amount which can be paid for the land and still
make the project profitable to undertake. Thus, with a market
system, the use which can pay the most for land will tend to
outbid alternatives. One of the pervasive tensions in the
system then exists because "new" uses, e.g., office accommo-
dation, periodically arise which can outbid existing uses. If it
is desired to maintain the latter, this involves the difficult
task of constantly thwarting the press of market forces.
This tendency in a market system for land to be allocated
to the use which can pay the most for it, is to be encouraged
on economic efficiency grounds if the market is not failing
significantly in some aspects, and if equity issues are not a
consideration. We return to these two very important caveats
later on. The market fulfils the invaluable role of signalling
and reflecting changes in taste, technology and in demand
and supply. It provides a relatively smooth mechanism for
adjusting to such changes and for rationing supply.
Land-Use Constraints
If landowners are constrained as to what they can do with
their land, these constraints will be reflected primarily in
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land-price. For example, given an adequate level of demar~d,
if the density of building permitted in a given zone per unit
area is increased,, then, Other things being equal, we would
expect the p.rice of the remaining development land in this
area to increase. The developer will take his "normal" profit
on the structure and the balance of the net return is available
to be captured by the landowner. Likewise, if constraints are
increased, we can expect that the land-price will fall.
Supply changes in any given area will also be reflected in
the market elsewhere. Thus, for example, a change which
reduces the supply of office accommodation available~An
desirable location X Will result in: (a) an increase in the
value of existing office accommodation in X (in excess of
what it would have been in the absence of thereduction in
supply) and (b) an increase in demand in other acceptable
locations which will be reflected in higher land prices than
would have prevailed if supply in Xhad not been reduced.
We can, therefore, imagine the land market as a large balloon
which, if constricted in one area, will expand commensurately
elsewhere. If supply-reducing constraints are applied simul-
taneously in a range of areas, the price pressure will intensify
unless supply-expanding actions are taken in other locations.
Similarly, changes in demand resulting, for example, from
transfers such as arise when rates are abolished and subsidies
¯ are made to farmers and prospective houseowners, will be
reflected in part at least in land-price changes. We are stating
the economic truism that, for a given set of conditions, land-
price is the product of the forces of supply and demand;
changes in either of.these will result in a new equilibrium pri~e.
Levels of income and household formation, and consumer
preferences, vis.~-vis location and style are key determinants
of housing demand. We belabour the obvious because in
official and popular discussions of planning and land-use
policy generally, it often appears to go unrecognised.
Equity
In Ricardo’s late 18th century exposition of rent theory, he
envisaged that a growing population would require additional
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food, and that this could only be provided by expanding the
margin of cultivation onto land heretofore uneconomic to
work. This could only be made profitable by a rise in the price
of food. As the price increased, rents would accrue to those
infra-marginal landowners, with those having the most fertile
land reaping the greatest reward. Since this was the outcome
of demographic and economic forces owing nothing to the
endeavours of these landowners, Ricardo regarded these
rents as windfall gains accruing to this class, and saw therein
the seeds of class conflict, since the needs of the rising indus-
trial entrepreneurial class for cheap labour (and therefore
cheap food) were contrary to the interests of the landowners.
While the above does not do justice to the subtleties of
Ricardo’s arguments, it does provide us with a crude paradigm
for the urban land market. Expansion at the margin, generated
by demographic and economic forces, and shaped by infra-
structural investments and technological advances, results in
price-levels which provide "windfall" gains to infra-marginal
landowners. A characteristic case arises in this regard when
infrastructural investments - roads, water and sewer services,
etc. -result in large property value gains for many adjacent
owners. The intensity of the resentments engendered by
such gains will depend, in part, on the extent to which (a) land-
ownership, and the participation (or the hope of participation)
in the gains is widespread in the population, and/or (b) taxa-
tion (including levies, development charges, etc.,) is used-
and seen to be used - to capture a portion of the resulting
gains for the populace.
Thus far, we have assumed that the landowners are suf-
ficiently knowledgeable to capture the bulk of the rent.
However, this is not always the case. If, for example, a
developer (or intermediary) knows that a zoning change is in
prospect, and the landowners in question do not, then this
additional knowledge allows this prospective purchaser to
capture the bulk of the rent "created" by the change. A priori,
we would expect that there would be an asymmetry in the
amount and quality of information available to these two
groups (developers and landowners). Major developers are
continuously involved in the land-market and, therefore,
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have the incentive and the opportunity to capture economies
of scale in acquiring information. For many landowners, a
sale is a once-in-a-lifetime act. However, too much should
not be made of this distinction. Sale by sealed bid or oral
auction- the latter is not uncommon here- will usually
ensure competitivebidding and therefore the transfer of most
of the rent to the vendor. Nevertheless, there are situations -
especially when the land-use changes are rapid- when the
superior knowledge of the developerwill confer real advantage.
If individuals can actually get changes made in the allowable
land use which increase its value after they have made the
purchase, this too will allow them (rather than the initial
landowner) to capture rent. If the opposite happens a
rent-reducing land-use designation is made after acquisition
-then of course the purchaser loses. However, the latter is
nota common event. "Development’’ value normally builds
up over a period and the increased rent will often be shared
by a number of parties in successive transactions.
In the next section, we introduce the notions of economic
efficiency and associated concepts. Since we draw on these
throughout the text, in what follows we provide definitions
of them for the general reader.
Efficiency and the Market
When markets are competitive and all assets can be individu-
ally owned and managed, economists say that it will achieve
a Pareto optimum and is efficient; all possible gains from
voluntary exchange have been exhausted. However, the con-
ditions for efficient market performance are rarely fully
met. When there is a significant divergence from the ideal
in this respect, this is called a manifestation of market failure.
Policy measures to adjust for such failure are justified on
economic efficiency grounds if the costs of intervention are
less than the benefits resulting therefrom.
One major source of market failure in the case of land-use
is the fact that some of the dimensions which add to, or
detract from, the value of land are not owned: aesthetic
wistas and the quality of adjacent air andwater fall into this
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category. Such effects are known as externalities. Building an
ugly, polluting structure may maximise net income yield to
the owner, but impose significant costs on "the public"
Economic efficiency is enhanced if the owner is obliged to
bear (intemalise) these costs, but only up to the point when
the last additional (marginal) cost of so doing equals the
resulting additional benefit.
Transaction costs are the costs incurred in transacting
business. They can comprise a source of market failure. To
illustrate, let us look at a simplistic example, where a large
number of owners are affronted by a particular proposed
development and are willing in aggregate to pay up to £50,000
to prevent it, e.g., by buying the land. The developer, on the
other hand, would require only £20,000 to desist and move
elsewhere. Clearly an opportunity exists here for mutually
beneficial trade. However, the costs of reaching a collective
decision, gathering the requisite funds, making arrangements
for appropriate management after purchase, etc. - the trans-
action costs - may be so large on the part of the landowners
that it proves impossible successfully to make the trade. These
costs act as a wedge preventing the system moving from the
status quo to a better solution. Conversely, government often
has the ability to impose transaction costs. This ability can be
used by a planning authority to influence land-use in the
direction favoured by it.
From this traditional view of market failure flows policy
prescriptions. Government can encourage the appropriate
internalisation of externalities by such means as: pricing; the
extension of the jurisdiction to include externalities; regula-
tion backed by legal sanctions; subsidies. It can reduce the
magnitude of transaction costs by such means as providing
"free" information and giving negotiating status to a repre-
sentative sub-set of the collectivity in question. Each of these
approaches has strengths and weaknesses; their aptness will
depend on the particular circumstances obtaining. While we
will draw on them in our analysis, they are limited in the
sense that they take the existing allocation of property rights
as given; an alternative allocation could yield a different
equilibrium solution and imply a very different pattern of
land-use. By identifying the sources of rights and the manner
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in which they interact we hope to provide insights concerning
how a given distribution of rights influences land-use and
welfare, and how alterations in property rights might change
matters in this respect.
Chapter 2
Legislative Background
In this chapter we give the reader a flavour of the legis-
lative provisions which bear most directly on land-use policy
in Ireland. This material is presented here in a very summary
and colloquial form. Some of the ramifications of this legis-
lation will be treated in subsequent chapters. A listing of
enactments and regulations directly relevant to physical
planning is presented in Appendix A.
The Local Government (Planning and Development) Act, 1963
This act- hereafter frequently referred to simply as "the
1963 Act" -- is the legal corner stone of governmental efforts
in Ireland to minimise the imposition of external costs as a
result of modifications of the physical environment. Its pro-
visions are administered by eighty seven local government
bodies, comprising county councils, county borough corpora-
tions, borough corporations and urban district councils. These
planning authorities are required to prepare development
plans for their areas of jurisdiction wherein future land-use,
transportation patterns, redevelopment areas, sanitary services,
amenity areas, etc., are identified and co-ordinated so as to
meet future demands while protecting natural and cultural
amenities. For all development, meaning "the carrying out
of any works on, in or under land or the making of any
material change in the use of any structures or other land",
planning permission is required, unless it is exempted develop-
ment. Exempted developments include work relating to agri-
culture and forestry, work undertaken by local authorities
themselves in their own areas, work carried out in comfor-
mance with the provisions of the Land Reclamation Act
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(1949) and minor developments (e.g., work to the interior of
a building). Development by the state is not defined as such
for the purposes of the Planning Acts, while a range of
exemptions are provided for under the 1977 Regulations.
On application, the planning authority can either refuse
permission, grant permission unconditionally or grant permis-
sion with Conditions. The conditions can include specifications
concerning the quantity, timing and disposal of waste pro-
ducts. The planning permission can be appealed. Under the
provisions of the 1963 Act the appeal went to the Minister
for Local Government for decision. Public involvement is
provided for by making draft development plans public, by
requiring the posting or publishing of requests for planning
permission and by making provision for appeal. Bord F~iilte
(Tourist Board), An Taisce (the National Trust for Ireland),
the Arts Council and the National Monuments Advisory
Council are identified as prescribed bodies who" must be given
notice of certain classes of planning applications, on which
they can comment or advise. The following apparent weak-
nesses emerged as the Act was implemented:
(1) Making a government Minister the adjudicator of
appeals thrust the land-Use decisions too directly into
the political arena.
(2) Enforcement was cumbersome, time consuming and
ineffective. A developer could contravene the specifi-
cations of the planning authority with little probability
of suffering significant adverse consequences.
(3) Once planning permission was given, developers could
wait indefinitely before implementing their plans.
(4) The local government staffs were for the most part
technically ill-equipped to prepare plans, to undertake
rigorous evaluation of planning applications and to
ensure the enforcement of conditions.
(5) Adequate provision was not made’for the planning Of
projects which simultaneously impacted a number of
jurisdictions.
(6) The Act only applied to new projects.
(7) It was thought that the small and intimate scale of
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most public authorities, with the resulting social and
personal ties with influential constituents, lead in
some cases to an undesirable affinity of interest
between the regulated and the regulators.
In the light of these criticisms, an additional planning act
- Local Government (Planning and Development) Act, 1976
was enacted. This provided for the establishment of an inde-
pendent Planning Appeal Board (An Bord Plean~ila) to take
the place of the Minister for the purpose of judging appeals.
Planning permission expires after 5 years4 if the proposed
action has not taken place. To prohibit unauthorised develop-
ment, or to secure compliance with planning permission con-
ditions, a planning authority or any third party can secure a
High Court injunction. To reduce conflicts of interest, all
elected representatives, members and staff of An Bord Plean/tla,
and certain local authority officials must declare their interest,
for public review, in matters relating to land development in
the area or to any planning application. When an application
is made for a development which is expected to cost more
than 5 million pounds, the planning authority may require
the applicants to prepare a statement of the environmental
impacts anticipated as a result of the proposed development.
An environmental study must be furnished to the planning
authority where the application relates to specified types
of trade and industry (see Article 28(3)(a) of the 1977
Regulations).
Environmental Acts
In addition to the above acts, there are two specifically
environmental acts which can influence land-use by industry.
These are the Local Government (Water Pollution) Act, 1977
and the Alkali, etc. Works Regulation Act (1906). The
former requires the implementation of a licensing scheme
administered by the sanitary authorities, whereby the dis-
4This has been extended to 6 years under provisions of the Local Government
(Planning and Development) Bill, 1982.
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charge of trade and sewage effluents to inland and tidal waters,
and the discharge of trade effluents to sewers, Can only be
undertaken under the terms of a licence issued under the Act.
The licensing authority may refuse permission, may grant it,
or may grant it with conditions. The Minister has ¯directed
that appeals under the terms of the Water Pollution Act should
be made to An Bord Plean~la. The Alkali Act requires that a
variety of plants including alkali, cement and smelter works
be registered and subject to inspection. The provisions of this
Act are implemented by the Department of the Environment.
The National Monuments Acts,¯ i930 and 1954 provide for
the acquisition, protection and management of national
monuments by the Office of Public Works (National Parks
and Monuments Branch). If it appears to the Commissioners
of Public Works that anational monument is in danger of being
destroyed, injured or removed, Or is falling into decay, through
neglect, they may, by order, undertake its preservation.
In the Wildlife Act, 1976 the Minister for Fisheries and
Forestry is given powers to protect flora and fauna, and to
this end establish nature reserves and wildlife refuges. Provision
is made for co-operative agreements and the making of grants
and loans to private individuals.
The Housing Act, 1969
Under this act, permission is required from the local hous-
ing authority to demolish, in whole or in part,¯ any habitable
house, or to use it otherwise than for residential purposes, if
its most recent use has been as a residence. The authority
may refuse permission, grant permission or grant permission
with conditions. Appeals are made to the Minister for the
Environment. Conditions imposed may include the require-
ment that alternative accommodation be provided for those
displaced or that¯ payment in lieu be made to the local
authority. On appeal, the amounts specified initially may be
reduced or eliminated by the Minister. This act only applies
to buildings which are being used as dwellings or were last
used for this purpose. With the exception noted below, build-
ings which were not last used as dwellings can be demolished
without permission.        34
Buildings listed in any development plan as being worthy
of preservation are, however, given a measure of protection
by a statutory order issued in 1967 under the 1963 Planning
Act; this order was subsequently revoked and then included
in the comprehensive Regulations made in 1977. Opportunities
to protect the interiors of buildings are provided for in the
1976 Planning Act. In each case, the owner must be notified
of such listing. However, this requires that these be listed for
protection in the Development Plan. Thus, permission is
required to demolish habitable dwellings and those listed for
protection. All other categories of structure can be demolished
without governmental review. It is interesting to note that
even if permission to develop is withheld under the Planning
Acts, the right to demolish could still be granted, since the
decision-chain differs.
The Derelict Sites Act, 1961
Under this act a local authority can serve notice on the
owner of a derelict area inviting him to submit a proposal for
’improving the site. If he fails to do so, or if he submits a
proposal but fails to carry out the work, the authority can
carry out the work and recover the cost from the owner. The
local authority may also compulsorily acquire such a site,
once certain conditions are met.
Administrative Acts
The Local Government (Ireland) Act, 1898 provided for
the establishment of county councils, county borough
councils and urban and rural district councils. The rural
district councils were abolished in 1925. The county councils
(27), county borough councils (4), borough councils (7)
and urban district councils (49) - hereafter referred to under
the generic title "local authorities"-comprise, as we have
seen, a central element in the formulation and implementation
of land-use policies.
In the local authorities, certain functions are "reserved" to
elected members; these include such tasks as specifying the
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tax rate ("striking the rate"), borrowing money and making
by-laws. Functions not so reserved, such as the collection of
revenues, the employment and control of staff, and property
management are known as "executive" functions, and are
discharged by the manager. The assignment of responsibilities
vis-a-vis land-use planning will be discussed later on. This
management system was initiated in Cork city in 1929,
extended to other county boroughs by City Management Acts
between 1930 and 1939, and all local authorities under pro-
visions in the County Management Act (1940). This act was
amended by the City and County Management (Amendment)
Act, 1955. In Section 4 of this latter act,~if certain specified
conditions are met, the elected members of the councilmay,
by resolution, require the~ manager toundertake "any par-
ticular act, matter or thing specifically mentioned in the
resolution and which the local authority or the manager can
lawfully do or effect to be done".
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Chapter 3
Administrative Procedures
The Development Plan
The development plan is prepared in draft by planning
personnel in the local authority in question. In urban areas,
the plan must show objectives for land-use, transportation,
redevelopment and the preservation and development of
amenities. In rural areas it must include objectives for the
extension of water and sewerage services. There is in addition
a wide range of "optional" objectives which may be included.
The Department of Local Government (now Environment)
in its explanatory leaflet titled Your Development Plan (1967)
states that:
It is the purpose of the plan to inform the public about the policy
of the planning authority and to give information on what is
permissible, as well as what is not, by way of development. In
this way it is hoped that the number of cases in which planning
permission has to be refused can be greatly reduced.
It is perhaps worth quoting further from this leaflet, as it
conveys the aspirations underlying the initiation of mandatory
land-use planning in Ireland:
Resources are not unlimited, and it is important that they should
be used to the best advantage from a national point of view. This
will not happen automatically. It will not happen if each developer,
public and private, goes his own way in ignorance or disregard of
a common purpose, or if there is no common purpose.., an
unsuitably located factory may affect house values and cause
nuisance and inconvenience to large numbers of residents; unsightly
chalets may spoil the view and the tourist appeal in a scenic area;
long-established access rights to beaches may necessitate costly
road improvements or by-passes. It is necessary for planning
authorities to make clear the limits which will apply to develop-
ments in the public interest. Briefly, the plan will help to prevent
disorder and waste in development and to protect the public
interest against damaging development.
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Later on we will be discussing the capability of the planning
system to achieve the types of objectives stated above.
A draft plan is made by the elected members of the local
authority and then put on public display for 3 months. The
public’s objections and observations must be taken into
account in making the final plan, which must be approved by
the elected representatives.
The elected representatives can also make a Special Amenity
Area Order which involves putting into this category an area
of natural, scientific or historical importance whose character
it is proposed to preserve. It allows the local authority to have
very strict control over existing or new developments in such
areas, or to prohibit the latter entirely. Furthermore, within
an area of special amenity, no compensation is payable by
the local authority because of restrictions imposed on the
private use of land. Because of this provision, there is natural
antipathy to the designation among landowners in the can-
didate areas. A Special Amenity Area Order must be approved
by the Minister. So far, only one Area- Dublin Bay- has
been designated as an area of special amenity by a local
authority; however, the Minister refused to approve the
designation.
The plan is shaped and structured by the planning ’staff,
and guided by public commentary, but final responsibility
rests with the elected representatives. Plans are to be revised
every 5 years. However, delays in reaching agreement on the
substance of some plans can result in much longer intervals
between revisions. The plans typically depend on zoning as
the primary means of encouraging compatibilities among land-
uses. Drafts do not usually present the public with alternative
visions of the future. A single plan is presented, and the public
input must perforce be reactive to what is proposed therein.
Local authorities must take the necessary steps to imple-
ment their plans. For example, if an area is zoned for industrial
development, then the requisite services must be provided.
The Role of Central Government: Development plans are
not subject to approvalby the Minister. However, the Depart-
ment of the Environment does issue occasional advisory
notices to local authorities regarding planning preparation.
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The key role of central government stems from its function
as the dispenser of the bulk of the funds for infrastructural
services. The Industrial Development Authority also plays a
central role, since it influences very strongly the location of
new industrial capacity. There is a roads plan, which provides
some sense of the central government’s priorities and plans
for trunk roads. There is nothing comparable provided for
water, sewage disposal, sewage treatment and public housing.
In Your Development Plan it is stated that:
The objectives of the plan must.., be realistic. They must take
account of the practical prnspects and of the resources likely to
be available. At the same time, planning authorities are encouraged
to avail fully of the opportunity of the development plan to set
out their views and proposals for the development and enhance-
ment of their area.
This represents both a caution and a challenge. The extent
to which a local authority can count on the central govern-
ment to provide the resources required to implement the plan
will depend on the priority accorded to the various items in
the national context. This in turn will depend on relative
needs and costs, political factors and the leadership and
implementation capabilities of the local authority manager
and staff. It is impossible to apply relative weightings to these
considerations. However, it is clear that, especially in the
smaller local authorities, the development plan can be used
by an ambitious local authority with an aggressive manager as
one means (among many) of mobilising central government
funds for the community in question. It is not clear also
whose priorities prevail if there is a direct conflict between
the plans of the central government and those of the local
authority. If the former feel sufficiently strongly about the
matter, budgetary control at this level (central government)
is such that presumably irresistible pressure can be brought to
bear, although the political costs of such action are likely to
be high. The Minister does have a--rarely exercised-
statutory role as co-ordinator of Development Plans (Section
22(2) of the 1963 Act).
Modifying the Plan: Since preparation of the plan is a
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"reserved function", i.e., the final decision rests with the
elected representatives, it follows that modification thereof
is also the preserve of this group. If a significant contravention
of the plan is proposed -this is typically called a "material
contravention"-then permission of the council members
must be sought.
Getting Permission
Assuming that the proposed project is not an "exempted
development", planning permission must be sought and
granted before development can proceed.
Before making a planning application, notice Of intention
must be published, either in a newspaper generally available
in the district of the proposed development, or by posting a
notice on the Site.
¯ Application can be made either for outline planning per-
mission or for full permission. To apply for the former, a
location and layout plan should be provided, but detailed
plans do not have to be made. The granting of an outline per-
mission is an agreement in principle by the planning authorities
that what is suggested will be acceptable. However, an approval
must be granted before development can proceed. Requests
for outline planning permission are typically made by in-
dividuals who are selling a property and are anxious to be
able to indicate that development potential exists. Since the
request for outline permission is subject to appeal, and
approval must subsequently be secured, some developers do
not find it advantageous to apply for outline permission.
On greenfield sites, because of the expense and uncertainty
involved with an application for full permission, the tendency
is to apply for outline permission.
Full Permission: The application for full permission must
be accompanied by a Site or layout plan and full drawings of
floor plans, elevations and sections. No environmental impact
assessment is generally required. The local authority may
request further information concerning this and other dimen-
sions. A decision should be made by the Planning Authority
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within 2 months of receipt of the completed application. If
further information is requested, the two month period begins
again after its receipt by the authority. Planning permission
is granted by default if nothing is heard from the authority
within the two-month period.
The decision at the local level is made by the senior
administrative officer in the local authority, i.e., by the
county or city manager, usually on the advice of his or her
planning officials and the local representatives where there is
a planning committee (as there is in most areas). However,
under section 4 of the City and County Management (Amend-
ment) Act, 1955, the manager can be directed to make a
planning decision by a majority vote of the elected represen-
tatives, when the number voting in favour of the resolution
exceeds one-third of the total number of council members.
Appeals: If planning permission is refused, or if conditions
unacceptable to the developer are imposed, the latter may
appeal the decision to An Bord Plean~ila. This must be lodged
within one month of receipt of the initial decision. The appel-
lant may, at the discretion of the Board, have an oral hearing,
at which all parties to the appeal may attend, make submis-
sions and call witnesses. The Board reviews each appeal de
novo. It is restricted to considering the proper planning and
development of an area, regard being had to the provisions of
the development plan for the area, and of any Special Amenity
Area Order. In doing so, the Board is required to keep itself
informed as necessary on relevant policies and objectives of
the Minister for the Environment, planning authorities and
certain other public authorities. The Board is authorised to
grant permission even when to do so contravenes a develop-
ment plan or Special Amenity Area Order.
There is no time-limit Within which an appeal must be
decided. Any third-party can appeal a local authority decision.
This must be lodged within 21 days of the decision. The
opinion of the Board is, in effect, final. While the courts will
get involved in matters procedural, they have thus far been
reluctant to pass judgment on the substance of decisions.
There is a provision whereby the council members can, in
cases where there has been a change in circumstances relating
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to the proper development of the area, revoke or modify a
planning permission. However, it is not clear what Constitutes
a "change in circumstances". We gather that the change would
need to be a matter of considerable significance, Such asthe
adoption of a new development plan with m~/jor new objec-
tives, or the determination of a big new bypass route which
traversed sites to which permissions applied. It is a power
which is rarely exercised, perhaps because of the ambiguity
in this regard and also because there are implications for com-
pensation (Section 59 1 (a) of the 1963 Act).
By-Law Approval: Independently Of the planning permis-
sion per se, prospective developments must also meet per-
formance and safety standards vis-~-vt’s structural soundness,
fire hazard, road construction, etc. Setting thesestandards is
at present a local responsibility. However, there are national
draft building regulations which define the norm for many,
but not all (e.g., road standards are not included) of these
aspects. If the regulations are approved, their implementation
will become mandatory throughout the country.
In Dublin and Cork
, 
anda few other areas, by-law approval
must be applied for separately. This is typically done concur-
rently with the filing of the planning application. However, a
considerable volume of construction-related activity requires
only by-law approval. The approval process is quite separate;
planning permission could be granted, but byqaw approval
withheld. There is no appeal against a decision off a by-law
application. When the Building Regulations made by the
Minister under Section 86 of the 1963 Act are in force, there
will be provision for the relaxation of regulations in particular
circumstances, either by the local authority or, on appeal, by
the Minister. While the technical specifications to be met are
published, it is impossible to be inclusive in this regard, so
that each situation has to be judged on its merits. There is no
time-limit within which a decision on by-law approval must
be made. By-law approvals cannot be granted retro-actively,
while planning permission can.
In some other local authorities, considerations dealt with
under by-law approval in Dublin and Corkhave been included
as part of the planning permission process. However, An
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Bord Pleamila has taken a jaundiced view of conditions
imposed on planning permissions which they feel should be
dealt with under building regulations, their attitude being
that the planning system is designed to regulate land use, not
details of construction.
Enforcement
The most salient enforcement provision arises, not from
the planning laws per se, but from the requirement on the
part of most lending institutions that a structure have full
planning permission and by-law approval before they will
consider lending money for its purchase. Therefore, if an
individual builds without permission, the potential market
will be confined to those purchasers who have ready cash.
For a landowner who plans to use the structure(s) himself,
and who does not care about the possible reduction in future
marketability, on resale, this provides little disincentive.
Jennings (1981) reports that in recent years between 20 and
40 per cent of houses were purchased without a mortgage.
However, since most property-owning individuals will be
anxious to ensure maximum future marketability, this
requirement on the part of lending institutions probably
means that for most "new" developments, planning permis-
sion will be sought.
The planning laws provide for a procedure whereby a
"warning notice;’ can be served on the owner of land or any
other person concerned, when land is being developed or
likely to be developed for unauthorised purposes. If the warn-
ing notice is not complied with, a fine of up to £250 is
payable. The maximum penalties for a continuing offence
after a first conviction are a fine of up to £100 per day, or up
to 6 months imprisonment, or both. There is also provision
for the serving of enforcement notices on those who have
carried out unauthorised development. Conviction carries a
maximum fine of £250 and a fine of £50 per day if there is
a continuation of the offence. The development must already
be in place before the enforcement notice process can be
initiated.
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Any planning authority or third party can secure a High
Court injunction to prohibit unauthorised development, or to
secure compliance with a planning permission. However, the
applicant can be held liable for costs if it turns out at the
hearing of the action that the granting of the injunction was
not warranted.
Taking-in-Charge: When a housing estate has been com-
pleted, the developer transfers it to the charge of the local
authority so that street cleaning and maintenance, garbage
pick-up, etc., can be undertaken. However, the local authority
can refuse todo so if the developer is deemed to be not in full
compliance with the planning permission and by-laws require-
ments. This provides a further incentive to the developer to
conform. The criteria applied in deciding when a development
is ready to be taken-in-charge can give rise to some dispute,
an issue we address briefly in a subsequent chapter.
Some of the enforcement provisions function automatically
and are effective. Others require an initiative by the local
authority and are only effective if both the will and the
means to act are present.
The emphasis is on negative incentives. There are few if
any "carrots" provided to encourage positive behaviour. One
important exception to this is the provision in the 1982
Budget passed by An D~il in March which grants income tax
relief in respect of the cost of repair and maintenance Of
buildings which are intrinsically of scientific, historic, archi-
tectural or aesthetic significance. To qualify, a building must
be capable Of conservation and there must be arrangements
for reasonable access by the public to it.
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Chapter 4
Compensation
Key considerations in land-use planning are the circum-
stances and extent to which a local authority is liable to
compensate private landowners when the latter are pre-
cluded from capturing the maximum value for their land.
Because of its significance, we devote a chapter to a review
of this critical dimension as it applies in Ireland.
Compensation for What to Whom
The Irish Constitution says that the state shall "pass no
law attempting to abolish the right of private ownership..."
but it continues by saying that the state "may as occasion
requires delimit by law the exercise of the said rights with a
view to reconciling their exercise with the exigencies of the
common good". While it is our habit in constitutional demo-
cracies to make decisions by reference to such statements,
they in fact provide little guidance. Lawyers try to find
legal principles to explain why one type of loss is classified
as private property whose loss of value by a public action
requires compensation and another type does not. (These
are summarised by Ackerman (19 7 7), having been critiqued
by Sax (1971).)
Economists too have tried to formulate theories to guide
compensation. If it is a pecuniary externality from a market
demand shift, for example, no compensation is suggested.
But, if it is a technological externality such as pollution,
there is a suggestion that the government should require
compensation to be paid (by whomever created it -private
or public.) Except, of course, if transaction costs are in-
significant in which case the efficient result will take care
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of itself if markets are permitted. Economists speak of
eliminating externalities via facilitating market exchange
or government direction.
But, both mainstream legal and economic analysis miss
the essence of the compensation problem in a world of
interdependence. Public choice theory focuses attention
on the reciprocal character of the opportunities of con-
flicting parties. If one person has the opportunity to pursue
their interest it often means that the other party is exposed
to a lost opportunity. In the land-use application, for example,
we can observe that if Alpha has the opportunity to build
flats on a former sports ground, it means that neighbouring
parties bear the cost of lost open space and increased con-
gestion. If development were prohibited and compensation
paid to the sports ground owners, it would be acost to whom-
ever pay the compensation. And conversely, if the neigh-
bours’ environment is to be maintained, it means a lost
opportunity for the developer. In an interdependent world,
it is not possible to make everyonebetter off. Externalities
can not be eliminated, only shifted. If a particular loser is
compensated, it just changes the name of the loser, for the
payment of compensation always lessens the opportunities
of someone. As Samuels (1981, p. 204) puts it: "To make
Alpha’s interest a cost to Beta is to refuse to allow Beta’s
interest to become a cost to Alpha. It is impossible to com-
pensate all losers. What is important are the factors goveming
which injuries will be identified and compensated". In this
context it might be added that what is also important is how
this choice affectsthe character of our urban areas.
Irish Planning Law and Compensation
Let us look at how Irish planning law treats different
situations of land-use change involving incompatible uses.
According to Section 56(1) of the 1963 Planning Act, the
planning authority is not liable to pay compensation for
refusing planning permission in the following instances
(among others):
(i) For any development that "consists of or includes
the making of any material change in the use of any
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structures or other land". As we shall see, this pro-
vision received judicial interpretation.
(ii) For developments judged to be premature in relation
to deficiencies in water supplies or sewerage facilities.
(iii) Because a road layout for the area, or part thereof,
has not been indicated in the development plan.
(iv) The proposed development "would endanger public
safety by reason of traffic hazard or obstruction of
road users", or would "tend to create any serious
traffic congestion".
(v) When erection of any advertisement structure is
prohibited.
(vi)When the refusal is necessary in order to preserve
"any view or prospect of special amenity value or
special interest", or to which Special Amenity Area
Order applies.
(viii)When the proposed development would injure the
amenities, or depreciate the value, of property in
the vicinity.
We can illustrate the import of these by reference to a
few cases. First, consider the case of an application for
development permission made to the local planning au-
thority to build a residence or flats on agricultural or open
space land. If permission is refused, and the community
wishes to preserve the open space and would prefer develop-
ment at another location, the local authority may be liable
for payment of compensation.
In re: Viscount Securities Ltd v. Dublin County Council
(1978) 112 ILTR 17, permission had been refused for
development of land on grounds that the area was zoned
for agriculture. It was established in the course of an appeal
to the Minister that water and sewerage scrvices were avail-
able to service the houses proposed to bc erected on the land
in question, so that the absence of such services could there-
fore not be used as a reason for refusal of the permission on
appeal. When a claim for compensation was lodged and the
matter came before the Property Arbitrator, the planning
authority pleaded that compensation should be barred
because of the provisions of Section 56 (1) (a) of the 1963
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Act. The :Arbitrator stated a special case in thematter to the
High Court, and the planning authority’s claim was rejected.
Nowlan (1978, p. 83) says that this decision"makes it
clear that permission to develop agricultural land cannot be
refused without risk Of compensation..." unless one of the
other situations exempting compensation in Section 56 of
the Planning Act are met. The wording of Section 56 (1)
(a) is rather vague and says compensation is excluded "in
respect of the refusal of permission for any development
that consists of or includes the making of any material
change in the use of any structures or other land, (italics added).
Whatever was originally intended by the phrase "use" inthis
context, the meaning has been supplied by the Court in
the Viscount Securities case; it does~ not include works,
From our discussions, we gathered that the Court’s inter-
pretation is one which would be supported by the:majority
of D~il members. Compensation is based on the reduction
of the value of the land which is caused by the planning
permission decision. However, there are a series :of rules
which have to be applied in determining the magnitude
of such reduction.
Commentators such as the late Edward Walsh (!979)
point out that the effect of applying these rules is that
liability for compensation is not the difference between
the value of the land in agriculture and its maximum potential
value for office or industrial use. This means that an owner
of open space is entitled torealise some gain above its agri,
cultural value but the rest of the community need not lose
to the extent of maximum development of the land.
In the open country this gets a bit difficult to interpret.
Assume, for example, that the IDA has made a decision to
acquire open land in a rural area and an actual bid has been
offered to the farmer. Further assume that development
permission has been refused by the local authority in order
to protect the beautiful but not unique rural landscape
amenity of the area. Unless a strong case can be made on
grounds, e.g., the development would be premature in
relation to water and sewerage services, the authority prob-
ably will be liable for compensation, but how much? It
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is common for industrial site bids to be more than marginally
higher than agricultural values. Is the farmer entitled to
realise the actual bid in hand or only the amount indicated
by sales for farming purposes in the area? Since we are not
lawyers, and our purpose is not to advise clients but only
to indicate the issues, we shall not try to answer these ques-
tions.
Contrast the liability for compensation in the above case
to the situation of refusing permission to alter the use of an
existing building. This requires no compensation. Nowlan
(1978 p. 83) comments that in Central Dublin Development
Assoc. Ltd. and other v. the Attorney General Mr Justice
Kenny "accepts that permission to make a material
change of use of buildings can be refused without giving
right to a compensation and such a restraint on property
rights is not unconstitutional."
What is the principle involved in saying that a farmer or
sports ground owner under certain circumstances is entitled
to compensation if they cannot build flats, but an owner
of an existing building cannot receive any compensation if
denied the opportunity to change its use?
Perhaps it has to do with the size of the loss inflicted on
the owner by the refusal of the opportunity to change use.
It might be the usual case that the appreciation gain from
agriculture to residential use is greater than from modifying
the use of an existing residence. But, if the size of the loss to
the owner is to be the guide, then why not state it as the
rule? One could imagine that in some cases the lost opportunity
to alter the use of a building might exceed in value that of
developing open land. Perhaps no explicit reference to size
of gain can be admitted because it might raise embarrassing
questions about income distribution justifications.
Further, consider the case of replacing a residence with a
new office building. In practice, a community which wishes
to preserve the residential character of a neighbourhood
may refuse development permission; if it gives as the reason
that it would reduce the residential amenities of adjoining
properties, there is no sustainable claim to compensation.
Note that if the claim were simply a broad concern for urban
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congestion, there might be compensatable damages.5 In this
case there is a common connection between a more dispersed
effect and damage to specific neighbouring property-owners
which can be prohibited without compensation. Apparently,
under ~some circumstances, if agricultural~ to residential
development causes a perhaps individually small, but poten-
tiaUy large, aggregative impact on visual amenity, and
stimulates ribbon development and undifferentiated urban
sprawl, the local authority must pay compensation to avoid
it; but if it affects the value of a few neighbours’ properties,
it may be stopped without compensation.
This latter provision is often justified by saying that one
can use one’s property as one wishes as long as it does not
affect other people in the use of their property. But, by
begging the issue of what is the extent of other people’s
property, the Constitution provides little guidance. Could
the local authorities say that the conversion of a sports
ground to flats depreciates the property rights not only
of neighbours but the opportunity of all residents and
visitors to enjoy an open city? The law, therefore, is con-
cerned with property rights as "defined in law," and not
with matters such as the "right to a view," which is not a
property right in this context. The fact that the issue is
seldom raised in this fashion is as much witness to pattems
of selective perception as to conscious choice among con,
flicting interests. The point is that when interests conflict,
it is not possible to act without affecting others. Whether
it affects others’ "property" or not turns on a policy decision
as to how "property" is defined.
It is a matter of physics to determine if Alpha’s building
affects Beta’s opportunities, but it is a matter of policy
whether Beta’s interests are to be accorded a property right
and thus a limit (cost) to Alpha rather than a cost to Beta.
5This is to be contrasted with the situation where planning permission is refused
on the basis that the development proposed would be a traffic hazard, an
obstruction or cause serious traffic congestion; these, as we have seen, are non-
compensatable reasons for refusal.
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Whether the Beta licks his/her wounds or through government
pays compensation to Alpha, the cost is borne for Alpha’s
opportunities. And if the rights run the other way, and Alpha
accepts the lack of development or buys out Beta’s interest
in order to build, the costs are always there no matter where
the Courts decide to let them fall.
In another instance, what about advertising signs? Per-
mission to place advertisements can be refused without
liability for compensation. If one observes rural Ireland
from the roadway, the effects of this policy can be seen in
the relatively uncluttered vistas. The case of two-storey
neon signs in towns and cities, however, is a different matter.
Even though the same statute law applies and local planners
are not without resolve to avoid a "signed" jungle, some
members of the public, and even more so the traders, do not
see what is wrong with such signs. When prosecutions are
taken for unauthorised signs, the district judges seem to
agree, and the traders are allowed to keep their signs upon
court appeal often enough, or are fined such derisory amounts,
that many planners have stopped trying to refuse permission
for their display.
There are several other exemptions to the requirement of
compensation for development planning refusal. Two com-
monly used reasons are noted. One has to do with premature
development by reason of inadequate water or sewer services
or yet unplanned road development. In practice what this
means is that a local authority may implement phased
development. It may indicate an area where it wants the
next group of houses to go and where it is prepared to show
road layout and water and sewer availability. The next ring
of development may also be implied. There is no reason
that the outlying area cannot or will not be serviced, only
that the time is not now.
Local authorities often use the inadequate water and
sewer services as an excuse for denying permission, hoping
to avoid compensation, when their real reason is the wish
to preserve open space, or prevent ribbon development
along existing roads. In many cases this has worked, but on
appeal to Bord Pleamila this provision which avoids com-
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pensation is sometimes stricken, even if the Board upholds
the refusal with other compensation-creating reasons. The
Board probably finds little evidence to indicate that the
refusal was related to prematurity rather than open space
objectives, when the land in question is zoned for agriculture
or open space. As:the advice and guidelines provided by
the Department of the Environment in relation to develop-
ment control point out: (Department of the Environment
(1982) p. 28)"
Prematurity as a reason for refusal is not, however, appropriate
except in cases where there is a reasonable expectation that the
service in question will, in the future, be provided. To refuse,
as premature, permission for the building of. an isolated house
in a rural area where there are no public water supply and sewerage
services should not, for example, be ~contemplated unless there is
a plan for servicing thearea in the future, or a reasonable pros-
pect that such a plan will emerge (emphasis added).
The law could be interpreted as saying that a landowner
near an urban area is entitled to a claim on the public treasury
sufficient to make the land useable. In this interpretation,
the owner has the right eventually to receive an appreciation
gain made possible by public investments in water, sewer,
drains and roads; if the owner does not receive these entitle-
ments translated into development projects, he can get it
via compensation.
While this entitlement to claim seems to accrue regardless
of whether one lives on a scenic river bank, swamp or well-
drahaed plain around a city, it apparently does not apply to
all landowners. A requestto builda warehouse or/an isolated
narrow sub-standard road was refused by the localauthority
and it was upheld upon appeal to Bord Plean~ila. The Board
in a common sense judgement could feel that there was no
expectation that this isolated road would ever be improved.
In effect, this owner is not entitled to a public expenditure
sufficient to make his land useable for a warehouse. There is
some implication here that it is a matter of cost. But, if
"excess" cost is the basis for decision, thena, landowner
on an area that is costly to lay pipes in, or to provide drainage
of, or that would create environmental costs for the com-
52
munity, could also be denied development permission.
It seems that, in practice, if an area is very costly to service,
the latter will not be undertaken and permission for intensive
development will be refused, on the basis of a non-compensat-
able reason. However, this rationale is not explicitly recognised
and there does not seem to be a consistency in the manner
in which this aspect is treated. For example, in 1982 members
of Dublin County Council approved a number of re-zonings
from agriculture to development of land which was unserviced
and which council officials argued would be very expensive
to service. It is not clear at this stage whether landowners of
these areas will be entitled to compensation if this property is
left "permanently" without services, or whether such (ex-
pensive) services will have to be provided.
The final example to be noted here is that development
may be refused with no expected compensation if it creates
a traffic hazard. Actually, that was the language of the above
warehouse refusal. Public health and safety is a long held
reason for public regulation creating costs for entrepreneurs.
The eminent legal commentator the late Edward Walsh
(1979) argued that the above provision excluding a claim
for compensation "may be said to be justified by the fact
that since the community must pay the compensation, it
would not be equitable that it would be so in cases in which
the granting of permission in the form sought would inflict
an injury upon the community"; (emphasis added). "It is
not in the public good that houses should be constructed
and occupied without satisfactory sanitary services or that
developments should be permitted which would give rise
to traffic hazard..." p. 87. But, as we have seen, inter-
dependence always leaves us with injury (costs), the only
issue is whose interests are to be upheld by leaving costs
for others.
The point is not a defence for unsafe conditions, but to
raise the issue of who bears the costs for avoiding them.
People will have sewers if houses are allowed, but is a land-
owner where services are costly because of construction
costs or because of the opportunity cost of lost scenic
values entitled to the necessary public investments? Even
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a road hazard may be corrected by sufficient public invest-
ment. It is an empty guideline to say that we can decide on
whom to compensate by noting if they avoid creating (costs)
to the public who pays the compensation. This can only
be applied by selective perception which accepts certain
costs and conveniently ignores others.
Summary
The components of Irish law can be summarised by noting
that denial of permission which creates losses for landowners
is not compensatable if it involves a change in the use of an
existing building, advertising, changes from residential to
office use, or if it creates a traffic hazard (among other
reasons) but the loss is compensatable if it requires the
retention of agriculture or open space use, when the land
is serviced. If the land is unserviced, but zoned for agriculture,
then the local authority cannot claim "prematurity" and
will have to allow low density (septic tank) development,
or face compensation claims.
It is not yet clear what will obtain in this respect if land is
zoned for development, but is unserviced and is expensive
(relative to other areas) to service. If the centralgovernment
and/or local authority refuse to finance such services, can
landowners claim compensation? The courts have yet to
decide on this issue, which is likely to arise first in County
Dublin.
The point is not to find anomalies, for the logic of the
analysis has been to show that it is impossible to prevent the
occurrence of damage (uncompensated loss of opportunity).
The usefulness of the exercise then must be to raise a question
of whether the particular pattern of anomalies is the one
citizens want in terms of the resulting income distribution
and environmental quality.
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PART III ANALYSING THE PLANNING PROGRESS
Chapter 5
Distribution of Gains and Losses
The workings of the planning process inevitably involve
"creating" great gains for some landowners and losses for
others. For purposes of analysis it is important to have some
knowledge of the processes which bring about these dis-
tributions and an understanding of their implications. We
turn again to the issue of liability on the part of the local
authority for compensation in cases where it refuses a planning
permission. This time we focus especially on the influence
which such liability has on the strategic behaviour and
decisions of the planning authority. We then look respectively
at the influence of the following on landowner gains and
losses: a form of exempted development which is es-
pecially difficult to control, zoning and density control
provisions, planning and by-law conditions and the housing
laws.
Compensation and Planning Permission
The grant or refusal of planning permission is the bottom
line in determining whether a landowner has the option to
change land use. The permission ultimately determines the
degree to which a proposed change may affect the interests
of neighbours and third parties generally. Also, the permission
determines which owners are able to capture the maximum
increases in land value to which access to public services, and
location in general, give rise.
The Planning Acts give the local authorities a great deal of
discretion to allocate these options to change land use. But,
there are substantial limits to these discretions contained in
the legal requirements to pay compensation in specified
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instances as outlined in the previous chapter. How has this
worked in practice? Some idea can be gained from the fact
that since the 1963 Act Was passed, Dublin Corporation has
only paid out £135,174 of which £60,800 was paid in the
last five years (Irish Independent, 31 March, 1981). This
suggests that the actual payment of compensation is no pro-
blem, since the amount is insignificant when compared to
even the development value of a single parcel.The real point,
which is evident by interview and news quotation, is that local
authorities grant permission for development of open space
to avoid liability for compensation even where they oppose
development.6 Yvonne Scannell (1976, p. 23) observed that
"local authorities.., are reluctant to use their control power
by prospects of paying compensation or being served with
purchase notices. No local authority has sufficient budget to
ignore these probable claims".
Planners interviewed expected that, as a result of the
Viscount Securities case, it may not be possible to maintain
undeveloped areas now included in zones designated as high
amentity, agricultural or greenbelt. This means that creating
villages and new towns around expanding metropolitan centres
as distinct and separate entities will be difficult; Cities can
be expected to sprawl with no intervening open spaces to tell
the traveller when one community is left and another entered.
For example, the County Dublin Development Plan calls
for distinct centres for several new towns, e.g., Tallaght,
Blanchardstown, separated by green areas. The same is the
case in the 1979 Cork County Development Plan which has a
satellite town strategy (p. 37). For example, Bailincollig to
the west of the city of Cork could be expected to grow. Some
extension of utility lines from Cork could be expected to
serve this area. Once these lines are in, however, and have
"spare" capacity, landowners between the satellite and central
city will want access and permission to develop their open
land. It would be difficult to refuse permission on grounds
6For example, Dublin CouncillorEithne FitzGerald referred to the "Hockey pitch
in Sandymount which was conceded for development under threat of compen-
sation claim."
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that development was premature because of non-availability
of public services. The local authorities face the high pro-
bability of liability for compensation if they try to maintain
their satellite town policy. Public purchase of the intervening
lands is not possible fiscally.
Special Amenity Area Orders
The Planning Act (Section 42) does provide that, if the
local elected council issues a Special Amenity Area Order and
it is subsequently approved by the Minister for the Environ-
ment, then refusal of development permission for open space
is non-compensatable. Likewise a Conservation Order can be
issued, (Section 46), and where the order states that, as
respects any flora and fauna, they are of "special amenity
value or special interest", no compensation shall be payable
in relation to them.
Two examples of the manner in which these provisions
were drawn on by local authorities illustrate the issues. There
is an area in County Kildare called Pollardstown Fen. It is a
220 hectare alkaline marsh unique in Ireland (Reynolds,
1980) and includes some rare flora. The County Council issued
a Conservation Order in 1974, but this was appealed to An
Bord Pleanfila, which annulled the order for legal and technical
reasons. In 1978, Kildare County Council considered passing
a Special Amenity Area Order on the fen. When it became
clear to landowners that no development would be allowed
and no compensation would be payable; the political pressure
became intense. The owners in some cases illustrated their
anger by setting fire to the marsh, destroying some of that
which the Council had wished to preserve. The central govern-
ment (Department of Fisheries and Forestry) has now ptir-
chased some of the land (Doyle, 1983).
The only case when a Special Amenity Area Order was
actually made was by Dublin Corporation for Dublin Bay on
April 4, 1977. After a public hearing, the Minister in Nov-
ember 1981 refused to approve it.
He specified the main reasons for his decision:
1. The Order did not set out, in appropriate detail,
"particular objectives for the preservation or enhance-
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ment of the character or special features of the area,
including objectives for the preyention or limitation
of th, d development in the area".
2. The Order includes provisions which are ambiguous
or conflicting, e.g., the reasonsstipulated for including
particular areas in the scope of the Order.
3. The Order was based on a development plan which
has been superseded by a new plan.
4. It provides for the location of potentially incom-
patible uses in parts of the area, without making pro-
vision for their separation or management.
5. It is not considered that certain housing areas included
in the Order can be regarded as of outstanding natural
beauty in the sense of the relevant statutory provisions.
6. The Order is insufficiently detailed to provide the pro-
tection for amenity which would be expected from it.
He went on to indicate that he felt that a Special Amenity
Area Order (or Orders) could be a suitable planning mechanism
for Dublin Bay,~ and provided detailed commentary and advice
concerning the scope and content which such an order should
contain in order to receive Ministerial approval. The issue
obviously touches on fundamental allocative property rights.
It may be acceptable to restrict the options of a terrace owner
to Convert to offices for example. The members of this class
of owners do not easily see themselves as a political group,
but if all owners ina geographical area lose their rights, while
those just over the line can still enjoy appreciation gain, it
generates a different sort of political response. However, iris
clear from the Minister’s response that, in the case of Dublin
Bay, the objection was not solely one of expediency, but of
the proposed manner of implementation.
One of the motivating forces behind the 1963 Act was a
concern for preserving the natural resources base of the
tourist industry. Therefore there is a provision (Section
56(1)g) that allows permission to be refused without com,
pensation if it is necessary to preserve any view or prospect
of special amenity value or special interest. Note that the
language refers to a view or prospect, not the general land-
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scape, which might be of great beauty. The language suggests
that if there is a unique point on a road where a waterfall is
visible, then permission to build a house at that point, block-
ing the view, might be denied without compensation. But, if
what is viewed (say a scenic river valley) were to be changed
by development, then refusal may engender cause for com-
pensation. Unfortunately, there is a paucity of published
instances where the preservation of a "view or prospect of
special amenity value or special interest" has been used
successfully as a non-compensatable reason for refusing per-
mission for development. Thus, it is difficult to derive from
experience what comprises such a view. However, it appears
to be the case that you cannot block a view if there is some-
thing noteworthy to see, but you can alter the landscape itself
unless the public wants to pay the developer for the privilege
of maintaining it. No exhaustive survey of reasons for planning
refusals is available, but compensation-creating reasons for
preserving high amenity are common, but the opportunity to
claim that a unique view or prospect would be blocked are few.
Exempted Development
The ability of local authorities to preserve underdeveloped
land in rural areas is also affected by the fact that most local
authorities give especially favourable consideration to appli-
cations for sites to be occupied by a farmer or member of
the farm family. This is intended to meet the needs of those
working the land. However, in practice, a farmer can apply
for development permission and subsequently sell the site or
completed house to a non-farmer. This practice, for example,
has resulted in non-farm houses being built in the uplands of
Kildare and South County Dublin. It is a difficult adminis-
trative matter to prove a farmer’s intention at the time of
application.
Zoning and Density Control
When the elected councils establish the development plan,
they in effect allocate the high valued uses among competing
61
sites. The coundil, for example, has the power to draw a line
and say that houses on one side are allowed to be converted
to, or replaced by, office uses, with subsequent capture of
higher land values by some and not others, as well as exposure
of neighbouring houses to costs of higher density adjoining
sites. Over time, as development plans are updated, the usual
process if any change is made is to move a site to a higher
valued category. But occasionally, objectives change in such a
manner that Sites are down graded. For example, the 1980
Development Plan for Dublin Corporation down graded a
formerly specified high density office zone to a mix of 60per
cent residentiat and 40 per Cent offices. While there is a grow-
ing demand for apartments in the central city, this would
mean a substantial capital loss for any buyer who paid a value
comensurate with the former full office zone. (However, in
one well-publicised case in Dublin (Earlsfort Terrace) the .
"old" planning permission was extended, allowing 80 per
cent offices (McDonald, 1981).)
A different situation arises in cases where land was pur-
chased on the presumption that the prior (relatively high
intensity) development would be allowed, but permission had
not yet been granted. In such cases, the prospective developer
stands to make a capital loss under the new (less intensive)
zoning designation.
Planning Conditions
The Planning Act allows local authorities to add conditions
to planning permissions (Section 27(2)). In general, these
conditions, while creating costs for developers, are not com-
pensatable (Section 56, (1)(c) and (d)). These include, for
example, regulating the size, height, floor area and character
of structure, building lines, parking, aspects of structures
such as design, colour and materials, the number of structures,
reservation of open space, road layout, landscaping and pre-
servation of objects of historical interest, views and prospects
of natural beauty, trees, existingpublic rights of way, to name
some of the items. The power to add conditions provides,for
example, the opportunity to continue the Georgian architec-
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tural character of an area or to emphasise a horizontal line
to make buildings on shorelines less obtrusive.
The power to add conditions also introduces the possibility
of strategic bargaining on the part of the local authority
which can modify the nominal rights which the developer
might possess under the kinds of refused land-use change
requiring compensation. A local authority may prefer to keep
an area in open space, but may give permission to avoid com-
pensation claims. Yet, it has sufficient flexibility in placing
conditions that the developer may accept retention of more
open space than is otherwise the practice for similar develop-
ments where the compensation issue does not arise. Housing
estate developers report that some planning authorities ask
for land for roads which serve regional needs rather than the
needs of the developers’ house occupants. Under Section 55,
the developer may claim compensation if the conditions are
not reasonable. But, the authorities’ bargaining power comes
from a marginal grey area when it is difficult to prove that the
condition is unreasonable. In addition, even if the developer
is confident of proving in court that a condition is unreason-
able, the cost of doing so may prevent pursuit of the nominal
rights.
To illustrate how bargaining may proceed, consider the
case of a housing development in County Dublin (Council
Minutes of 10/10/1977). The applicant requested permission
to develop houses and flats on 21 acres. The Council had
previously made the decision to acquire 4.5 acres in the area
for open space purposes. So when the development was pro-
posed, the Council took the opportunity to impose a con-
dition providing for 11 acres of open space. This was more
than the usual standard requirement for a housing estate. The
conditional permission was appealed, but upheld. However,
support upon appeal does not remove cause for compensation.
The developer subsequently filed a compensation claim of
£550,000 under Section 55 as the amount that the value of
the property had been reduced by the condition. This amounts
to £50,000 per acre for the 11 acres of open space. After the
Council was advised by Senior Counsel that they were liable
for some compensation, and an Official Arbitrator to deter-
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mine the amount had been appointed, :the Council entered
into negotiations with the developer.The developer agreed
to retain 6.5 acres as public open Space plus 2.5 acres around
an existing and retained manor house on thesite. The Council
agreed to pay £30,000 compensation. This figures to be
£5,615 per acre for the 6.5 acres. The Chief Valuer advised
that this was very good value. Indeed, the Council had paid
£17,090 per acre for some nearby land previously.
The question is, why was the developer willing to provide
the open space above usual requirements for a bargain price?
The authors have no inside information on Strategic bargain-
ing by the publicauthodties. The result suggests that they
can effectively utilise the flexibility to impose conditions to
their advantage.
Another illustration is provided by an application to build
72 houses On t32 acres (County Dublin Council Minutes
14/7/1980). The permission was refused because it was in an
area for preservation as high amenity, and conflicted with
preserving views at a riverside site, plus creating traffic con-
gestion and non-availability of water supply. The refusal was
appealed but upheld; citing only the compensatable reason
of high amenity preservation. The developer subsequently
filed a claim for compensation of £150,000.Negotiation then
followed. The developer also owned an adjoining parcel of 20
acres. The Planning Act provides (Section 26(2)) for inclusion
of adjoining lands owned by the applicant in the area subject
to conditions. The developer agreed to a condition prohibiting
the development of the adjoining 20 acres plus ceding, free of
charge, land for road widening.
Again, why would a developer agree to keep 20 additional
acres as open space to achieve permission to build on an area
designated as preserved for high amenity reasons, when Senior
COunsel for the County Council advised that the County
would be liable for compensation if the development was
refused?
Finally, there was an application for planning permission
for 30 houses on a (former) Pitch and Putt course in South
County Dublin which was zoned for amenity in the Develop-
ment Plan. On the basis of a previous decision by An Bord
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Plean~ila, it was judged that the Council would be liable for
compensation if permission was refused. The matter was
resolved when the applicant reduced his density to 24 houses,
and on that basis, permission was granted (Council Minutes
of 8/811982).
Along the line to final approval and actual servicing of
sites there are a number of opportunities for the public
authorities to exercise discretion which can cause developers
increased construction or delay costs. Some of these matters
are contained in By-Law Approval, which is in addition to
Planning Permission. Some of these detailed building require-
ments are incorporated into standards whose extent is easily
predicted and allow little room for interpretation. Others are
site specific in application, and allow a considerable range of
interpretation by a local authority which can be helpful and
accommodating or obstructive and delaying.
All of these things are interactive and cumulative. If a
developer is intransigent and insists on formal rights in a
particular instance (say files for compensation for a condition
requiring ceding of extra land for open space or a carriage
way), the public authorities may utilise their power to exact
costly marginal conditions on future or concurrent projects
by a larger builder.
These observations should not be misinterpreted. It is not
implied that public authorities use these tactics of cost increas-
ing threats frequently and directly. They are more subtle and
largely remain as background possibilities which heighten
acceptance of the authorities’ requests.
Housing Laws
One class of people that is potentially affected by change
in use are those who rented housing space in a building which
the owner wishes to convert, or tear down and replace, with
non-housing uses. The Housing Act, 1969, Section 3 requires
a developer to obtain permission to demolish a habitable
house or change its use. The Act (Section 4) allows housing
authorities to add a condition requiring the replacement of
the former accommodation. So, if a low rise building of three
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flats is replaced by a high rise office building, it will some-
times have three flats on the top floor.Their usein a block of
offices may be non-marketable or objectionable to the owner.
In practice these units, equipped with kitchens, etc., have
been used for employee lounges, etc,, rather than housing. It
is one thing to check plumbing in a building plan but another
to enforce actual use.
The objective of keeping an area populated so that it is not
deserted after office hours might be better served by mixing
buildings rather than uses within a single building, but this
again is hard to achieve by requesting one parcel owner to
develop for lower profit housing while the neighbour has
high land ~/alue producing offices, but it does tend to happen
with large developments.
The rights of (previous) tenants can be a barrier to assembly
of parcels for large developments and therefore they can be a
factor in land-use change,
The Housing Act 1969, Section 4(3)(c & d) enables the
housing authority to place a condition on a demolition or
changed use of former housing which requires the developer
to make a payment towards any costs incurred by the housing
authority in proViding for the rehousing of the displaced
tenant; if it is a dwelling not subject to rent control, the
developer may be required to pay the tenant for any hard-
ship in securing alternative accommodation.
This is a matter of negotiation and introduces delay and
uncertainty. In England, this payment is a matter of formula
related to the rateable value of the building. A developer
spoke of allowing a temporary use of an office in a building
scheduled for demolition. This was intended as a charitable
act because the occupant was a voluntary social service organis-
ation. When he was ready to build, he was required to provide
altemative office space for the organisation.
Decisions concerning demolition or change of use for a
house can be appealed by the developer to the Minister for
the Environment, Section 4(6). There is noprovision for
third party appeal, which has implications for architectural
preservation to be discussed in a later section. (See Taisce
Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1981, p. 34). There is likewise no pro-
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vision for compensation in the event of a refusal of permission
under the 1969 Act. However, if the house in question has
been listed for preservation in the Development Plan, then a
separate permission must be sought under the Planning Acts.
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Chapter 6
Procedural Controls
In the previous chapter the nominal ownership of develop-
ment options was discussed. The key legal provision was seen
to be what restrictions to development could be placed by
the local authorities without creating liability for compen-
sation. The compensation rules seem to give most of the
options to the landowner in the case Of open land particularly
so¯ when it has access to services. In practice, it was noted
that the local authority exerted more influence thanmight be
expected from the nominal rights. It was suggested that part
of its countervailing power came from its discretion in giving
permission with conditions. This does not stop open space’
development, but it can modify it in the direction of the pre-
ference of the localauthority.
In this chapter, some further ability of a local authority
to influence development beyond its nominal rights is ex-
plored. It will be found that all nominal rights are modified
by the costs of securing them in application. A party may
have a right to develop in their preferred way, but if it costs
too much to insist on that right, the preferred development
may be considerably altered in practice. One major cost may
be the delay involved before a final ruling affirming the
developer’s rights can be secured. It is not suggested that
public authorities or the third party public deliberately use
delaying tactics in all cases to enlarge its ability to alter
developer’s plans. Some delay andtransaction costs seem to
be inadvertent aspects of the public administration of com-
plex claims.
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Time Limits and Delays
Section 26(4) of the Planning Act requires the planning
authority to act within two months of receipt of an applica-
tion for development permission. However, during that period
the authority may request further information, which gives
an additional two months beginning upon receipt of infor-
mation. One observer notes that "requests for additional
information, which invariably arrive on the last day of the
second month, are seen by developers as a device often to
extend the time for a decision" (McKone, 1980, p. 31).
For complex developments, the two month period may not
be sufficient. In any case, most are acted upon during the last
week. (If no action is taken by the last day of the period in
question, then permission is regarded as having been given.
This is the reverse of UK law.) There is a provision in the
legislation for extending the two months period, by agree-
ment with the applicant, but thi:~ provision is infrequently
used.
The decision of the authority may be appealed to An Bord
Pleamila by the applicant within one month upon receipt of
the decision, or by third parties within 21 days of giving the
decision. There is no time limit given for the appeal board to
act. This will be discussed further below in the subsection on
appeals.
Conditions Subject to Future Administrative Actions
The power of the planning authority to give permission
with conditions has already been discussed. Their bargaining
power derives from their ability to use this power in ways
which add to development costs. This is, of course, limited
ultimately by a rule of reason. As will be discussed below, the
applicants may appeal what is considered unreasonable. The
point to be noted here is the opportunity for delay when the
condition takes the form of meeting requirements to be
detailed by another department such as the fire or sanitation
officer. An increasingly common condition found in develop-
ment permission is that approval of the fire officials is to be
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obtained. Such a condition is allowed (Department of the
Environment, 1982, p. 43): "Pending the making of the
Regulations, it is open to planning authorities to request that
consultation take place between the developer and the fire
authority to ensure that the appropriate fire prevention
devices, etc. are provided". This can create further uncertainty
and delay. The developer has permission, but has some un-
known further obligation tomeet. This may be particularly
troublesome for large developments with extemal financing.
Such conditions are not imposed by An Bord Plean~la.
By-Law Approval and Building Regulations
After planning permission is obtained, the developer must
get by-law approval for building details in the Dublin area
and Cork. A number of developers indicated that this was
their biggestproblem area with the regulatory system. One
developer reported that there was no time limit in acting on a
by-law submission. Another indicated that it was possible to
file an intent to build, which, if not acted upon, constituted
approval.
One developer of housing estates reported that the plan-
ning authority would use delays on aspects of one project to
get concessions on a new application. Another said this was
no problem because the public authorities were not that
efficient or well organised. A survey of builders by An Foras
Forbartha7 found a respondent who claimed that a local
authority used by-law approvals to get things from the
developer which werc not strictlyrelated to by-law matters
of materials and engineering.
An apartment developer claimed inflexibility in applying
by-law requirements. The access road and footpath were
required to be of a certain width, but at one point in the
road, they had one foot less than the requirement. Without
entering into a debate on the desirability of meeting this
standard to the letter, it appeared to this developer that no
70’Rourke,Jennlngs and Pigott (1982).
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official wanted to take responsibility for making a judgement
as to what was close enough; requests for waivers like these
get refused out of hand. The local authority has two months
to act on a request for waiver. There is no appeal against by-
law decisions.
The Planning Act (Section 86) provides that the Minister
may formulate building regulations relating to the Public
Health Acts. A draft of Building Regulations has been in cir-
culation for many years. After the Dublin Stardust disco fire
disaster in 1981, the Minister for the Environment requested
local authorities to use the draft as if it had the force of law,
but as of December 1982 the regulations have not been laid
before the D~iil and the manner of their implementation is
not clear. These regulations will take precedence over any
local by-law regulations. Some provisions, however, might
contain an option for waiver by the local authorities.
Flexibility in applying by-law regulations is a particular
problem for those who wish to re-model and preserve existing
buildings of architectural merit. It is very difficult to meet
exactly the letter of the regulations and maintain the desired
aesthetic qualities, particularly with respect to fire provisions.
Again the issue is one of what is close enough. In many cases,
the fire conditions of the proposed re-furbished structure
may be a substantial improvement in comparison with the
existing building, but still be short of new building standards.
It is acknowledged that judgements are even more difficult
in this area after the public reaction to the Stardust fire
disaster. The easiest thing for a fire official to explain is
that no development was allowed except in conformance
to standards. It is more difficult to explain that a trade-off
was made for a slight fire risk to obtain the viable retention
of outstanding old buildings.
The Cork Local Development Plan (for St. Lukes area,
1980) observes that "the widespread disregard of the Planning
Acts and Housing By-Laws contributes to the decline in the
standards of accommodation in the area". It was observed
that many houses had been converted to flats, but few
applications for permission had been made. It might be ex-
pected that some people might fear that city planners might
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prohibit flats. Others might fear that they could not meet
by-law requirements. In Dublin, an architect reports that he
tried to get planning permission for conversion of a house to
offices. This apparently was no problem, but a condition
would require approval of the fire official. One of the two
required exits was across the roofs of adjoining buildings and
did not meet the regulations. The fire official was reported to
have said that he could ignore the current usage by default (it
has been in offices for some time), but if asked for formal
approval, it would be refused. Again without debating whether
the fire provisions were "good enough", it seems relevant to
raise a question on the practical result of inflexible adminis-
tration of standards. If people know they have no chance of
meeting the standards, they will ignore them and hope that
high detection costs will protect them. This difficulty seems
to arise even though "substantial compliance" is a concept
recognised by the Courts.
It is not possible to obtain by-law approval retroactively.
This can create a problem when an extension is made to a
house without obtaining permission. When the house is to be
sold, a building society is reluctant to give a mortage without
by-law approval. So a practice has been developed whereby
the societies will accept an architect’s or engineer’s certifica-
tion that the structure substantially meets by-law regulations.
Water and Sewer Connections
Upon appeal, An Bord Plean~la may grant planning per-
mission or remove an objectionable condition; But in the
end, the connections for water and sewer must be made, and
this can provide one more opportunity to delay a project and,
by implication, to provide bargaining strength with regard to
other projects by the same developer. However, the Public
Health Act, 1878, gives a householder a right to connect to an
existing sewer, so that the possibility of imposing delay in this
respect is limited once planning permission has been granted,s
8In adecision in the High Court, Mr. Justice O’Hanlon ruled that the 1878 Act
gave a prima facie statutory right to a developer (McKone Estates Ltd.) to seek
connection with the sewerage system of Kildare County Council (Irish Times,
7 July, 198S).
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Taking-in-Charge
When a housing estate is completed and all required public
improvements are in place, the developer will request the local
authority to take it in charge. This means that the public
then becomes responsible for maintenance of streets, lighting,
etc. (Garbage pick-up is undertaken as soon as residences are
occupied.)
There can certainly be differences of opinion as to whether
the developer has in fact completed the required improvements
in roads, lighting and seeding of play grounds, etc. In fact,
some local authorities have had to take action to force
developers to complete facilities, even when the last house is
finished. (See County Dublin Council Minutes, 12 May 1980.)
A High Court mandatory injunction was granted in 1981 to
the Council requiring a housing estate developer to complete
the landscaping of an estate finished in 1975. ("Court Order
Against Builder", Irish Times, 10 February 1981.) A housing
estate in Sligo was left by the developer in a deteriorating
state with a raw sewage pipe outlet, large holes in the road,
open manholes and inoperative lighting (Ireland’s Eye, RTE
2, 13 May 1981).
On the other side, a developer (Dublin) cites a case when
the road inspector is on the site during construction and
approves of what is being done in this regard. However, when
the request to take-in-charge is made, the local authority says
the road is not up to standard. These standards can be vague
and shifting. The developer sometimes windsup making cash
payments to get the estate taken in charge. In other cases the
developer rebuilt an open space three times and could not get
a precise statement of what was required.
In 1973, the Construction Industry Federation (CIF)
requested legislation on what was called "the vexed question
of the taking-in-charge of housing estates" (McKone, 1976,
p. 14). The following CIF request was not heeded:
Regarding the issue of a development certificate.., this should
include provision that where development works.., are com-
pleted satisfactorily and so proved by the developer.., the
District Court should order the Local Authority to take these
services in charge.
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Appeals to An BordPleanfila
The first recourse for the developer or a third party who
objects to a planning decision is to appeal toAn Bord Plean~la.
On large, complex cases, this process can take o,~er a year
before a decision is available. Appeals 0nhand for over six
months at end of 1981 were 17.8 per cent of the total (see
table below). Delay affects the nominal rights of developers.
A devel0per may feel that a refusal Or Condition is not legal
or reasonable and from past experience with similar cases
may judge that the local decision would be reversed. But, in
exercising the right to appeal, the developer must consider~
the transaction cost involved in delay. At high interest rates,
delay is very costly (Brangan, 1977). This can be offset if sales
and rental values are also inflating, but it does introduce an
element of additional uncertainty in fluctuating markets.
Builders and architects may also simply have a human pre-
ference for bringing things to a completion; evenif there was
no financial iilcentive to turn over one’s investment money as
quickly as possible. Those builders ’operating on small margins
may face a cash flow crisis as construction is delayed on land
purchased with borrowed money. Others, such as insurance
companies with intemal finance, maybe less affected.
These transaction costs of delay are mentioned frequently
by developers as the reason they donot appeal an unfavourable
decision, even when they believe they.might eventually win.
This provides an opportunity for the local authorities to
Table 1 : Appeals on hand before An Bord Pleandla
Date
Less than 3 3 to 6 months 6to 9 months Over 9 months
months
No~ percent No. percent No. p~ cent No. percent
$1.12.1981 1,061 48.7 780 33.5 258 11.9 128 5.9
31.12.1980 793’ 46.4 571 33.4 224: 13.1 122 7.1
31.12.1979 878 43.7 580 28.8 320 15.9 233 11.6
31.12.1978 716 47.3 476 31.5 196 12.9 125 8.3
31.12.1977 686 40.7 574 34.1 227 13.5 197 11.7
Source: An Bord Plean~la, Annual Report and Accounts, 1981.
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bargain beyond their nominal power and obtain concessions.
One observer of An Bord Plean~ila concluded his analysis by
saying that "The problem of arbitrary decisions by planning
authorities in minor cases- such as the colour of bricks to
be used to close windows in a building - remain because of
the cost to developers and third parties of such appeals"
(Zimmerman, 1980). Some might dispute that it is limited to
minor cases.
The applicant has one month to file an appeal after a local
authority decision. Third parties have three weeks. An appli-
cant may decide to accept objectionable conditions rather
than bear transaction costs of appeal. If a third party makes
the delay inevitable, the applicant may use the extra week to
also enter an appeal hoping to get some of the conditions
relaxed.
Third parties can use the right of appeal in a strategic
manner to obtain concessions from developers. The threat
of a delaying appeal has been known to give rise to developers
paying bribes to third party appellants to drop their appeals.
Anyone may file an appeal for a £80 fee. One developer
estimates that "there have been at least 30 cases of blackmail,
and sums of money up to about £40,000 each have been
paid to objectors ..." (McKone, 1980, p. 29). Some of this
may be compensation for a neighbour’s loss of amenity and
some may be simply vexatious and malicious.
Section 18 of the 1976 Planning Amendments enables the
Bord to determine if the appeal is vexatious or creating un-
necessary delay, and could order the appellant to pay com-
pensation and expenses in relation to the appeal. This is
difficult to determine and is infrequently used. Zimmerman
(1980, p. 335) reports that: "In 1978 the Bord gave four
directions relative to the payments of appeal expenses totalling
£150, and in 1979 for the first time declared several deposits
forfeited".
Any individual who is familiar with the provisions of the
Planning Acts and reasonably articulate can readily compose
a plausible basis for an appeal. Proven cases of vexatious
appeals are therefore more an index of ignorance and inepti-
tude than vexatiousness.
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Another case illustrating the power of appeal mechanisms
arose with theapplication to build a pharmaceutical manufac-
turing plant by Shering Plough in South County Tipperary.
Many local people objected because they feared a health
hazard. After a lengthy appeal, permission was upheld. Some
objectors did not attend public meetings during the formula-
tion stage and then at time of appeal said they needed con-
siderable time to consider the plan and obtain opinion of
their own experts. The objectors then threatened to turn to
the courts at which point the company abandoned its plan.
This illustrates that thecost of pursuing one’s nominal right
to build may in effect destroy the use of the right.9
Information on the law and its processes is part of the
transaction costs of securing one’s nominal rights. For
example, during an appeal proceeding, each party is given the
opportunity to respond to any material submitted in writing
by the other side. This itself can be used to delay, asthere
can be responses to responses, etc. However, if this is under-
stood, by the defendant developer, no comments are made
in writing on the objection and discussion is reserved for the
oral hearing, Thus, an advantage is given to the party who can
invest in the most information on the decision system.
Even after permission is obtained and building proceeds,
there are opportunities for third parties to create delay.
Section 27 of the 1976Act gives any person the right to
apply to the High Court to prevent development not in sub-
stantial compliance with the conditions of the permission.
The courts will evaluate the merits of the case in deciding
whether to hand down a prohibition order.
Developers claim that there are some conditions which
are impossible to carry out precisely, andthis gives an open-
ing for those who object-to the overall project to create a
delay.
Developers argue that they need some flexibility to meet
changing conditions between the time permission is granted
9It is interesting to note that subsequent to this, the law was changed. Section
42(a) of the 1976 Act limits the period within which a decision can be chal-
lenged in the High Court to two months after the date of decision.
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and construction. For example, housing design may have to
change in response to consumer demand. The Planning Act
does provide for local authorities to grant waivers for small
changes. Some developers in the Dublin area feel that local
authorities are reluctant to grant these waivers, thus forcing
the developer to make a new application which is again
subject to the whole appeal process and delay. A 1981 High
Court case illustrates the delay potential. An office develop-
ment off Leeson Street was under construction (five storeys
completed) when an objection was filed that the building was
not in accordance with the permission. One change was the
omission of the basement. The developers argued that this
change could hardly harm any neighbour. Justice D’Arcy
agreed and denied the injunction ("Planning File for Office
is Missing", Irish Times, 7 April, 1981).
The same problem of flexibility applies to the often
lengthy appeal process. The Board may invite the applicant
to submit modified plans (Section 42 of 1977 Regulations),
or he may volunteer revised plans. In the latter case, if the
Board decides that the revisions alter significantly the character
of the original application, it may advise that a fresh applica-
tion be submitted to the local authority.
Decisions of An Bord Plean~la may be questioned in the
Court if proceedings are instituted within two months. The
Courts do have ultimate review power, but are reluctant to
replace their substantive judgment for that of an adminis-
trative law board. The Supreme Court in July 1979 decided
in favour of the Board in relation to the use of a site in
County Cork for disposal of asbestos waste (An Bord Pleanfila,
Annual Report, 1979).
The Courts do pass judgment on the adequacy of the pro-
cedures followed in the appeals process. In a recent (March,
1983) judgment by the High Court, An Bord Plean~la was
directed to show cause why its ruling in a particular case
should not be set aside. The Board had confirmed the decision
of Cork County Council to permit the establishment of a
chemical plant. A woman, whose appeal was not sustained by
the Board, claimed that it had reached its decision without
giving her a full and fair opportunity of making her submis-
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sions in relation to documents made available to the Board
but not to her. The judge said that the failure by An Bord
Pleamila either to furnish her with the required information
or to afford her an opportunity of making a final submission
meant that the appeal was not conducted in accordance with
the minimum standards of fair procedures guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Court Actions
Reference to court actions has already been made above.
All that remains to be added is to discuss how the rules
affect use of these rights-enforcingproceedings. An important
issue is who bears the costs of delay. While a private individual
may be awarded an injunction which prohibits development,
if the bases for this injunction are subsequently not sustained,
then the person seeking the injunction can be liable for costs.
This potential liability in the context of an unsuccessful
court suit creating delay can be contrasted to such liability
in the context of an appeal before An Bord Plean~la. The
problem of finding the delicate balance between creating
enough costs to discourage frivolous and malicious delay
appeals, and not enough to prevent action by those who are
genuinely concerned about development efffects, will be
discussed later.
Land Assembly
Not all of the time absorbed in getting to the building stage’
is occasioned by the planning laws. Major delays are encoun-
tered in assembling the necessary parcels in already built-up
areas for re-development (Trench, 1980). As already noted,
removing tenants from buildings can be a problem. Finding
owners and solving conveyancing problems take time. Owners
of strategic parcels may bargain for a larger share of the total
project economic rent (land appreciation). Local authorities
have the power to assist in land assembly via compulsory
purchase orders, but it is seldom used.
Land is not a homogenous commodity with perfectly
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substitutable parts. The owners have different personal situ-
ations which affect their willingness to sell. This may explain
why, when a developer finally controls a site, there is such
tenacious determination to build despite all opposition. Even
after a refusal, the developer may keep coming back with
new applications. It may also explain why new land suburban
sites may be preferred to old central city sites.
Transportation Planning and Other Public Investments
The location of public investments in roads is another
device to shape settlement patterns and, of course, confers
great appreciation to those who are served by it, or are near
key entry and exit points. The Department of the Environ-
ment has published a Road Development Plan for the 1980s
(May, 1979). It contains a map of planned major improve-
ments and a time scale. These can be incorporated into local
Development Plans. Local plans, however, have been frustrated
by lack of central government grants. The Land Use and
Transportation Study (LUTS) for Cork would need £4 million
for 1981 to keep on schedule, but "Government allocation
is expected to finally come to £1.6 million" (Business and
Finance, Special Supplement, February, 1981, p. 17).
There is no published multi-year central government plan
for other public investments, but obviously investments in
central sewage treatment plans affect location of develop-
ment. There was a High Court case which establishes the
principle that appeals of permission can not only consider
the existing sewage and pollution situation but also the
cumulative future effects of future development (KiUiney
and BaUybrack Development Association Ltd. v. Minister for
Local Government and Templefin Estates Ltd., High Court,
1 March, 1974).
Casual observation and reading of development plans
would suggest that new housing has been permitted at a
faster rate than money is available for sewage treatment, with
consequent damage to coastal water at population centres
(Downey, 1981, p. 14). The 1972 Report on Water Pollution
said that: "Virtually all sewage systems serving populations
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of more than 10,000 are causing or contributing to pollution
and require remedial action" (reported in Scannell, I976,
also see Lennox and Toner, 1980). Several years ago An
Taisce appealed against a proposal of "Pfizer Chemical Co.,
to put untreated effluent into Cork Harbour equivalent to a
pollution effect of a population of 2.4 million people. Per-
mission was not granted..." (Taisce Journal, Vol. 1, No. 4;
1977, p. 11). Still County Cork decided to allow untreated
domestic effluent from Midleton to be discharged into Cork
Harbour (Taisce Journal, Vol. 4, 1980, p. 8).
It is easy to let the houses be built when builders think
thai they can be sold, even if the social and physical services
are over-taxed or unavailable. At some point these social and
infrastructural services will have to be built, or quality of
life will be severely threatened. The cost of such "retr0-
fitting" is likely to be greater than it would have been if
cost-effective infrastructural investment had shaped the
pattern of developments.
Land Banks
One way for the public to control new development is to
own a considerable portion of the developable land. The
City of Cork owns a major share of the open land in the city.
South Tipperary used a budget surplus some years ago to
buy land for industry. This was sold off to private developers
and the money tumed over to buy yet additional land. The
problem with this apprOach today is that it would be hard to
start to acquire any Sizeable acreages; local govemment is
simply too hard pressed financially.
Many local authorities have a land bank for use on council
housing. This does little to control private development and
isused for the most part slightly in advance of needs. This is
not made any easier by the policy of the Department of the
Environment (at urgence of Department of Finance) not to
give loans for land banks. The loans for council housing do
cover land costs, but only at time of Construction.
There is great scepticism in the building industry that local
government in general (as opposed to a few "exceptional
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cases") is capable of using landbanks effectively. As Greene
(1982) put it:
Transferring land into public, i.. bureaucratic, hands ignores
Constitutional rights and assumes that the public sector will
approach the disposal of serviced land in a manner suited to the
demands of the community. Anyone who believes that ignores
the totally inept performance of public authorities in the area of
land management in the last twenty years.
The Developer
Thus far, we have discussed some of the mechanisms-
formal and informal - which the planning system provides to
local authorities and third parties to influence the nature and
timing of development. We conclude by noting that developers
themselves are not without resources in this respect. By
making multiple applications for one site- in one case we
were informed that 22 separate applications had been filed -
the issues can be so obfuscated and confused that when per-
mission is finally given it is possible to be creative in interpret-
ing the conditions. In addition, the enforcement procedures
have been so weak in some instances that within a wide range,
conditions imposed could in any event be ignored.
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Chapter 7
Public Participation
In the preceding chapter, there was some implicit con-
sideration of public participation ,in the process Of land-use
change. Here this will be made more explicit by focusing on
those procedural points that affect public participation.
Notice to Affected Parties
The first requirement for anyone to participate in any
direct fashion is to know thata decision is about to be made.
The Planning Act requires that applicants publish their inten-
tions in a newspaper in general circulation in the, area of the
development. In practice it is quite possible that those con-
cemed may not hear of the proposal. For example, a developer
in rural County Cork may gave notice in a Dublin-based paper.
While the paper may circulate there, it may not be widely
read. Also the notice may be in English or Irish. The practice
in the City of Cork is to publish once a week all accumulated
applications altogether in the local paper (regardless of where
they originally appeared). There is no requirement to notify
neighbouring property owners, though notice will typically
be sent regularly to any registered residents’ association.
While some public notice is required, the Planning Act is
not clear on what the public can do after they know an
application is pending. The notice must imp!y some purpose
to be served, but this isnot spelled out. This was pointed up
by an 1981 dispute commonly referred to as the Torca case
in Dun Laoghaire Borough. An application was made to build
a bungalow, although this was not clear initially. The first
two public notices were rejected by the planning officer
because the location and extent of development were not
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clear. One day after receipt of the third notice, the permission
was granted. Three near-by residents brought a case to the
High Court claiming their right to object was thwarted by the
quick decision. It was finally decided by the Supreme Court.
The Senior Counsel for the developer was reported (para-
phrase) to state "that there was a defect in the planning law
because it did not say an objector had a right to make an
objection or for his objection to be considered by the planning
authority" ("Planning: How the Judge found the Loopholes",
Sunday Press, ~ April, 1981). Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court upheld the injunction to stop construction.
The Court accepted the argument of the public right to be
heard in objection, rather than give a narrow interpretation
of the law which gives no guide on how long an application
must lie open giving opportunity for comment. (The authority
must act within two months, but no direction is given on the
speed of action within that time.)
There appear to be some unresolved conflicts in philosophy
contained in Irish planning law. The element of public notice
implies the opportunity for the public to be considered in de-
cisions. Yet, the decision is made in the first instance by the
professional technical staff and ultimately by the professional
administrative (manager) staff. We frequently encountered
the point of view that decisions should be made "in accordance
with good planning principles" which suggests that it is a
matter of technical judgement rather than of public purposes
which are reflected in political choice. If this line of thought
is extended, public comment is largely irrelcvant and., perhaps
only ceremonial. The text of the Planning Acts is more cir-
cumspect in this regard, saying that decisions should be based
on "the proper planning and development of the area". This
issue of technical administration vs. political choicc is further
discussed below.
In making a decision on a planning permission, a local
authority manager must have regard to the devclopment plan,
but need not follow its provisions slavishly. However, when a
significant departure from some fundamental principle of the
plan is proposed, then a "material contravention" must be
sought. The elected council may grant permission which
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would contravene materially the development plan or a Special
Amenity Area Order, subject to prior public notice (Section
39(d) of the 1976 Act). Copies of the notices must be given
to any persons who have submitted a written objection con-
cerning the development. Section 39(d): of the 1976 Amend-
ment to the Planning Act requires the planning authority to
duly consider the objections received not later than 21 days
after publication of the notice. Note that for material contra-
vention, in contrast to a regular development application, the
public must be considered and they have a specified length of
time in which they must be heard before a decision is made
by the elected council.
Third Party Appeal
The right of third parties -- whether neighbouring property
owners or the general public --. to appeal planning decisions
has already been noted. Third party appeals comprised 18 per
cent of the total appeals in 1977, 20 per cent in 1978, 11.5
per cent in 1979 and 22 per cent in 1980. Under present rules
there is no requirement for objectors to come forward during
any formative stage, or during the period the application is
pending before the local authority. The objector can wait 21
days after the permission is given to file an appeal. This may
be the first time the developer is aware of the nature of any
objection. It may also be the first time the planners are aware
of objections. This makes it difficult for the planner to
require conditions which might obviate the objection. It is
very hard to work out compromise if one of the parties says
nothing until a formal appeal is made. This may explain
something of the reluctance of a planner to recommend a
permission with Conditions rather than an outright refusal,
thereby shifting the decision to the appeal board. The planner
may sense that a particular land-use changewill be controver-
sial, but have little idea of what modification in the proposed
development might be acceptable to the parties- so better
to refuse than be caught in the middle. The planner might go
to great lengths to work out a compromise only to find that
the third parties change their minds or a splinter group emerges
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and still files an appeal. There is no public forum where an
objector has to go on record prior to the formal appeal of a
planning decision.
The general public objector often is at a disadvantage to
the applicant, whose high stake justifies considerable invest-
ment in information. There is a potential for ignorance of
procedural detail to defeat public participation. This is
illustrated by a 1981 Supreme Court case in Bray. Develop-
ment permission had been granted for a shopping centre and
was appealed to An Bord Plean~la by local residents. The
Planning Act requires that the appeal when filed contain
written grounds for the appeal. The residents said they would
submit their reasons after further study. The developers tried
to block the appeal by an action in the High Court claiming
infraction of the legal procedures. The High Court refused to
sustain this action, and was upheld by the Supreme Court.
Mr Justice Henchy was reported to have said "that it would
be unduly legalistic and unfair if ordinary members of the
public were to be ignored if their appeal against a planning
permission did not immediately state the grounds of appeal"
("Planning: How the Judge Found the Loopholes", Sunday
Press, 5 April, 1981). The Courts have it in their power to
equalise the differential access to information and legal
expertise if they wish. (Note that the objectors had their
court costs paid by the losers.)
In this case, the Courts upheld the procedures which are
followed by An Bord Plean~ila; the latter attempts to keep
the appeals system as informal and "non-legalistic" as possible,
so as to accommodate the ordinary citizen.
85
Chapter 8
Decision-making Authority
Who in the regulatory system actually makes decisions as
to what will be allowed in terms of land-use? In this chapter
we address this issue. We first discuss the relative position of
the manager and the elected council in this respect and then
turn to the influence of the central government. In con-
clusion, we touch on the issue of confliCt between local
authorities. Because of its significance, we devote the next
chapter to a discussion of therole of An Bord Pleamila, which
is the primary appeals tribunal.
Managers vs. Politicians
The making of the Development Plan, and any material
contravention thereof, is a function reserved to the elected
local council.
Throughout 1982 there was heated and often acrimonious
debate in County Dublin concerning the zoning of land for
development. The Draft Development Plan went on exhibition
in July 1980. A large number of submissions were made from
landowners to have their land rezoned from agriculture/
amenity to development. Many of these were proposed to the
council and passed by majority vote, over the strong objections
of council staff. Rezonings were typically justified in the
particular by arguing that they would generate jobs, and in
general, on the grounds that insufficient land was zoned for
development in the draft plan. Council officials opposed the
proposals on the grounds that they would overload water and
sewer services, that roads were inadequate, that they would
be prohibitively costly to service andthat sufficient land was
already zoned for development purposes. The will of the
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majority of council members prevailed initially, Since they
have the statutory authority at this level. However, members
of one major party were instructed by their leader to support
the proposals of the planning officials, and the Minister for
the Environment subsequently indicated that he would not
provide finance from central government to service the re-
zoned areas. Recission of the rezoning decisions is now
being undertaken in some areas.
This illustrates how a combination of national political,
policy and financial considerations can combine to under-
mine the statutory authority of local politicians.
Acting on an application for a development permission is
an administrative decision of city or county manager. The
implication seems to be that development within the plan is
a technical matter for professional administration and not a
policy matter for political choice between competinginterests.
The usual Development Plan leaves considerable latitude for
allocative choice among conflicting parties. Whether these
choices should be made by professional managers, with
informal pressure from the elected council, or by the council
itself, is a major policy question. The informal pressure
usually takes the form of a council requirement that the
manager discusses certain categories of decisions with members
before a decision is taken.
Section 410
Section 4 of the City and County M~tnagement Amendment
Act, 1955, authorises a council to direct the manager to take
a specific action. This may be used by the council to direct
the manager to grant or refuse .an application"for’ planning
permission. Some councils use their Section 4 power fre-
quently and others’ never. Zimmerman (1980) obs~rr/,es that
the power has never been invoked in 12 planning authoriti6S
,
but was used frequently in Counties Kerry, Mayo :andWick-
low. It is aisc/ ~quite common, in County Du’biin, Use o£
Section 4 directives seem to have their own dynamic. If there
’
10When this report was in final d.raft, a, coml~rehensive review and analysis of the
use of Section4 .resolutions was p’ublished (CoUeran, 1983).
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is not habit of use, each council member can deflect con-
Stituent pressure by saying that it is a matter for professional
administration. This can be very useful for elected policians
when their voters are rather evenly divided on an issue. In
that case, political choice is a no win situation, for half of the
people willbeunhappy no matter the decision.
But once there is a precedence for Section 4 directives,
they tend to grow. One councillor does a favour for a consti-
tuent seeking to avoid a refusal. Then; if this is supported
by other councillors, they expect the votes to be returned
when they have a constituent in need. This presents a social
trap dynamic whereby many elected members may abhor
the overall cumulative result, but cannot withdraw from
exchange of support for directives.
It seems plausible that the frequency of Section 4 directives
may become common. Since rates Were removed from housing,
the local councillors have much less power and opportunities
to provide material benefits to constituents. The allocation
of capital gain via planning permission is probably the most
significant category of benefit at their disposal,
Up till now, the most vocal public groups have found the
planning decisions of the professional administration more to
their liking than the directives of elected councillors. This
has produced therefore many public outcries against the
Section 4 power in the media. The planners have tended to
be more protective of high amenity areas than the more
development-minded councillors in some jurisdictions.
The grant of permission on foot of Section 4 may still
be appealed to An Bord Plean~la. This is not unusual. For
example, a number of appeals of shore line developments
as a result of Section 4 directives by Counties Galway and
Mayo have been made by An Taisce and other environmental
groups.
This means that attempts by local councils to avoid claims
for compensation can be frustrated by subsequent refusals
by the Board. There were appeal cases in Red Rock, Howth
and Cabra in north Dublin, where the Board’s refusal to
allow development of open space could leave the local
authorities liable for compensation and no means of escape
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(See Business and Finance, 25 June 1981, p. 29 and Taisce
Journal, Winter 1981, p.-13). In effect, the Board’s decision
implies that the preservation of open space in some particular
cases is worth whatever compensation might be necessary
(though the required amount and availability of funds was
not known to them at the time of decision).
The issue being considered here is the distribution of
decision-making power among elected politicians and ap-
pointed professionals. The initiative lies initially with the
manager. If the council acts before a decision is made, or
after upon foot of a new application, it can exert its will.
However, in the final analysis it is subject to appeal to a
non-elected appeal board which can not only affect the
ultimate land-use, but in effect either cause the elected
council to come up with money to compensate developers
for the loss of their right to develop, or aUow them to do so.
Level of Government (local vs. central)
An aspect of whose preferences count in land-use change
is related to the level of government that makes control
decisions. In a sense it is a question of boundaries and juris-
diction. Different parties may be expected to have different
degrees of influence at different levels of government. In this
section the factors affecting the interaction of local and cen-
tral government is examined.
Department of Environment Guidelines
The Minister for the Environment may issue planning
circulars to the local authorities. These are rare and in any
case are advisory only. One such circular- Planning Control
Problems-was issued in 1973 (PI. 2i0/8). In addition to
his comments urging a liberal approach to ribbon development
and concentrating into settlements, the then Minister urged the
following: principle of restricting development on National Pri-
mary roads; inappropriate for planning control to go into detail
on septic tank control; inappropriate to go into detail on
design features, and minor extension of existing develop-
ment in built-up areas need not be sifted finely, except in
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’,areas Of veryhigh’. archit’ectUral qualilty; for rural areas,
¯ cannot see tl’t~ justification for refusing .permission-for
, ,reasonably designed :’residential develop/nent .except for
areas .,0f very high amenity and traditional .beauty spots
of national importance; reasonable to restrict development¯
¯
in coastal areas if it isessential to protect tourist attractiveness
and "does not Create a ’reservation’"
-- An9ther major policy statement came in 19.80 (PD 2/80;
28 July 1980). Tl~e theme was concern for "over-rapid
development of larger urban concentration". With reference
to" encouraging population growth in eXisting smaller settle-
ments, ,’~ne is anxious to ensure that such settlements should
expand when possible in order tO encourage the maintenance
’ ’,o.f., e~!s~g communities- and to counteract the higher energy
demands generated by isolated housing ¯developments in, rural
areas unrelated to any identifiable centre. , ." "
"    i".!"i’.Ai.~ ve~. important~ documen’t, Development COntrol:
: Advice and’ Gu~idelines, was issued by. the Department of the ,
Environment .in’October 1982 (Department of the Environ-
.merit, 1982). Itpr0vides a comprehensive compilation of the
¯ " ..I)’eparttnent’s viewregarding the preparation of the develop-
..... -ment. p!an’, particular classes of ,development, refusals of
¯ " i..p.ermission, conditiofis arid procedural matters. Though not
"legally¯ binding, the’guidelines are likely to be used informally
by:An B.ord Plean~la, in discharging,its,review, responsibilifies,
ai~d ~the Department’s control over the ’all0cafion of in-
¯ : .i ,    .frasti;uctural investment funds gives it. considerable potential ’
¯ "iey.ei(age..in encouraging, favoured ~modes of.behaviour. We ’
ha~e"seen that theMinister did not hesitate to.use this power ¯
.in Couiity Dublin to discourage rezonings which were not
..,, ."," ."recOmmended by p/ofessional plafiners. -’ ,. - , ’ "
, i:, -- -, . ’;. ’Tliere’are:Some,o:therindications of related.nati0nal policy ~,’" ’
- " by .: other agencies., The, Industrial .Development Authority ’ ’
~: ,: ,~ :.:,~f~ilb~,:a:poi!c~:,"ofil.b~n~iig indtiStrial, eiriployment ,’to: th, e. : i..
~" ::.~ 1~ ~:," ~t~g’lo:cations "OfpOp~lation.-:Ther.e ha,~e,.fieen discussi0ns ,, ;
:..,:,::,, ,, :~,~ent, r~hsmg, central "governmen, t, employment,,but only,’.,
¯ "’.’,’," " ;.2:.3. "~".’-"~""~"," ¢ :: " " ’"’"~ ~" ~~ :, .;" . " ¯ ’ ..... ,: ¯ " . ..... "" ’     ",;,,, ....::" .~:,st~ps’:have been~,taken. ,.For. a,.dmcuss~on .of reg!onal ...~ -,
................... ’, ,.~’~ ~ee~(NESC, !,9,75:, t.976,and,O,F,al, re,U-, ~979).:A May,
". ;.. i’: .’.1972;"go~rnrndnt policy statetnent --.,.Reoiew 6f Regional PO, ’
..... ,’, ....... 90 .........
.. , ." ....
. ¯ . , .
"2 ,," ....... , .
licy -- adopted elements of concentration and dispersion. It
would appear that the politics of regional location policies
are such that it is not possible to enunciate a sharp directional
policy but rather to follow a mixed series Of particulars:
decisions in terms of public aids and investments, ¯
The Minister may require a planning authority to vary"
the development plan (1976 Act, Section 22 (3)). Thishas
never been used. The closest thing to it was the case ’of
Wood Quay in Dublin where the immediate building of civic
office buildings would prevent recovery of old Viking artifacts,
After vocal public demonstration,the Minister ordered the Cor-
poration to delay its construction for further study of the issue,
and this was carried out. Whether the Minister has formal
authority to stop a particular city development is uncle~r~
but it demonstrates the respect of afforded central g0vern-
ment and perhaps t, he-informal,-bargainin~ "~trength~ it has
with local government.
In practice, the pressure on a local authority to conform
to national objectives is probably frequently subtle. An
example of the forces at work is provided by the following;"
the centralgovernment road planners have strongly urged a
new high capacity north east Dublin corridor road, but
Dublin City Council has refused to include it in its !980
Development Plan because of fear of its effects on established
residential neighbourhoods. The central government never-
theless announced private plans to build a new toll bridge
across the Liffey on the eastern edge of the city. Without a.
new approach road this bridge is less useful. There are no
doubt potentials for application of .carrots and sticks in th¢’
distribution of grants for local services to persuade 10e~
governments to the national point of view.
Conflict Between Local Authorities
The 1963 Planning Act, Section 22 (2) provides that the
Minister may require the development plan of two or more
planning authorities to be co-ordinated. Of course one
person’s co-ordination is another’s oppression. For example,
Dublin Corporation can not meet its need of council ’housing
within the Corporation boundary, so that it buys land in
91
County Dublin.’ It/ the interest of reducing its per housing
unit land costs, the Corporation has asked the County to
alter its pres6nt density maximum of 10 houses per acre
(County Council Minutes, 13 May 1980, p. 446). The Cor-
poration owned 1,900 acres in the County at the time. The
Chairman of the County Council said that the Corporation
was not a good developer and left its projects without suffi-
cient community services, which then created demands for
county services. So the Chairman expressed the need to keep
density low to insure that services would be adequate. 11 From
one perspective there is a lack of co-ordination, but shall
it be co-ordinated in favour of county or city? In principle
the Minister could settle the debate, but in practice the
county now prevails. There probably are other differences
of opinion between city councils and the neighbouring
countie~’over~drainage~systems~and xoads, ~,~,~,~-,~,,.-~ .... ~- ...........
11 However, in the current Draft Development Plan, higher densities than here-
tofore are allowed, subject to suitable design standards and safeguards.
92
Chapter 9
The Appeals System
Number of Appeals and Reversals
While planning decisions are initially made by local au-
thorities, a significant number are appealed to the national
level appeals board. The number of appeals formally de-
termined by the board has tended to increase over time,
as indicated in Table 2.
The numbers for 1979 were "artificially" low because
of the postal dispute in that year. Over the five years of its
operation, An Bord Plean~la has confirmed the decision of
the planning authority in over half the cases; in over a quarter
of them the decisions of the planning authority have been
reversed, while for the balance the decisions of the planning
authority have been varied (Table 2). Dublin City and County
(including Dun Laoghaire) account for close to one-third
of the appeals.
Table 2: Number of appeals and relation to decisions of planning
authority (%)
Decisions of planning authority
(percentage of total):
Number ofYear appeals Reversed Varied Confirmed Total
1977 2,487 29.6 13.4 57.0 100
1978 2,762 25.0 14.0 61.0 100
1979 2,251 25.4 12.2 62.4 100
1980 3,139 29.8 16.7 53.5 100
1981 2,980 27.1 15.6 57.3 100
Source: Annual Report and Accounts, 1981, An Bord Plean~la.
93
The number of appeals has meaning primarily in relation
to the total number of decisions made by local authorities.
In Appendix B the number of planning decisions, and the
percentage refused, are listed foi~ Counties and county boroughs
for the years 1979-1981. In Appendix C, the number0f
appeals as a percentage of decisions are listed.
It is interesting to compare the extremes and the average
for the counties and county boroughs.
Table 3: Planning decisions and appeals, Clare, Wicklow and total
(Ireland)
Planning decisions Percentage refusals Appeals as percentage
of decisions
1978 1981 1978 . 1981 1978 1981
Clare 1,184 1,230 2.02 3.25 3.02 3.25
Wicldow 1,127 1,251 27.41 30.13 17;77 19.04
Total 41,798 43,446 12.07 15.00 7.65 9.39
Source: Appendix B and ’Appendix~.
Although both Counties Ciare "and Wicldow made about
the same number of planning decisions, Clare’s refusal rate
was negligible, while in" Wicklow close to a third were refused.
The same" relative relationship obtains at the appeal stage. As
a generality the greater Dublin area tends to be more "appeals
prone", with appeals in Counties Dublin, Kildare, Meath,
Wicldow, Dublin CountyB0rough and Dun Laoghaire together
amounting, to almost half 9f ~the:total in 1981. In 1981
about 1 planning decision in ~10 was appealed overall,
but there was a great variety in this aspect, ranging from
2.55 per cent inDonegal~to 25.86 per cent in Dun Laoghaire
(Appendix C).
Factors Affecting Refusals and Appeals
As long as there is an national leVel appeal process and
someone is dissatisfied with the planning permission, there
will be some shift of the locus of decision upward. But; there
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are things that local planners do which can affect the fre-
quency of appeals (and reversals). If developers, from examin-
ation of the local Development Plan and conversation with
planners and other related officials, could determine what
would be approved, they would only risk unacceptable
proposals when they thought they would be reversed on
appeal. However, some developers claim that the Develop-
ment Plan is not detailed and that they get little or con-
flicting signals from officials. A 1976 survey of Dublin
architects and planning consultants provided this response
... "It is difficult to get a worthwhile commitment on
[road, sanitary and fire] requirements. This also applies
to the question on the need to employ an Information and
Development Control Officer to give information to" developers
and architects on a co-ordinated and comprehensive basis"
(McKone, 1976, p. 4).
Local control, of planning is jealously defended in principle,
though some authorities on occasion act to pass on res-
ponsibility to A~n Bord Plean~la. An example of the honour
given to local control is manifested by the public reaction
to a celebrated appeal of Dublin Corporation refusal in .1977
of an office building on Harcourt Terrace, the original
terrace being a block of architectural distinction. The Board
upheld the refusal on grounds that the "development would
be injurious to the residential amenities of properties in the
vicinity ,.." The Board went on to suggest what type of
development would be acceptable. This brought much
criticism .arid a charge reflected in news stories thal~ the
Board was usurping the prerogatives of the planning authority.
(Also see Taisce Journal, Vol. 1, No. 5, 1977, p. 26.)
In response to this criticism, the Board wrote a pubiic’
letter saying that its commentary did not a~fect local planning
authority nor bind the Board, and that it regretted "that its
decision should have been interpreted as a challenge to, or a
usurption of, the authority vested in the Dublin Corporation
as a planning authority." (Letter to the Editor, The Irish
Times, 15 September 1977, p. 9.)
In spite of this nominal objection to policy-making at the
national level, in l~ractice Dublin planners are seen~o refuse
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major developments and pass onthe decision to the Appeal
Board. Some developers claim that the Corporation is "afraid
to make decisions on big projects", and so passes the decision
on to Bord Plean~la. There is a delicate line here on which
reasonable observers might well differ in their interpretation;
we have no inside information on planner motivations and
can only discuss potentials. Thereis a body of literature to
the effect that there are great incentives for bureaucrats to
make no mistakes. The incentive structures are often such
that the cost of making a mistake is greater than the benefits
of taking a chance on a creative solution of public conflicts.
Reference has already been made to the lack of incentives
and information for finding a compromise between groups
at the local level. If local people are divided why not shift
the decision to a body which does not have to face the local
electorate? The local authority staff may also reckon that
since the proposal is in any event likely to beappealed to
An Bord Plean~la by a third party, why not reject it right
away and let the applicant appeal?
Some architects speak of theirinability to get approval for
creative design. They say that if it had not been done before,
it tends to be rejected. Again, the line between just poor de-
sign and the fear of controversy over the new design is
debatable.
Also, if a delaying strategy is employed to discourage
certain developments, especially those which might give rise
to claims of compensation, the local authority exposes itself
to the shift of decision-making to the national level. When a
developer decides to bear the delay and transactions costs
of appeal, then the local authority loses control.
The reasons forrefusal may reflect the concerns of differeflt
perspectives from within local govemment. A development
might be highly desirable in terms of its major use, but
objectionable from some particular perspective of the Fire
Officer, Medical Officer or Engineering Department. In a
large city with specialised departments often housed at a
distance from each other, there can be problems of com-
munication as wellas of priorities. This is a variety of trans-
action costs discussed previously. Some Dublin developers
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claim that a permission is often refused because one depart-
ment objects to some feature, even when from a general
land-use perspective the proposal had basic support. One
planning consultant, speaking of an applicant for planning
permission, said, "in contacting the various departments it
is quite possible that he will find the various requirements
conflict and cannot be easily rationalized" (Keaney, 1976,
pp. 6-7).
In a survey of architect and consultant practises made
by the Royal Institute of the Architects of Ireland and up-
dated by McKone (1976, p. 2) around three-quarters of
them reported that Planning Authorities were unfamiliar
with the requirements of the Roads, Sanitary and Fire
Authorities in 1976. The earlier 1970 survey showed on
the order of one-half were unfamiliar. About 80 per cent
of the practices saw a need for some type of information
and development control officer to facilitate co-ordina:tion.
The City of Cork brings together all department officers to
exchange views on applications so that all are aware of the
perspective of each and the Manager can then secure a com-
promise if necessary.
A substantive example of possible internal conflict is
that of a major shopping redevelopment. The site may
border a narrow street and the developer may prefer to
keep the present street pattern to create an intimate environ-
ment desired by shoppers. But from a road engineering
view, it might be desirable to use the demolition and renewal
as an opportunity for street widening (See McDonald, "In-
vestors Bring Gaiety Blues", Irish Times, 24 February 1981).
In Dublin, in such a case, the Corporation granted permission
for a shopping and office development in 1973 near the head
of Grafton Street and St. Stephen’s Green, with the condition
that the side street be widened to 80 feet "to protect and
improve the existing amenities". A group concerned with
building preservation appealed to the Minister who re-
moved the condition for street widening. (This was prior
to An Bord Plean~la.) The developer came back later with an
expanded application and the Corporation again insisted on a
road widening condition. The developer appealed in 1975,
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and again the Minister kept the existing street, Herethe local
government pursued its objective even after indication that
it was not satisfactory to the appeal authority.
Substance of Appeal Rulings- Is there a Ni~tiondLPolicy ?
Some judicial theories argue that appeal bodies, whether
special purpose or general courts, only act to clarify law and
work out special cases when their application create a par-
ticular hardship for an individual. There is a firm line between
this view and one involving substantive policy review reflect-
ing basic objectives of public purp0se.No systematic review
of appeal decisions by An Bord Plean~la is available. HoweVer;
a few decisions are pre’sente’ffhere to illustratelthe types of
declsxon made and the opportunity fo~~ basic~(plaii6’~6;ptliC’
differences between the Board and local authorities.
" Ti~eCork City DevelopmentPlan 1977 (p. 13) has a policy
of preventing office users from locating in the city’s retail
centre. It represents a philosophy that pedestrians enjoy a
shopping experience uninterrupted by. sterile facades of
offices, including financial institutions. Also it reflects¯ the
idea that these users can pay higher land prices ~nd mill drive
out little shops who cannot afford high rents, but neverthe-
less contribute to the total shopping experience of’a city
centre. Cork officials have occasionally found their planning
refusals in accordance with this plan frustrated by approvals
on appeal. The same experience occurred in their street
polity on advertising signs.              . -
In Dublin, five pl.anning applications for amusementhalls
were refused by the Corporati6fi but granted on appeal.
These decisions are never easy to interpret. It could be claimed
that the Board is not contradicting the basic objectiTe of the
local development plan, but only working out matters of
individual hardship or equity in application of the basic
objective.
Several recent reversals of decisions by Dun Laoghaire
Borough Council led the CounCil to ask the government to
reduce the power of An Bord Plean~la (Southside, 11 March,
1981, p. 2). The council had refuseda proposed 393 houses
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on a 50 acre site near the coast, arguing that the density was
too great (Murtagh, 1981). It would appear that the case
involved elements of judgements of equity as well as land-use
objectives. The appeals board approved the proposal. The
inspector’s report (not usually made public) indicated that
the proposal seemed reasonable because of high density
building already in the area, some of which was high density
housing built by the Dun Laoghaire Corporation itself. This
might be seen as a judicial-type judgement on fairness and
equity but also has elements of substantive objectives as well.
A city may decide that, irrespective of the past, it now
wants to lower the overall density and impact of further
development.
To illustrate further the kind of disputes settled on appeal,
consider the case of redevelopment in a Georgian area of
Dublin. The Corporation refused permission for a five storey
building which would have filled ’in a site at the end of a
Georgian street sc’ape. The,proposed building had large vertical
panels of glass set between brick piers, and this was con-
sidered as out of char~acter with the existing Georgian terrace
(Dubl, in Corporation Decision Order, p. 20, 14 January,
1977). On appeal permi§sion W~s nevertheless granted. This
decision was taken by the Minister shortly before An Botd
Pleamlla commenced operating. Two conditions were attached.
The first gave the local authority power to control brick’
coloug and texture (but kept the glass panels). In~ effect, tl~e
city’s concept ofpreserving the Georgian Character by copying
existing.styles was not accepted, Here is a basic substantive
difference in policy objectives. Incidentally, ’the site was
later acquired by a developer more sympathetic to historic
preservati~)n and a more compatible building is now under
construction, .                          .    ~,
The second condition imposed in the above case illustrates
a major ~caush of land~use conflict--namely the effect of
developm~ri~t o.n immediate neighbours. It was required to
have the windov~s ’at the back’ of the development, of a type
~ot .al, lowirlg’,easy over!ook into the back yard of neighbout~
ing residences. A r, elat~d cbnflict, concerning this development
was cdrri’ed to the High Court. Occupants of a neighbouring
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flat claimed that the new building would interfere with
"rights of ancient lights" to their bathroom (Irish Times,
24 March, 1981). The developer also owned the affected
flats. The claim was settled and the building proceeded. This
is the type of case in which compensation is sometimes made
to remove an injunction which is creating delay costs for the
builder. It illustrates that individuals can have recourse to
both planning procedures and common law in asserting their
rights.
To get a sense of the kinds of cases and reasons given by
An Bord Pleamila, some examples are presented below, all
dated January, 1981.
Housing - reversed grant: premature because of deficient
sewerage services
Warehouse -- upheld
refusal:
House upheld grant:
Flats reversed grants:
Housing development -
reversedrefusal:
Houses and flats -- up-
held grant:
Bungalow -- upheld
refusal:
narrow road creates traffic hazard
added conditions requiring reser-
vation of land for future road and
controlling access
out of character with established
pattern of two-storey neighbouring
houses and vehicular access injuri-
ous to neighbouring residential
amenities
added conditionSproiaibiting de-
velopment until by-pass is built,
density similar to surroundings,etc.
contained conditions on an em-
bankment relative to sight lines
and footpaths, restricted access to
a nearby major road, controlled
materials in the interest of visual
amenity, and reserved open spaces,
retained trees, etc.
further increase in septic tanks
would be prejudicial to public
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Offices at rear of site --
upheld refusal:
Bungalow - upheld
refusal:
Two storey house exten-
sion - upheld refusal:
Continuance of office use
-- upheld refusal:
health and road serving site is
inadequate
would be traffic hazard
Development Plan policy to pre-
serve high scenic amenity is reason-
able and it would be harmed by
prominent location of the site and
lacks natural screening
injurious to residential amenities
of adjoining properties by reason
of over-shadowing and loss of day-
light
area is zoned residential which is
considered reasonable and it would
lead to build-up of offices which
would detract from residential
amenities. (Note that the office
in question might not detract, but
more based on the cumulative use
of the precedent would.)
As noted in the section on compensation, local authorities
have in the past included reasons for refusal which they hope
will be non-compensatable. The appeal Board often remove
these reasons when they think they are not valid, even though
they may uphold the refusal on grounds which may give rise
to a claim for compensation. For example, the Board may
not allow the reason of premature development when the
zoning suggests the local authority has no intention of pro-
viding services at any time. The appeal Board is also called
upon to make qualitative judgements. A local authority may
refuse an application because it judges that the development
would create a traffic hazard which is a non-compensatable
reason. On appeal, the Board may decide that it is only a
matter of occasional traffic congestion; as contrasted with
serious traffic congestion, which is a non-compensatable
reason for refusal.
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We examined a number of:cases involving applications to
convert to or build offices in residential areas within south
Dublin’s growing office area (Dublin postal zones 2 and 4).
They show that the appeal Boardupheld Corporation policy
to restrict this encroachment from going further.
Some examples of appeals forother types of land,use change
are illustrated by a 1980 application bya drug manufacturer
near Bandon, County Cork. The approved plan was appealed
by An Taisce. After the group met with the company, details
of effluent levels and monitoring were agreed to and incor-
pbrated as conditions by An Bord Pleanfila. The TaisceJournal
(Vol. 5, No. 2, 1981, p, 33) noted that "TheCounty Council
were a little annoyed that their monitoring procedures were
considered inadequate..." The added conditions were
claimed to be more stringent than the council’s.
One observer has argued that the public’s lack of confidence
in the ability of’ local councils to set and monitor complex
industrial pollution standards introduces an additional uncer:
tainty inhibiting industrial growth. The lack of confidence
leads to additional appeals to An" Bord Pleamila, so that
industry is not sure what is expected of it at the time of its
initial investment planning (Dun ne, 1981).
Another area of conflict involves vacation homes in the
prime tourist coa.~tal and lake areas. Recall that preservation
of the tourist industry was one of the motivations for the
1963 Planning Act. In one case, the appealBoard approved a
holiday village on Lough Melvin in County Leitrim (Burrows,
Irish Times, 12 March, 1981). The number of houses was
reduced from 36 to 24 and conditions Were placed to reduce
the visual impact; The appealwas brought by several environ-
mental groups. Another recent case involved a proposal for
80 cottages anda 30 room h0tel, on the coast in County’Clare.
The developer already had a 1967 permission for 38 cottages.
The refusal by COunty Clare was upheld upon appeal "on the
grounds that it would interfere with She scenic attractions of
the White St[and area" (Business and Finance, 12 March,
1981, p. 17)..Tl~e development compkn3~ subseqtientlY decided
to dispose of the site. ¯ ¯
The history of the relati0nship of the ’apt)eals process to
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the political system is relevant to recall at this point. The
1963 Act put the appeals process in the hands of the Minister
for Local Government (now known as Minister for The Environ-
ment)~ While the bulk of the decisions were probably made
on the advice of the professional planners in the Department
(some of whom are now employed by An Bord Plean~ila)
enough seemed to reflect party politics to cause a negative
reaction. This led in 1976 to the transfer of the appeal process
to an appointed board, chaired by a former judge of the High
Court. This gives the appeal Board considerable independence
from party politics; no one interviewed wanted to return to
the pre-1976 ministerial system. However, since all members
of the Board are appointed by the Minister, this power does
allow some indirect policy influence at this level.12
Leaving aside the question of favouritism in individual cases,
the history of ministerial appeal does give some evidence of
appeal decisions reflecting fundamental public policy judge-
ments and therefore changing with elections and the govern-
ment in power. In 1973, the Minister for Local Government,
in an effort to reduce the number of appeals issued a Ministerial
Circular PI. 210/8 "Planning Control Problems" (12/11/1973)
urging planning authorities to be less restrictive. The directive
stated "Some development plans contain provision against
ribbon development and/or requiring development should be
gathered into settlements. It is the Minister’s view that such
clauses should not prevent a liberal approach to individual
cases" (pp. 1-2). Since the Minister was the appeal source,
he could back his policy advice with grants of permission. An
analysis indicated that: "In pursuance of his stated policy
some figures for parts of 1974 show that the Minister has
increased the number of reversals of decisions on appeal. In
County Offaly, for example, the number reversed in the first
nine months of the year was 35 per cent of appeal decisions
made. This figure far outweighs any for previous years"
(Feighery, 1975, p. 26).
12Under provisions of the Local Government (Planning and Development) Act,
1983, the authority of the Minister in this regard has been diluted. The Chairman
and members of the Board must be chosen by the Minister from names submitted
by various representative organisations.
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County Dublin
Dublin County Borough
Nation
Permissions as a per cent of applications rose slightly from
1973 to 1975 as follows (McKone, 1976, p. 10):
Permissions
(% of Applications)
1973 1975
69 80
71 77
86 88
One builder applauded the Minister for the "great improve-
ment in the permission decisi0n, particularly for the year
1975, and most particularly in the decision by the Minister
on appeals" (McKone, 1976, p. 10)~.
During this period when the Minister was development
oriented, many approvals were made upon appeal for office
projects in south centre Dublin. Later, under An Bord Plean~la,
Dublin Corporation policy to contain officedevelopment and
slow its advance into residential areas such as inDublin postal
zone 4 was more sympathetically treated.
Policy Objectives and Predictability
The above samples of appeal cases can give some ideas
about basic substantive objectives reflected in decisions. It
is not possible, however, to easily sumrnarise these in a state-
ment of overall policy, The inspector’s reports giving facts
of each case are not available to the public. The rulings them-
selves are quite terse. In the UK, from time to time, the
Department of the Environment makes available key cases
which illustrate precedents, and there is an annotated
summary organised by type of land:use changes. This re-
duces the information costs to those whomight wish to
appeal, and increase the predictability of result. In Ireland;
the prospective appellant can only turn to a solicitor or
planning consultant who, through accumulated experience,
can predict how different situations might fare on appeal.
The 1976 Amendment to the Planning Act(Section 6)
says that "The Minister shall, from time to time, ,give to the
Board such general directives as to policy in relation to plan-
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ning and development as he considers necessary". Only one
directive, relating to retail shopping developments, has been
issued. Perhaps in an attempt to remove any suspicion of
political influence, Ministers have avoided providing much
general policy direction. This means that an appointed body
must make its own policy, the only requirement being that it
shall keep itself informed of policies of various public authori-
ties. (See TaisceJournal, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1977, pp. 4-6.)
While it is difficult to summarise the current policies which
result in particular appeal decisions, it is clear that the rulings
do have a major impact on Ireland’s physical landscape. The
Board is certainly more than a minor arbiter providing equity
among owners, or deciding whether a claimed traffic hazard
is only a traffic congestion. The Board cannot avoid passing
judgement on the desirability of alternative conceptions as to
what Ireland’s urban and rural landscapes should look like. It
may be necessary to assert that the primary responsibility
for planning is local, but the authority of the Board is above
it. Some perspective on this authority is given by comparison
with the US. For many years after affirming the constitu-
tionality of local zoning, the Supreme Court refused to enter
with substantive policy judgements andwould not superimpose
its judgment on the land-use objectives contained in the
zoning. It would only address procedural matter. This has
changed recently with respect to matters of segregation and
civil rights. The point is that if any appeal body rules on sub-
stance (as opposed to only procedure) it cannot avoid replacing
the local authorities as the ultimate formulators of policy.
A frequent comment from developers is that "There is too
much planning and not enough development". While there
will always be differences between the public authorities and
builders, the resources to promote development might be
augmented if the size of exemptions were raised. The area of
a house extension which is exempt from the requirement
to get planning permission has been extended by Ministerial
Order from 18 square metres to 23 square metres. By-law
approval must still be granted in some areas (Statutory
Instrument No. 154 of 1981). This is not to say that minor
extensions are not cause for dispute between neighbours. The
105
only question is whether society should spend its resources
adjudicating all of them. An alternative would be to specify
more standards for height, size, yards, etc., than are now
provided and then leave some of these remaining disputes to
the councils. The high transaction costs, of course, would
mean that many disputes would remain to be suffered or
worked out informally between neighbours. In addition, since
some of these latter cases are likely to end up in the courts,
there are costs to be borne here also. The point isnot that
higher exemptions would be costless, but whether the alter-
native costs to local planners and An Bord Plean~ila i worth it.
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Chapter 10
Pricing and Payment for Infrastructural Services
In providing infrastructural services - water, sewers,
roads, lighting, etc.- to developments a choice must be made
between charging the costs to the benefiting development
directly, or financing these services from general tax funds. We
have seen that the provision of some services in this res-
pect - notably roads and open spaces internal to the develop-
ments- must be provided to the requisite standard before
the development will be taken-in-charge by the local authority.
In addition, we learned that in some cases a developer may be
"required" to undertake additional work which is not neces-
sary for the proper functioning of the development per se;
such requirements are imposed in a somewhat arbitrary and
ad hoc fashion. In some cases a major contribution in this
respect will be extracted, while in others nothing will be
demanded.
Economists argue as a guiding principle that economic effi-
ciency and social well-being will be enhanced if goods and
services are charged for at a rate which reflects the long-run
marginal costs of their provision. By long-run marginal costs
is meant the total additional costs which will be incurred
over time in providing the service in question. Thus, connect-
ing a development to a main sewer may involve modest costs
in the short-run, since there is excess capacity in the system.
However, if building in the area is expected to continue, it
will be necessary eventually to provide additional capacity.
The developments taking place now and their successors in
essence make necessary the provision of additional capacity
in the future. The costs charged against them should incor-
porate an element reflecting this fact. If the full long-run
marginal costs of services- roads, water, sewers, gas, tele-
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phone, electricity- are not assessed against deVelopment,
the following consequences ensue:
(i) Developments in areas which are relatively costly to
service will be encouraged vis-h-vis areas which are
less costly in this respect.
(ii) Following on (i): sprawl will be encouraged, as out-
lying areas do not suffer a cost-penalty compared to
areas close-in; for a given outlay on services fewer
structures will be serviced.
(iii) Since taxpayers in general must pay~ there is a transfer
of resources from the public to the construction sec-
tor. This is captured by property purchasers, renters
and landowners. It seems probable that some land-
owners and the purchasers of the more expensive
properties will have higher than average incomes. If
the income distributions of beneficiaries is higher
than that of taxpayers in general, then the system will
involve a transfer from the less to the better off.
(iv) Regions in which a disproportionate slaare of building
is located, i.e., the East, will benefit relative to the rest
of the country.
(v) Local authorities will probably not receive the re-
sources necessary to service the effective demand; they
depend on the allocations from Central government,
which are made on the bases of political, adminis-
trative and financial considerations. Cost increasing
delays are likely, as developments "queue up" to be
serviced. Rationing of services is done on a political/
administrative discretionary basis, rather than through
the use of market-clearing prices. A market-clearing
price in this context is defined as the price at which
all developments wanting services can get them.
We acknowledge that it may be difficult in practice to
charge the full service costs to developments as they occur.
Problems of "lumpiness" in supply and co-ordination in the
provision of services can make it difficult to estimate the
"correct" prices. There will be political pressure from land-
owners - particularly those in areas which it is especially cost=
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ly to service -- as they realise that such charges reduce the price
they can get for their land. To ,the extent that the charges can
be passed forward to house buyers, they too are likely to
exert pressure to keep these costs paid by taxpayers in general.
Finally, while developers might welcome such a system if it
meant that the sen, ices were provided in an efficient and
timely fashion, if the payments were made but there was no
commensurate improvement in these respects, they too
would resist these charges.
In spite of these difficulties, we feel that the advantages of
charging developments the full long-run marginal costs of
providing infrastructural services are so compelling that a
determined effort is warranted to arrive at a workable pricing
system. The manner of such charging can take a variety of
forms: the developer could pay a lump sum to the local
authority; rent sufficient to cover the full costs could be
assessed; the developer and the local authority could form a
partnership, sharing costs and returns; a developer could
finance and construct the infrastructure and with appropriate
constraints, sell access to others. No single approach will be
uniquely appropriate for all circumstances. Cost-effectiveness
and political, legal and administrative feasibility will all bear
on the choices available in this respect. Once the decision in
principle has been made to charge developments their full
long-run costs, alternative means of accomplishing this can be
tried. The experience gained thereby can be used in designing
an appropriate mix of financing methods.
Section 26 of the 1963 Act precludes a local authority
from charging for "works which have facilitated the proposed
development which were provided earlier than seven years be-
fore the grant of permission for development". A legislative
relaxing of this time constraint would be desirable, but not
essential for the effective operation of the concept.
Pricing can also be used to reinforce, or take the place Of,
regulatory approaches in other areas. For example, in areas of
high amenity, such as coastal zones, if it were desired t0 dis-
courage high-rise developments, a charge could be assessed,
e.g., per metre, which escalated with the height of the struc-
ture. These charges could be in the form of a lump sum, an
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annual payment, or some Combination. Undesirable strip-
development could similarly be discouraged. Likewise, the
owners of derelict sites could be charged a feewhich increased
rapidly over time and varied depending on the extent to
which dereliction was judged to diminish the quality of life.
Conversely, payments could be made to property owners
who were willing to maintain structures of historic, cultural
or aesthetic/architectural interest, so as to. preserve them for
their own sake and/or in order to maintain the character of
an area. This concept could be broadened to comprise a
house improvement grant which increased in amount with
the age Of the structure. This would help maintain the exist-
ing old housing stock.
Other pricing opportunities arise in the area of assessing
planning applications and appeals. Here the anomolous situ-
ation arises where delay imposes very high costs on developers,
but the planning assessment and appeals systems do not have
the evaluative resources to provide timely decisions. In 1980,
total expenditure by An Bord Plean~ila (including value of
services received from the Department of the Environment)
came to £1,007,976. Since 3,139 appeals Were determinedin
that year, this works outat an average cost per appeal of £321.
A sliding’scale of charges, increasing with the magnitude and
complexity of the application, could be of benefit to both
developers and regulators if the revenues generated thereby
were used to provide timely and usefut evaluations of applica-
tions and to improve the quality of the planning process. In
the Local Government (Planning and Development) Bill,
1982, provision is included for the introduction of charges
for planning applications and appeals. Such charges are en-
visioned by central govemment as a means of reducing the
demand for Exchequer financing.
In addition to the points with regard to charging for infra-
structural services, pricing has the following ~/dvantages:
(i) Once the principle and conditions for payment are
established, payment will (relative to regulation) be
"automatic". For example, ttie owner of a derelict
site will be billed at the appropriate rate, which will
be pre-specified, and based on area, location and dura-
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tion of dereliction. The simplicity of this can be com-
pared with the tortuous, expensive, time-consuming
and often ineffective procedures which must be in-
voked at present to deal with this problem under the
provisions of the Derelict Sites Act (1961). Enforce-
ment costs of encouraging the desired behaviour will
be lower than they would be with exclusive depen-
dence on the regulatory mode.
(ii) Pricing allows for graduated responses, while regulation
tends to favour "either--or" decisions. Take the
hypothetical case of an application to build an apart-
ment block in a coastal zone. It is felt that such a
structure will diminish the aesthetic quality and
character of the area. The planning authority is faced
with the decision of allowing it or not. While in the
former case conditions can be imposed on the size and
nature of the structure, the regulatory approach does
not allow the community to be compensated directly
for an irreducible (by conditions) dis-benefit imposed
by its construction. If a charge were assessed, the
community would be so compensated. The resources
thereby made available could, for example, be used to
develop and maintain a linear coastal park or provide
adjacent housing for low-income individuals. Since
the prospective liability to compensation provisions
of the planning acts (as interpreted by the local
authorities) tend to result in many such permissions
being granted, there is real merit in our view in having
a pricing system in place which simultaneously en-
courages the construction of a "socially desirable"
structure and compensates society for any irreducible
costs imposed.
(iii) Exclusive dependence on a regulatory system may
not be inappropriate in countries where for centuries
govemments have ruled with the consent of the gov-
erned. Such a tradition gives societal legitimacy to
government strictures; this in turn influences posi-
tively the efficiency and enthusiasm with which
regulators carry out their assignments and the willing,
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ness of the regulated to comply with them. However,
Ireland is a post-colonial society where govemment
regulation was for centuries associated with an alien
and malevolent authority, popularly presumed to be
acting in a manner inimical to the general interest. In
these circumstances, to break regulations and the law,
far from being :perceived as anti-social, was taken by
many as a manifestation of patriotism. Given this
tradition, which still shapes attitudes to some extent
today, we feel that in addition to its other not incon-
siderable advantages, the use of pricing has much to
commend it as a means of encouraging socially desir-
able land-use behaviour in Ireland. Enforcement costs
are lower, the penalty, or reward, is graduated in pro-
portion to the magnitude of the impact and the
adjustment is left more up to the individual.
Who should decide what can be charged for and at What
rates? Should there be provision for appeal concerning the
scope and magnitude of charges assessed? The answers to
these questions turn to some extent on the degree to which
one "trusts" the local authorities to behave responsibly. We
recommend that a generous amount of freedom be provided
to local authorities in this respect, subject to the general pro-
vision that a charging scheme as implemented should pro~cide
incentives which advance the objective specified in the develop-
ment plan.la
Experience
The 1963 Planning Act Section26 (2) allows local authori-
ties to require payment of a development levy in the foi-m of
a contribution towai’ds expenditures where any works bythe
18In An D~il on March 3, 1983, the Tanaiste and Minister for the Environment
indicated that he proposed "to allow local authorities the maximum discretion
and flexibility to determine their own spending and revenue patterns and to restore
some of the freedom they had lostin recent years in this regard". Thisproposal
has been given statutory expression in the Local Government Financial Provisions
(No. 2) Act, 1988.
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local authority facilitate the proposed development (including
those commenced up to seven years before the grant of per-
mission for development). Thus, the 1979 Cork City Develop-
ment Plan requires, for land being developed for the first
time, a contribution of £2,800 per hectare in respect of main
drainage and an additional charge based on cost and area
served. In addition, there is a charge for water schemes based
on cost of works and water requirements of the development.
These figures are updated to reflect inflation.
County Cork charges £2,500 per acre for water and an-
other £2,500 for sewers and also an occasional extra charge
for roads. The charges do vary by area of the county. Under
this provision County Dublin and County Kildare charge a
flat development fee of £4,000 and £1,500 per acre res-
pectively. This practice of a flat fee is questioned by Walsh
(1979, p. 36) who points out that the law requires the levy to
be proportional to benefit. This would require expensive
estimating procedures. The practice has not yet been chal-
lenged in the courts. The rate has often been fixed so as to
cover all of such costs which the local authority must finance
(typically 50 per cent) the balance being paid by central
government.
In general, public services have been charged for (if at all)
at a constant level regardless of location. This provides no
incentive for new building to consider the effect of its loca-
tion decision on service costs. It provides no incentive for
locating in city centres, where some infrastructure is available,
as opposed to new areas requiring new investments. If the
Ministerial circular advising planning authorities to favour
existing settlements instead of ribbon and isolated develop-
ments were backed up with government grants and appropriate
service pricing policies, it could have more impact on settle-
ment patterns.
The right to a development levy constitutes an opportunity
by which a part of the land appreciations gain subsequent
to development might be captured by the public. It might
be objected that the law is written in terms of a charge equi-
valent to the amount of value added by public investments
and is not related to the cost of such investments and not cer-
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tainly to the to:tal appreciation gaim But, in practice, the value
added by the specific public improvements to water, sewer,
roads, drainage and that added by the locational rents occa-
sioned by growth of an urban centre are inseparable. If you
do not have water, access to the city is of little Value.
The availability of ’water and sewers is the ultimate land-
use’- control, at least for major developments. When the
sewerage service boundary is drawn, it effectively defines
the limits of major developments. Even if development per-
mission were granted by the local authority, it would be of
little use Without connections.
We have argued~ in favour of the principle ~that develop-
ments in general should "can3," their full long-run incre-
mental infrastructural costs. However, we recognise that, in
certain cases, state subvention will be Warranted. For example
,
in certain inner City areas the costs of financing particular
forms of development, e.g., residential, may be higher, for a
variety of reasons, than~ the costs of such developments at
the periphery.. If it is felt that there is a societal advantage in
retaining a residential component in the inner city, then a
grant to this efid can be justified. However, it will be more
efficient if the grant (including in this category provisions for
tax relief) is paid irrespective of the infrastructure costs, so
that the development is still fully charged for the latter. This
will ensure that the builder confronts the full costs and will
economise on theiruse appropriately.
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PART IV OUTCOMES OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM
Chapter 1 1
Open Space: Aesthetic and Financial Aspects
An important feature of development plans around cities
is the identification of areas for preservation of open space
and protection as zones of high amenity. By open space we
mean any undeveloped land, either within an urban area or
at its fringe, which is commercially attractive for develop-
ment. For example, Counties Dublin and Cork have a policy
of concentrating development in existing or new popula-
tion centres and maintaining a distinct identity to these
centres by keeping spaces open between them.
There are a number of reasons why ribbon development
is objectionable. Accident rates per mile are higher on ribbon
development (Hearne, 1976). Also public service costs are
higher. Scattered rural developments, when compared with
clustered units of housing at peripheral sites with relatively
high densities, have five times the capital cost for electricity,
lighting, sewerage, etc., and three and a half times the on-
going cost for refuse collection, lighting, mail and school
transport (Suffren and Mulvihill, 1977). Also, scattered
development on the periphery leaves behind decaying upper
floors and derelict sites in city centres.
No systematic data are available to measure success in
meeting stated open space and clustering objectives, but the
available observations do indicate a mixed result. There is no
doubt that a considerable number of planning applications in
these open space designations have been denied and upheld
on appeal. At the same time many have been permitted, some
on Section 4 order by elected councils, some on appeal and
some after threat of compensation claim by the owners.
In the rapidly growing Dublin area, agricultural and open
space zones are under considerable pressures and the sub-
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urban towns are starting to run together with loss of identity
to an undifferentiated conglomeration (Byne, 1977). A recent
example is the rezoning of 300 acres to industry in the green
belt originally specified to separate the new towns of Tallaght
and Clondalkin (Kilfeather, 1981). The Dublin ’ Mountains
have seen fingers of house development pushing higherinto
the valley sides along the roads (Johnston, 1972). The observa-
tion of the then chief executive of An Foras Forbartha is
worthy o f nothing in detail (Downey, 1981, p. 18):
Scattered and ribbon development along national primary routes
and other major roads not only destroys the visual character of
the traditional Irish landscape -- particularly when the design and
finish of the dwelling and its situation are insensitively treated --
it also makes the countryside less accessible for the remainder of
the population. Contrast, for example, the Dublin mountains of
today, where mile after mile Of new, scattered residential develop-
merit may be encountered, with that of twenty years ago. In
areas of high scenic value :-Wicklow, West Cork and Donegal
are good examples- the growth of retirement, holiday, and
second homes, as well as the thoughtless development of agri-
culture:related dwellings, is actively threatening tourism, and may~
well, in the end, destroy the very attractiveness of the area.
Paradoxically, the quality of dwellings erected in the West of
Ireland in the late seventies was higher than in the rest of the
state, yet ribbon and scattered development -- often, sadly, sanc-
tioned by elected representatives against the advice of their pro-~
fessional planning staff using Section 4 of the City and County
Management Acts -- is endemic.
What are the economic, inStitutional and property rights
ingredients which contribute to the above results? First, the
demand for building in advantageously located open spaces
must be acknowledged. There is simply a huge demand for
filling in spaces between suburban villages around metro-
politan centres. Even if there were dramatic changes in policies
on industrial location and the location of government emp-
loyees, public infrastructure investments and the assessment
of long-run marginal costs for infrastructure, the attraction of
Dublin would be immense. Even attempts to concentrate
development into existing or new towns in the metro region
have strong countervailing forces, The very act of designating
a development zone alerts the owners there that they have a
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valuable asset- reservation prices rise, land availability may
actually decline and there is then a reward to move to cheaper
land along the roads and spaces connecting the city centre
and its satellites. This phenomenon is also present in smaller
towns.
The same demand pressures are found in rural scenic areas.
With the growth of income and leisure, there is great demand
for scenic housing sites. The first to build and enjoy the view
may resent those who come later and detract from the view,
but the same desire motivates both groups. There is also
pressure in depressed rural areas for any development which
promises jobs (construction and services). Politicians cannot
easily ignore public opinion willing to trade a bit of coastal
or mountain scenery for jobs, even though the latter are
temporary, and more permanent jobs relating to tourism
may be forgone as a result.
The indulgence with which applications for houses for
farm family uses are treated contributes to ribbon develop-
ment; there are substantial, administrative and political costs
involved in preventing non-farm families from acquiring these
houses. There is also an understandable tendency for elected
officials to want to help the individual who makes a case for
an exemption from the open space designations. This is a
dynamic which is hard to stop when once in motion. When a
few permissions are granted which at that level create no en-
vironmental harm, the next set of applicants ask why they
cannot get permission since their neighbour did. And, so on
it goes.
Kilfeather (1981a) reports in thelrish Times (December 12,
1981) on a decision by Dublin County Councillors to rezone
for industrial use 33 acres of agricultural land. Approval of
this proposal was followed by another motion proposing that
the adjoining 3V2 acres be rezoned to commercial use. A
councillor opposing the motion said that he was beginning
to see how this system operated:
With our previous decision just 10 minutes hot, we are moving
on to extend it to this man’s lands. There is plenty of land fur-
ther on: why should they be treated any differently?
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Elected oouncils and An Bord Plean~ila can get caught in
this dynamic of trying to be fair to each applicant in sequence.
To say that Section 4 power, which allows elected councils
to dictate the decisions of managers, is itself the culprit is to
oversimplify a complex set of forces.
The attempt of some local authorities to discourage rural
housing may have actually contributed to sprawl. The 1977
Co. KildareDevelopment Plan (2nd Revision, Part 1, p. 97)
calls for sterilisation of land around a rural house for a mini-
mum of 5 acres on a county road and 10 acres on main roads.
This policy of large lots may just further spread isolated houses.
The key property right influencing use of open land is
the right of owners to receive compensation if permission to
develop is denied, for all but a few reasons. For example, as
noted earlier, a denial of permission because development
would be premature given lack of water or sewers is non-
compensatable. This reason provides only temporary pro-
tection at best, and where land is zoned as open space (so that
there is a presumption that there is no intention to provide
services) "prematurity" provides no protection. In some cases
it may appear that ,the Appeals Board has no sympathy for
local councils’ policies for open space when theBoard either
grants permission or gives non-compensatable reasons upon
the local councils’refusal. In fact the councils may be hoping
that their refusal will not be appealed, and that the applicants
do not pursue their right to compensation, even though the
council knows that the basic law places the developer of open
land in the predominant poSition. The Appeal Board may
sympathise with the open space objectives, but it knows that
when land is zoned in this category and there is no intention
to ever supply services, denial can create the basis for com-
pensation. In urban "infill" open space areas- which are
typically adjacent to services if the local authority wishes
to maintain the area in theexisting use, liability for com-
pensation arises in most cases.
To the extent that local councils have been successful in
thwarting development of open space, it is more a matter of
providing transaction cost barriers than of relying on the
nominal rights created by planning laws. Local councils make
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refusals which contradict the rights to develop but which are
accepted because it costs too much for the developer to pur-
sue the matter further. But these costs are always relative to
gains; as the benefits to development increase, developers will
appeal refusals on open space, and as long as the rights of
compensation remain, they can be expected to win.
Designation of an areaunder a Special Amenity Area Order
which is confirmed by the Minister can remove the right to
receive compensation if the ability to develop open space is
denied in the area so designated. As we noted earlier, the fact
that this has never been implemented suggests that there is a
fundamental problem in selecting some as ineligible to receive
the land appreciation gains of development while granting
riches to others.
We conclude that a likely outcome of the existing land-use
planning system will be a pattern of urban sprawl which will
be costly to service - relative to a least-cost alternative -- and
less aesthetically and perhaps socially pleasing than more con-
centrated development. Attempts to concentrate development
in satellite towns surrounding the main urban centre are
likely to fail; the very act of providing services to them makes
the land along the "serviced" corridors extremely attractive
for development while the local authority is liable for com-
pensation in most circumstances if such development is for-
bidden. This combines with a preference on the part of many
individuals to live on the fringe of the major urban area,
which also exerts pressures for change. While the local
authority has procedural mechanisms for influencing land-use
these will tend to be over-ridden when the gains to indi-
viduals from so doing become sufficiently large. Such gains
will be captured primarily by those landowners who have the
knowledge and the willingness to argue their case and maxi-
mise their personal gain. Those who hold back either from
lack of knowledge or from an unwillingness to impose on the
community and go against the spirit of the collective aspira-
tions, may well find that their holding back in this regard
has been in vain.
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Chapter 12
Structural Preservation and InnoVation in Design
There is a growing interest in the preservation of our archi,
tectural heritage (Nowlan, 1980). An Taisce published an
Amenity Study of Dublin and Dun Laoghaire (An Taisce,
1967), proposing buildings Of architectural and historic value
for preservation. This was followed in 1982 by a further study
of Dublin - Urbana-Study of Dublin - which had the objec-
tive of "formulating a conservation policy for buildings on
List 1 and adjacent streetscapes" (An Taisce, 1982). Develop,
ment Plans commonly contain lists of buildings which the
local council wishes to preserve and those whose preservation
is to be decided on a case by case basis. The 1976 Dublin
Development Plan listed 106 buildings whose preservation is
an objective and 124:buildings whose demolition or altera-
tion will be considered on their merits.
The architectural merit of a building is subject to much
debate, and different people would add to or delete from any
list; when it comes to making a judgement to preserve an al-
ready deteriorated building, there can be even wider dif-
ferences of opinion. But it would be fair to say that some
important buildings have beenlost and some others retained
upon threat of demolition (Nowlan, 1980 and Robinson,
1980). In the Urbana-Study of Dublin work cited above, it is
pointed out that (An Taisce, 1982, p. 5):
The deteriorating physical condition of buildings and continuing
development, pressures are eroding the stock of buildings in
Dublin~ on List 1. In the last twenty years about 70 houses on
streets containing buildings on List I have been lost.
Most attention ’has been given to exteriors. The 1976
amendments Section 43 (c) extended the necessity for per-
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mission to listed interiors as well, but only a few local authori-
ties, including Cork andWaterford, have implemented interior
control.
The interaction of laws and strategies in this area can be
complex. Owners of listed buildings are notified that their
buildings have been so designated and alterations are subject
to planning permission.
It is not clear whether a grant of permission to demolish a
listed building is a material contravention of the Development
Plan, thereby requiring council action instead of managerial
action alone. This appears to turn the degree of specificity
vis-a-vis listing provided in the objectives stated in the Develop-
ment Plan. Also, it is not clear to us what manner of pro-
posed alteration of a listed building would, if refused, give
rise to compensation claims.
Permission may be required under the Housing Act for
demolition of a building used as a residence irrespective of its
being listed in the Development Plan under the Planning Act.
A demolition permit under the Housing Act may not be
appealed by third parties but such actions can be so appealed
under the Planning Act if the building in question is listed. A
building which is not used for housing and is unlisted may be
demolished without any permission. This leaves unregulated
a range of buildings which are merely attractive and part of
the character of a block or city rather than being of great his-
toric or architectural merit. In Dublin, St. Ann’s Schools and
the Molesworth Hall, which were demolished in 1978, were
of this genre.
The desire of local authority officials to avoid eyesores and
dilapidated buildings provides an opportunity for owners to
make some strategic moves. A building may be left to decay
and then applications made for demolition and replacement.
The local authority is then faced with the trade-off between
continuation of an historic but derelict building, or its re-
placement with a sound building of a different architecture.
A recent case in Dublin arose when a developer was refused
planning permission for an office development because it
would replace a listed Georgian building. The owners were
then observed taking the roof off (McDonald, "Developer
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Works on Roof of Georgian House" Irish Times, 30 May
1981, p. 20). More subtle processes of presenting the authori-
ties with the choice between a building too costly to preserve
and a new building can also be observed.
A case in Drogheda was appealed to An Bord Plean~la. The
manager granted permission for demolition of a 250 year old
school building to make way for a housing development. The
appeal was brought by environmental and historical groups.
Drogheda’s mayor testified against the permission granted by
the county manager. The developer argued that the building
could not be restored economically (MacConnell, "Appeal
overDrogheda Plan Adjourned", Irish Times, 10June 1981).
The Board refused demolition permission (An Taisce, !981).
The restoration of an historic building is often more costly
than new construction. It is frequently impossible tomeet
the fire standards of a new building and, as noted earlier,
some trade-off has to be made between a slight fire risk (com-
pared to new construction- but still better than that which
applies to the current structure) and retention of historic
architecture. The high cost of restoration means that conserva-
tion is not just a matter of prohibiting demolition. The
Planning Act, Section 14, permits local authorities to give
financial assistance’ to private owners to help preserve build-
ings, but this has not been used by them. Another key
scarcity in this area is personnel to establish standards and
make surveys of historical buildings and advise on their pre-
servation. This may be one of the areas where the trade-off
between use of scarce planning resources for minor building
extensions, etc., and.other planning activities should be
examined.
A potentially very important positive change in the incen-
tives was provided in the Budget and ensuing Finance Bill
(Section 19) enacted by An D~il in t982. The provisions
apply to buildings which are judged bythe Commissioners of
Public Works to be structures which are "intrinsically of sig-
nificant scientific, historical, architectural or aesthetic in-
terest", and to which "reasonable access is afforded to the
public". Expenditures qualify which are incurred on "the
repair, maintenance or restoration of an approved building
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or on the maintenance or restoration of any land occupied or
enjoyed with an approved building as part of its garden or
grounds of an omamental nature". Qualifying expenditure
incurred by the owner or occupier of an approved building
will be treated under the income tax code as if this amount
were a loss¯
For individuals paying a marginal rate of tax of 65 per cent,
this in effect means that qualifying expenditure "costs" the
owner only 35p per £ of expenditure. For persons with a
relatively high taxable income who can allow public access (a
minimum of $0 daysper year and 4 hours per day is specified)
this provides an attractive inducement to maintain and per-
haps improve approved buildings. For low taxable income
individuals, the benefits, and therefore the positive incentives,
are much less.
The Kinsale Experience
The Development Plan and the listing process provides
local authorities with the opportunity to assert their objec-
tives in the preservation area and to mobilise opinion to their
point of view. However, very few communities have embraced
this opportunity. An exception is the town of Kinsale, County
Cork. Here, the town’s urban district council, through its
officials, has used the Development Plan as a means of high-
lighting the unique architectural heritage of the area. The
Cork County Architect, personnel of the School of Archi-
tecture, University College, Dublin, An Foras Forbartha and
others have participated in advisory roles and the community
has responded very favourably. In explaining this success,
Mr. Pat Murphy, Chairman of Kinsal~ Community Tourism
Promotions Ltd., wrote, in a letter to the Irish Times, October
22, 1977:
¯.. If the growing success story of Kinsale as a town determined
to conserve its own heritage is to provide any lessons, it is that
there is boundless goodwill in the inhabitants towards sensitive
developments which emerges if a suitable vehicle for its expression
is provided and trust and tact are equally intermingled .... The
Statutory Draft Development Plan is... exemplary in that it
embodies and expresses the hopes and intentions for the future
of their town of the people of Kinsale.
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To help act on these aspirations
, 
a report- "Kinsale: A
National Heritage Town"--was commissioned from the
School of Architecture, University College, Dublin, and this
document was formally adopted by the Urban District Council.
Philip Geoghegan, who directed the study, explained (Irish
Times, October 22, 1977):
It did little more than articulate and structure the expressed
wishes of the people in Kinsale. Great care was taken in discover-
ing what those wishes were .... The report also sets out direc-
tions which would help conservation in the town.
The School of Architecture also provided a resident, free
and independent advisory service.
The Kinsale situation is somewhat unique, in that it is al-
ready an important tourist and culinarycentre, and has a dis-
tinguished history and architecture. There is a palpable self-
interest for many citizens in maintaining an attractive ambi-
ance. The town is sufficiently small that with effective
leadership it was possible to heighten community awareness
and coficem, and thereby bring community pressure to bear
in encouraging preservation. "Outside" talent, interest and
funds (from the Heritage Trust)reinforce these tendencies.
Finally, the officials, notably the Cork County Architect and
the Town Clerk, and the elected council members, supported
the effort vigorously.
While there have been some successes in other towns, fre-
quently the necessary ingredients for a sustained preservation
programme are lacking. The following reasons for this can be
suggested:
(i) Rent Control. In 19.81, it was estimated by Threshold that
there were 31,500 controlled tenancies in existence, while
another study showed that in 1979 the average rent paid per
month by controlled tenants was £10.80, compared with
£72.00 by "uncontrolled" tenants. The consequences were
inevitable (O’Brien and Dillon, 1982, p. 15).
Almost by definition, most controlled lettings were in fairly old
properties and many lacked even basic amenities. This situation
was aggravated because the low rental incomes received by land-
lords were not conducive to ensuring that the property was
maintained in good order. Again, not infrequently in the case of
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Dublin, landlords sold off properties very cheaply with sitting
tenants to property speculators who, having got the property
very cheaply with the sitting tenants, then sought to get rid of
their tenants by allowing the house to fall down around their
ears,
Thus rent control was very destructive of much of the older
building stock, while providing often very inferior and
deteriorating accommodation. In 1981, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed an earlier ruling of the High Court that the provi-
sions in the 1960 Rent Restrictions Act relating to the restric-
tions on rent and the right of landlords to recover possession
of controlled premises were unconstitutional. This clearly has
implications for the well-being of tenants and these require
serious policy attention.14 However, the ability of property
owners to capture close to market-level rents on the formerly
rent-controlled buildings should have a very positive effect on
structural conservation.
(ii) Lack of Awareness. In spite of such excellent volumes as
Patrick Shaffrey’s The Irish Town: An Approach to Survival
(Shaffrey, 1975) and numerous local histories, there is still a
widespread lack of understanding and knowledge concerning
what each community’s architectural endowment consists of.
"You can’t see what you don’t understand", the painter
Constable observed.
(iii) Ascendancy Complex. Since many of Ireland’s most
interesting structures were built by and for the ruling class,
there is a tendency in some quarters to therefore denigrate
their social, historical and architectural significance. The lack
of historical mainstream "legitimacy" encourages apathy, and
sometimes even antagonism, towards preservation.
(iv) Lack of Skills. Only six of the 27 county councils employ
an architect, and even among professionals there is a general
lack of expertise in identifying structures worth maintaining,
and in prescribing cost-effective strategies for preservation.
(v) Lack of Positive Incentives. Although the Development
Plan and planning process can be, and is used, to discourage
14Many of the issues and opportunities in this area are discussed by O’Brien and
DiUon (1982).
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destruction of structures, the procedures empioyed to this
end all take a negative form. No positive financial rewards
are offered, although such is allowed by the acts. This is a
reflection both of the straitened financial circumstances in
which local authorities find themselves and the low priority
which preservation is assigned by them in bUdgetary terms.
The facility provided in the Ma~ch 1982 Budget, Whereby
expenditure incurred on approved buildings can under certain
conditions be treated as a loss under the income tax code, is
a potentially important exception to the negative nature of
incentives. (See discussion above.)
(vi) Lack of Direct Local Vested Interest in Preservation. We
have noted that in Kinsale, an enlightened citizenry could
see the long-term economic and Community benefits of pre-
servation. In many districts, although there is a comparable
self-interest, it is not always so readily identifiable by those
affected, nor so easily orchestrated and mobilised.
(vii) Absence of Leadershipi Overcoming the "natural ten-
dencies" inimical to preservation; requires vigorous leadership.
Given the pivotal role which the mai4ager is assignedin the
Irish planning system, this usually means in effect that the
manager must be Willing and able to provide the necessary
lead. In some cases this has not been forthcoming.
(viii) Procedural Deficiencies. To be protected, buildings must
be listed in a development plan. However, it takes time to
compile the list, and development plans are typically revised
at best on a five year cycle although piecemeal revision is
allowed under the Act. Thus, many buildings worthy of pre-
servation may be left without any protection for several
years.
As implemented, the land-use planning system is unlikely
in many cases to result in the preservation of zones of archi-
tectural distinction, except in cases, such as Merrion Square
in Dublin, where there is a coincidence of commercial and
aesthetic interest in preservation. Even here, unless positive
efforts are made to encourage maintenance, disintegration
may eventually set in. In those cases where there is a sub-
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stan.tial commercial advantage in allowing deterioration and
eventual clearance, the current listing and permit process is
likely to be insufficient in many - perhaps most- cases.
Innovation in Design
In the course of our interviews with architects, we were
consistently told that the planning system encouraged medi-
ocrity and a lack of venturesomeness in design. A prominent
architect, Mr. Sam Stephenson, expressed the prevailing view
at a conference of the Architect’s Association of Ireland
(quoted by McDonald in "Architect says Dublin Office Block
Design Depressing" Irish Times, 23 October, 1981):
There is no single culprit, but an unholy and unwilling alliance of
developers, planners, conservationists and tired and timid archi-
tects.
With regard to planners, he observed that they shied away
from anything new or striking in architectural design. "Most
of the time they seem to hope that no development would
ever take place so that they wouldn’t have to make any deci-
sions". His criticism of conservationists was that they were
satisfied with "anything that is not obtrusive or noticeable.
They seem to prefer all new developments to blend with the
existing developments, despite the fact that some of these
developments are very large indeed".
In Dublin, the requirement in many areas that a facsimile
of the original frontage be provided -- usually with red brick
-- on new buildings is regarded as especially chafing, as it so
restricts creative originality that all architectural design tends
towards a (low) common denominator. Planners respond that
when developers (and their architects) were "let loose", as in
the office boom in Dublin in the 1960s, they produced mainly
glass boxes of negligible aesthetic merit. Better, they say, to
have a low common denominator than none at all.
An exactly parallel set of concerns arise in the case o,f the
design of housing schemes. Private developers and their archi-
tects argue that a planning application which includes only
design features- in terms of plot ratios, spacing, materials
used, road widths and layout, etc., - which are already well
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accepted, will maximise the probability of approVal. Any
application incorporating new or different features--e.g.,
the use of cluster development, novel structural designs, culs-
de-sac, etc.,- is likely to be delayed and perhaps even re-
fused. This combines with uncertainty concerning the degree
to which consumers are likely to be enthusiastic about new
concepts to stifle creativity. That there is a measure of cre-
ativity available was demonstrated in Dublin when the Cor-
poration held a competition for architectsasking them to
submit local authority housing scheme designs. Several very
attractive and functional designs were submitted, and the
realisation of some of them can now be seen in inner city
areas. Planners at An Foras F0rbartha developed a proto-
type for a housing scheme which had a number of unique
features vis-a-vis open space, contours, culs-de sac, etc., and
which would not cost more than the conventional design, but
which would necessitate some sacrifice of road widths; kerbs
and junctions (Brangan eta!., 1980).
This study is of such Significance that it is worth describing
in a little more detail. The team undertaking the study set
out to demonstrate that it~ is possible to build housing estates
which are safer, more diverse and engender a stronger sense
of community than existing schemes and to build them at no
greater cost. The professional skills of the six team members
included architecture, engineering, planning, quantity survey-
ing and Social science. They note that half of the accidents to
child pedestrians in residential areas occur when the child is
crossing from behind a parked vehicle. Roads have tended to be
wide and straight and to be through roads rather than culs-de-
sac. They are wide because they are designed to allow for
parking on both sides of the road and to allow access by large
vehicles such as fire engines and straight because minimum
garden depth requirements, bUilding line requirements and
sewers located in grass margins make it uneconomical to put
in curves. They argne that curved, short culs-de-sac with wide
driveways and plenty of off-street visitor parking should be
used. They note that research has shown that culs-de-sac are
the safest type of residential road layout, but that existing
minimum junction spacing requirements (about 60 metres)
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discourage their use. They took 5 schemes currently under
development, and designed alternative layouts, employing
the cul-de-sac concepts and using flexible road standards. In
Figure 1 the original layout and the attractive layout can be
seen for one of these schemes. They argue that the latter is
safer for children than the former, provides more diversity
and a greater sense of identity, and is more secure, in terms
of discouraging vandalism and burglary. The new layout
would allow 302 houses in the scheme, compared with 288
in the original. Taking the average per house original layout
costs as 1,000 units, the costs per house of the revised plan
worked out at 962; the distribution is presented in Table 4:
Table 4: Average layout costs per house, original and revised
Original Revised
(288 houses) (302 houses)
Paved Areas 467 410
Fencing 90 84
Landscaping 81 102
Drains 260 262
Services 102 104
1,000 962
Many developers to whom we spoke shared the opinion of
the Foras Forbartha group that if roads did not have to be
designed for through traffic and to allow on-street parking on
both sides, then much more pleasing and socially desirable
scheme designs could be adopted. Others felt that what was
proposed would cost more than the existing conventional
designs.
In spite of the opportunities identified in this study,15 there
have been few moves to act on them. We feel that an effort
15The concepts were first presented at a conference -- "Streets for Living" -- held
in 1976.
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should be made to identify the constraints inhibiting progress
in this regard. The following are among the likely candidates:
the costings estimates are over-optimistic; developers feel
that customers would not be attracted to such schemes; road
engineers insist that roads be designed for through traffic
which allows passage for bin-collection, fire brigade vehicles,
delivery lorries, etc., and on-street parking; planning permission
is delayed or refused.
We feel that diversity could characterise housing scheme
layout if there was the flexibility and will to encourage it. A
key requirement for the successful implementation of such
schemes appears to be that householders and visitors comply
with regulations limiting on-street parking. Even though ample
off-street parking would be provided, it might prove difficult
to enforce this requirement.
The assumption is implicit that house purchasers would be
willing to buy houses in schemes other than the conventional
layout. If builders are willing to test this premise, they should
be encouraged to do so.
However, the incentives are to minimise hassle and delay
by being determinedly unoriginal; we can expect that current
design conventions will continue to be an outcome of the
current planning system.
Chapter 13
Planning and Development
It is clear from the statement made by the Minister, Mr.
Neil Blaney, in introducing the 1963 Planning and Develop-
ment bill to An D~il’ (D~il Debates Volume 197), and from
other sources such as Meagher (1965), that the land-use
planning system was viewedas a major element in encourag-
ing and facilitating economicand social development. This
would be achieved by a cost-effective provision of infra-
structural services, by anticipating potentiaI bottlenecks in
the supply of housing, industrial sites, transportation, etc., by
avoiding an unbalanced population distribution and by pre-
serving an attractive environment so as to attract both
tourists and industry. With regard to the latter, in introducing
the bill Mr. Blaney commented (D~il Debates Vol. 197,
p. 1762):
Good environment is important to existing industry and it can
encourage:new industry... Industrialists are influenced by good
amenity, by the appearance of a place and by the facilities which
it offers for leisure .... A good environment and prosperity are~
closely associated.
To what extent has the land-use planning system fulfilled
these aspirations? It is virtually impossible to give a definitive
answer to this question, since separating out the influence of
planning per se from all of the other factors bearing on dev-
elopment is not feasible. However, itmay clarify matters if
some of the issues involved are addressed.
By examining the systems whereby infrastructural invest-
ments are allocated, we canget a sense of the extent to which
the aspiration of the planningsystem to utilise these resources
cost-effectively has been realised. With reference to both
regional policy and the distribution of development within
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Dublin we address the issue of achieving a "balance" in
population and economic development.
The Allocation of lnfrastructural Investment
How does the planning system encourage the allocation of
infrastructural investment in a co-ordinated and cost-effective
fashion? The bulk of these funds are dispensed by the central
government. Since development plans are prepared at the
local level, it is possible at this level to prepare a co-ordinated
and cost-effective combination of investment opportunities.
In most development plans, a co-ordinated local infrastruc-
tural "package" is presented. However, the central govern-
ment only makes a very limite.d volume of general purpose
funds available. For important road, water and sewer schemes,
the work has to be authorised and financed by the Depart-
ment of the Environment. The exemption of residential
housing from rates and its replacement by finance provided
by the Exchequer has in effect diminished the autonomy of
a local authority with regard to embarking on a self-funded
infrastructural investment programme. Allocations from the
central government for these purposes are based on some
index of need, combined with distributional and political
considerations. A national roads plan has been published
(Road Development Plan for the 1980s, Department of the
Environment, 1979) which is to serve as a locational guide
for future allocations. No national water and sewer investment
plan is available. It is not clear what criteria are employed to
ensure that, within the distributional and political constraints
imposed, the funds devoted to infrastructure are spent in an
economically efficient fashion. However, Foster et al., (1981),
in a study of the importance of infrastructure for industrial
investment undertaken for the National Economic and Social
Council (NESC), noted that (p. 82):
We have detected a tendency to improvisation and to ad hoe
decisions in the provision of infrastructure. There are infrastruc-
ture plans but especially at the local level they tend to be col-
lections of worthwhile proposals rather than systematic attempts
to anticipate needs and opportunities .... It would.., seem as
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if there is a serious problem in determining investment priorities.
The style of decision-making of the past and of the present would
appear better suited to times when the supply of investible re-
sources is more ample in relation to demand... ~The present
mixture of national and local POlitical decisions may appear eas": st
to sustain since they imply no break with past practice, but their
adequacy will come under greater strain as the scarcity of funds
becomes greater.
They conclude this theme in their analysis by saying that
(p. 87):
We believe that the needs and costs of providing infrastructure
have reached such a point that urgent attention should be given
on how to establish priorities and improve methods of provision
so as to make the best use of scarce resources.
There is, therefore, a strong implication that economic
efficiency is not being achieved with the present system.
Regional Policy
The limitations of a highly localised land-use planning sys-
tem as a means of making decisions on infrastructure invest-
ments has been recognised by commentators. Meagher, who
has played a central role in the Department of the Environ-
ment in developing and implementing the Planning Acts,
looked to regional planning in part as a means of overcoming
these (Meagher, 1965), as did Murray (Murray, 1966). Their
anticipations concerning developments in this regard have not
been realised. Although regions have been defined, none of
them has been assigned autonomous decision-making authority
or revenue-raising capability. The Industrial Development
Authority has established job targets in manufacturing, by
region, and has used its considerable financial resources and
discretion in channelling private investment (and therefore
jobs) to particular areas in order to achieve its objectives.
Foster et al., (1981) point out that the IDA has been success-
ful thus far in overcoming bottlenecks in infrastructure be-
cause it has "been able successfully to put pressure on other
public agencies to undertake special investments to overcome
such bottlenecks." These author’s go on to argue that the
ability of one agency to override normal priorities is only
possible when the existing authorities do not have "well-
worked out programmes according to their own priorities."
We conclude that, in terms of achieving regional objectives
vis-h-vis economic development, the land-use planning system
per se has not played a pivotal role, although it has in many
cases responded positively to efforts in this regard by the
IDA. Has the system had much success in shaping the location
and nature of development within a single planning jurisdic-
tion? Dublin provides an interesting example in this respect.
Location of Developrnent in Dublin
Two interrelated issues have dominated recent discussions
of this topic.
The first concerns the decline of selected areas of the inner
city, the latter defined usually as the area bounded by the
Grand Canal on the south, by the Royal Canal on the north,
and the Phoenix Park to the west. The decline is documented
in a number of recently published reports, including Bannon
et al., (1981), Davis et al., (1980) and a report on the inner
city prepared by an inter-departmental committee (Inter-
Departmental Committee, 1979). The problem stems from a
combination of declining employment opportunities in in-
dustry, as the "old" base becomes increasingly uncompetitive,
the replacement of residences by office and related develop-
ments and the attractions of the suburbs for family living.
The situation does not yet resemble the so-called doughnut
effect, which is a familiar feature of many American cities,
where a "dead" interior is surrounded by a vibrant ring of
economic activity. However, some disquieting trends in this
direction have been identified in the reports cited above.
The second is the continuation of a trend, now almost of
two centuries duration, for most office, apartment, prestige
retail outlets and middle and high income housing develop-
ments to locate south of the River Liffey, tending to partition
the city into two socio-economic zones.
A number of steps have been taken to deal with these
problems:
(1) As noted earlier in a different context, the Corpora-
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tion is building small blocks of attractive residential
units in areas which have been losing population.
(2) The IDA has initiated an effort to attract industry
and service activity into the inner city.
(3) The police presence in the most crime-prone inner
city areas has been increased. This seems to have
effected a reduction in the incidence of serious crime
in 1981 in some zones -- Kevin Street and Kilmainham,
and relatively low growth in 198-1 in Others, e.g., Store
Street at S.6 per cent, compared with very rapid rates
of growth in some suburbs, e.g., Blackrock/Dundrum
(63%), Rathfarnham and Tallaght (43.7%) (Data pro-
vided by the Minister for Justice in response to D~iil
Question, Dec. 1,198!).
(4) Irish Life Assurance Co. Ltd., a company in which the
state is a majority share holder, is a major developer
of office accommodation in Ireland. It has established
a large office/residential/shopping mall complex on
the n0rthside Of the city and has als0 developed a
major shopping centre in this zone.
(5) In May 1981, the Minister for the Environment
issued a general policy directive to An Bord Pleamila.
In it he stated that, in determining appeals relating to
retail shopping structures which would represent
large scale additions to the existing retail shopping
capacity in the locality, the Board shall have regard to
"the need to counter urban decline and to promote
urban renewal and to promote the-utilisation of un-
used infrastructural facilities in urban areas", among
Other matters. "
(6) Relatively indulgent planning conditions, compared
to those in the south, are available for office develop-
ment~in the northside. For example, developments in
the south must now have 60 per cent of the space resi-
dential, while 100 per cent office designation is avail-
able in the north.
The highly concentrated nature of Dublin’s office develop-
ments can be judged from Figure 2. Close to 90 per cent of
all Dublin apartments have been built on the south side of
Figure 2:
in Dublin, 1962-1980.
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the Liffey: 40 per cent of the Dublin units are in the Dublin
4 postal area. It is too early to say whether the measures
taken will have the effect of diminishing the relative attractive-
ness of the south side of the city for office and apartment
developments. Most of those to whom we talked felt that
they would not, for the following reasons:
(1) In the case of offices, there are substantial agglomera-
tion economies. Since traffic movement within the
city is slow and difficult, being within walking dis-
tance of other offices with which the bulk of business
is transacted is a substantial advantage.
(2) Most company chief executives, Secretaries of Govern-
ment departments and their senior management, reside
in the south, and are unwilling to travel to the north,
mainly because of the time loss and frustration en-
gendered in travel.
(3) The financial institutions and letting agents know
that Dublin postal zones 2 and 4 have a very good
track record in terms of commercial viability. They
provide ready finance and marketing services in this
area, but are much less enthusiastic about financing
activity in areas without a "solid" past record of
lettings.
(4) The aesthetic and social atmosphere in the office/
apartment zone in the south is said to be superior to
what is available elsewhere.
(5) The central government and government-financed
institutions have for several years been the major
occupiers of new office accommodation. The govern-
ment has shown no interest in, or commitment to,
the objective of encouraging the shift of development
north of the River Liffey.
There was also a sense that the predominant position of
the major downtown retail outlets was likely to be challenged
in the future by suburban developments in the form of shop-
ping centres "anchored" by department stores of a scale and
diversity now only foun’d in the city centre. In many inter-
views the difficulties of inner city and speedy cross town
access, and the severe shortage of parking, were cited as being
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perhaps the key constraints. Ambitious road construction
plans designed to overcome this difficulty have failed to come
to fruition, because of lack of resources and/or political
opposition; the latter derives mainly from the antipathy of
those who would be displaced if the proposals were acted
upon.
In 1982 there were very substantial funds allocated for
housing and related social purposes from central govern-
ment to parts of the inner city in Dublin and the Urban
Development Areas Bill (1982) was introduced. The latter
provided for the establishment of urban development com-
missions to secure the regeneration of designated urban
areas. The Custom House Dock site and the area covered by
the medieval wailed city of Dublin were so designated. The
Minister would be empowered to designate the areas as
urban development areas and to establish commissions.
Development carried out by, or approved by, an urban
development commission within its area was to be exempt
from planning control. The commissions would be very
much creatures Of the Minister -- Section 19 Of the Bill pro-
vided for the dissolution of an: urban development com-
mission when it appears to the Minister that there is no
longer a need for its existence. The powers of local authori-
ties were to be further confined. With the change of govern-
ment at the end of 1982, the Urban Development Areas Bill
(1982) has been allowed to lapse.
Because of the predominance~of Dublin on the urban scene
in Ireland, problems of inner city decline tend to be defined
in terms of thecapital. However, it is clear that~ the difficulties
are shared to greater or less degrees by all of our cities.
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Chapter 14
Gains in Land Value and their Distribution
In the report of the Committee on the Price of Building
Land (1973) hereafter referred to as the Kenny Report, the
first chapter is devoted to detailing the very rapid rise in the
prices paid for serviced land and potential building land near
cities and towns. Between 1968 and 1971 the average price
of serviced land in County Dublin increased by 530 per cent,
while in the same period the consumer price index rose by
64 per cent. This pattern has since continued; Jennings
(1980) showed that the median cost per undeveloped house
site in the Dublin area has increased from £500 in 1975 to
£4,000 in 1980, a 700 per cent increase, while the consumer
price index increased by 98 per cent over the same period. He
divided the market into three parts: the northern sector, the
southern sector and the new town areas (Tallaght, Blanchards-
town, etc.,) and shows that for the past three years, prices in
the south and the new town areas have grown especially
rapidly (Table 5). He also estimated the share of house price
which land comprises over time in the three areas and in the
greater Dublin area as a whole (Table 6).
While the proportion of the average house price consisting
of land price has remained quite stable in the greater Dublin
area over the period, this masks very sharp shifts within the
area, with decline in the northern sector being "compensated
for" by growth in the southern sector; the new town areas
have also shown some growth, albeit from a much lower base.
The price payable for land is a residual. In a prestige area
with strong demand, and therefore high house prices, builders
will be willing to pay much more for sites than they would in
less attractive areas with lower prices. In each case, the dev-
elopers will estimate the price at which they feel they can sell
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Table 5 : Median prices paid per undeveloped Site for housing
land, Dublin area, Current £
Year North South New town areas Greater Dublin
area
1974    800 700
1975    800 1,500
1976 2,200 1,900
1977 3,000 2,600
1978 3,000 5,000
1979 2,900 9,500
1980 3,700 12,000"
400 500
400 500
700 1,500
2,600
1,000 3,000
2,400 3,400
2,900 4,000
*Only, one transaction
Note: The data for 1979 and 1980 were generously provided to us by Jennlngs
as an update of his original analysis, which covered the 1974-1978
period.
Source: Jennlngs (1980) pp. 28, 25.
Table 6: Site cost as a percentage of average house price in
the greater Dublin area, selected years
Year Northern Southern New town Greater Dublin
sector sector areas area
1976 19 16 7
1978 11 15 6
1979 11 22 9
1980 13 22 11
13
II
11
12
Source: Jennings (1981) p. 4.
their houses; they then deduct all of their non-land costs, in-
cluding an allowance for profit; and this defines the maximum
amount which they will be willing to bid for land. In com-
petitive markets, the price actually paid will amount to the
maximum which the most economically efficient developer
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could afford to pay and still make a profit. Land price, there-
fore, is derived from the price which developers estimate they
can get for the finished house. Jennings (1980) estimated that
in 1979 median prices paid per undeveloped site in the south
suburbs, north suburbs and new town areas amounted res-
pectively to £9,500, £2,900 and £2,400 (see Table 5). The
higher prices paid in the south suburbs derived from the
higher prices which, other things being equal, developers felt
they could get in that region compared to the other sectors.
The higher site cost per se does not cause the higher house
prices. Putting this another way, if developers were given the
land for nothing in the south, the house prices would not fall
by 22 per cent in the area unless there were price controls.
There would be some (probably slight) downward influence
on prices, as a result, but the predominating factor determin-
ing house sale prices in the short run is likely to be demand
for properties in the area in relation to supply.
In addition to growth in income and population, a variety
of factors can cause a major appreciation in land value. These
include: the provision of infrastructural services, including
water, sewer connections and roads; changes in taste;the pro-
vision of adjacent aesthetic, cultural, educational and social
amenities, and reduced rates of crime and delinquency. Value
may likewise be diminished by a parallel set of negative influ-
ences. When substantial property appreciation occurs, the
owners capture what economists call a rent. Rent in this
sense does not have its popular meaning, but is defined as
the return over and above that required to maintain a resource
in its highest valued use. Take the case of land now used for
farming. If services are provided adjacent to this land, and it
is located on the south side of Dublin, it would have had a
median market value in 1979 of£76,000 per acre (8 sites per
acre) for development. If the landowner would require a mini-
mum of £16,000 per acre before he would give up his land to
this use, the difference between the minimum necessary to
induce the change in use and the amount actually received is
called rent. Thus in this case the rental yield to the landowner
is £60,000 (76,000-16,000) per acre.
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Rent Yield
Minimum Pricg
The average price per statute acre received for agricultural
land which was sold at public auction for farming in 1974-
1980 has been estimated by Kelly (1981) and is shown in
Table 7. This is land which is unserviced and which does not
have planning permission.
Table 7: Average price per sta tu te acre received for agricultural
land at public auction. 1975-1980
£/AC
1975 1976 1977     1978 1979     1980
597 839 1,164 1,554 2,365 1,474
Source: Kelly (1981)
The price of agricultural landis the absolute minimum which
landowners would accept to transfer use, However, the mini-
mum price which would induce a voluntary surrender of land
for development- this assumes that the full market price
for development is not obtainable -= will generally be higher
than this. We were told that a farmer who does not particularly
wish to sell, but who has say, two sons who wish to farm, can
be induced to sell for a price which allows him to purchase
farms for each of them and that this type of consideration
tends in many areas to define the minimum threshold price.
If we allow a 100 per cent .mark-up’ on the historically
high average agricultural land price of 1979, we arrive at a
"minimum acceptance" price of £5,000 per acre.
Area Developed
There are no annual data available specifying the total area
of land which is developed annually. This must be estimated.
In 1979, the composition of housing output was as follows
(Table 8):
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Table 8: Housing output and land area requirement, 1979
Houses                 Land
No.      % of total AreaI    % of total
Local Authority 6,239 23 624 18
Private Estate 10,323 39 1,032 29
Private Single (one-off) 9,095 34 1,819 52
Private Apartments
(New Blocks) 437 2 15 0.5
Conversions/Apartments 450 2 15 0.5
26,544 100 3,505 100
I. Assuming a density of i0 units per acre for local authority and private estate
houses, and 5 units and 30 units, respectively, for private single (one-off) and
apartments.
Source: Duffy (1980, p. 2)
We estimated that a density of 10 dwellings per acre is
likely to be the net average space requirement for local
authority and private estate houses, while for the private
single (one-off) units and apartments, densities of 5 and 30
per acre, respectively, have been assumed. Bannon (1979)
estimates that industrial, commercial/institutional, transporta-
tion and interior associated open space requirements consume
the same amount of land as residential use. Thus, with a total
residential land requirement of 3,500 acres we estimate that
the total annual conversion of land to development would
amount to about 7,000 acres.
Land Price and Rent
For building land in the greater Dublin area, the average
price per acre for land for private housing- undeveloped
sites - came to £49,000 in 1980 (Table 9). This is the only
firm data we have on the market value of such land; the
Dublin area accounts for about one-third of the nation’s
housing construction.
As can be seen in Table 9, the average price paid by local
authorities in the Dublin area for land for all purposes --
amounting to £10,000 per acre in 1980 - is lower than
that paid for private housing land. If we take the average
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Table 9: Average price per acre of undeveloped land purchased for private housing
and by local authorities for all purposes, Dublin area
Private housing Local authorities
Area Value Average price Area Value Average price
(acres) (O00s £) per acre (£) (acres) (O00s £) per acre (£)
1974 554 3,120 5,632 432 1,080 2,500
1975 398 2,300 5,779 323 1,020 3,158
1976 158 2,400 15,190 64 1,000 15,625
1977 504 9,940 19,722 105 700 6,667
1978 334 6,900 20,659 392 1,400 3,571
1979 249 6,987 28,060 611 6,100 9,984
1980 300 14,700 49,000 273 2,730 10,000
Note:
Source:
The data available for private housing account for about 66 per cent Of
the total land "converted" to housing in the Dublin area.
Adapted and updated in personal communication fromJennings (1980)
price for a 0.2 acre site for a single house as £2,500 this
yields a per acre value for land for such purposes of £12,500.
We assume that the average price of land for local authority,
private estates and apartments outside Dublin is half the level
obtaining in the Dublin area. We apply the private estate
value per acre to apartments in Dublin (Table 10).
Table 10: Tentative weighted average estimates of land values per acre
for development land (housing), 1980
Price per acre (1980 £)
Land area
as % of total Dublin area Outside Dublin
Price Weighted Price Weighted
average average
Local Authority 18 ~10,000 1,800 5,000 900
Private Estate 29 49,000 14,210 ,,24,500 7,105
Private Single
(one-off) 52 12,500 6,500 12,500 6,500
Private Apartments 1 49,000 490 24,500 245
Conversion/Apartments
23,000 14,750
Note: Weights applied arc the percentage of total land area for each category
(Table 8).
Source/ Tables 8 and 9.
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If we assume that a quarter of development (by area) takes
place in the Dublin area with the balance being located else-
where, we arrive at a weighted average number (rounded to
the nearest thousand) of £17,000 per acre. Deducting the
£5,000 per acre "minimum acceptance price" leaves us with
an average "rent" per acre of £12,000. Applying this to the
total developed area of 7,000 acres yields a total annual rent
of £84 million (1980£). Rent is defined in this specialised
context as that amount (surplus) above the minimum neces-
sary to shift the land into development.
The reader will appreciate the tentativeness with which this
estimate must be advanced. (We derived it in part to show the
deficiencies of available data.) Its magnitude depends primarily
on two variables -- the average sale price of the land for each
purpose and the acreage of land being developed for the
various uses.
With regard to the former, the only published data available
relate to Dublin. With regard to the latter, no published esti-
mates are available. We are especially uninformed concerning
the private single (one-off) category, which comprised 34 per
cent of all new housing units in 1979. The areas and price per
acre of land being devoted to industrial and other non-
housing uses are likewise not published. Such information
appropriately analysed is absolutely fundamental to sensible
public discussion of the land price and rent capture discussion.
In the absence of such data, the most fanciful estimates can
be advanced and gain credence. We hope that the very use-
ful work of Jennings at An Foras Forbartha on land prices
will be expanded and that accurate data on the areas being
developed, by use category, will be gathered and published.
No data are available on land transactions for private housing
outside Dublin.
Who gets this rent? It is divided at present between the
landowner, intermediarieswho may buy unserviced agricultural
land in hopes of getting services and planning permission, and
the state. Note that usually the developer per se does not cap-
ture any of it, nor does the purchaser of the house or other
development. This is so because if the market for development
land is competitive- and all the indications are that it is --
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the developer wili pay full market value and will only be able
to realise a "normal" profit on the investment; If, however,
a developer is also active as an intermediary in the land mar-
ket, then, as a dealer in land, he may be able to capture some
of the rent. This depends, however, on a degree of ignorance
on the part of the landowner, and/or the existence of some
special influence or ability by the developer vis-h-vis matters
such as the following: getting services to. the site, getting the
land rezoned, getting planning permission,, or using tax-
avoidance skills. Over the next 50 years, if presenttrends
continue, we can expect a total of 35,000 acres, (7,000 x 50)
to be developed. Since there are Over 1t million acres of agri-
cultural land in the Republic, this comprises about 3 per cent
of the total land base potentially available. Profitable specula-
tion in the land-for-development market is therefore confined
to a very small fraction of the total area. The sharp fall in the
price of agricultural land from 1979 to 1980 illustrates the
potential penalties borne bythose who buy farm land in
hopes of capturing a large gain :when it is developed
, 
if this
latter anticipation is not realised. In our discussions, for
simplicity we assume that ;the rent accruing when land is
ready for development is capturedbY "the landowner" and
the government.
The government’s share comes from the payment of a
capital gains tax, which is payable on all capital gains, includ-
ing those accruing as a result of the sale of land. The tax is
collected under the provisions of the Capital Gains Tax Act,
1975. The rate prescribed initially was 26 per cent and in
1978 this was increased to 30 per cent. In the Finance Bill,
1982, passed byAn D~iil; the rate of capital gains tax was
further increased, as follows:
Circumstance Rate (%)
Period of ownership of the
asset is not more than one year 60
Period ofownership is 1-3 years 50
Any other case 40
Somewhat different provisions Were made for gains resulting
from the disposal of development land, when thisis a "once-
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off" transaction, such as a farmer selling sites would engage
in. The tax rate when the period of ownership is not more
than one year remains at 60 per cent but the 50 per cent rate
applies to all gains when the ownership period exceeds 1 year,
except in cases when the land was" purchased compulsorily
and has been owned for at least 3 years, in which case the
rate falls to 40 per cent.
Indexation relief applies only in respect of the appreci-
ation gain in the then existing use values on the date from
which the gain is computed. In the January 1981 Budget
Speech (where the measure was first introduced) it was
stated that indexation would be allowed for that portion of
the gain which would enable a farmer to replace a farm sold
for development by a farm of similar agricultural value. In
addition, roll-over relief does not apply and losses on other
disposals are not allowed for off-setting purposes.
Where a disposal is by a dealer or developer of land, or by
an individual or company trading in land for a profit, it is cor-
poration tax which applies rather than capital gains tax. No
indexation relief is available in relation to the disposal, and
a tax rate of 50 per cent applies.
The net tax payable under the capital gains provisions,
and net receipts, are listed below (Revenue Commissioners,
1981):
Net tax Net Net receipts as
Year payable (£) receipts (£) % of tax payable
1975 n.a. 40,166 n.a.
1976 383,978 430,453 112.1
1977 4,609,849 1,470,248 31.9
1978 12,328,329 3,239,437 26.3
1979 20,343,546 3,996,472 19.6
Source: Revenue Commissioners (1981) p. 165
Two things strike one about these data: the first is the very
modest amount of the total tax payable from this source, both
in relation to tax yielded from other sources and in terms of
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our estimate of total annual value appreciation gain on land
moving into development; the latter amounted to about
£84 million. Some of this gain will have been realised in
intermediary transactions which took place prior to 1975,
and this would not be assessable for capital gains tax. In 1979
net receipts from all sources came to £1,990.8 million, so
that the capital gains tax payable- £20.3 million- only
amounted to about 1 per cent of receipts from all sources in
that year.
The second item worthy of note is the low percentage of
the net tax payable which has actually been paid: it fell to
less than 20 per cent in 1979.
In the case of land, the low yields to the Exchequer resulted
in part because in the past it has proved possible to reduce or
indeed avoid tax by, among other means, the use of subsidi-
aries and annuity payment schemes. One such approach in-
volved the parent company which owns the land forming a
subsidiary and subscribing for a number of shares therein.
The subsidiary then buys an annuity which is secured on the
land for the, amount of the parent company’s shareholding,
and pays the annuity to the parents for a time. The parent
then transfers the land to another company, which will do
the development. However, in arriving at the taxable income,
since the annuity is charged on the land, its capital value can
be deducted from the profits made on the sale, thereby sig-
nificantly reducing tax liability. A number of land deals in-
volving the use of such tax-liability reducing schemes are out-
lined by Crowley (1981). In June 1981 the government
announced measures to preclude the masking of gains so as to
reduce tax liability, but it remains to be seen how successful
they will be. We return to this topic in the next section, when
we address policy choices.
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PART V POLICY CHOICES AND SUGGESTIONS
Chapter 15
Characteristics of the Land-Use Planning System: A Review
As a result of our review and analysis, we have drawn some
conclusions concerning the characteristics of the Irish land-
use planning system, from which derive our policy suggestions.
We present those characteristics here in a summary form.
Characteristics
1. Complex Decision Environment
The decision-making environment vis-h-vis land-use planning
is unusually complex.
The manager of the local authority, and his or her staff,
comprise the front-line decision-makers; within the context
of the development plan, they make the initial decisions. This
administrative level is necessarily complicated, with the plan-
ning, roads, water and sewer, parks, fire departments and
others all being involved. In the nature of bureaucracies, in
some local authorities some of these entities have become
semi-autonomous fiefdoms with their own imperatives, which
may be difficult or impossible to harmonise with an overall
vision or plan. To run this system effectively requires mana-
gerial skills of the highest order; any deficiencies in this regard
among the senior management staff in a local authority can
seriously impair performance especially in the more populous
jurisdictions.
The policy-making authority at the local level rests with
the elected members of county councils, urban councils and
borough corporations. This authority is most formally mani-
fest in the resp6nsibility to prepare and revise development
plans, but council members also set the tone for managerial
decisions and can ultimately over-ride a manager’s decision
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in most cases. Because the ability to do favours in other
spheres of activity has been diminished, planning permissions
have become, in many cases, a primary mechanism for achiev-
ing favour with constituents. When a development plan is
being revised - as in County Dublin in 1982/83 - councillors
can be seen to vie with one "another to accomplish rezonings
on behalf of constituents. Where the prospective capital gain
is so large, when there is no popular countervailing pressure,
and when there are few viable means of indulging constituents,
this pattern is to be expected.
Local authorities themselves are also major developers,
providing 20-25 per cent of all housing units. Local authority
housing and transportation policies are therefore a significant
influence on land-use.
An Bord Plean~la is the final arbiter of disputes concerning
the substance of planning permission decisions. Its influence
is direct and immediate in the particular, but as the nature of
what it favours and does not favour becomes clear, it also has
a role in the shaping of land-use policy at the local level.
The Minister for the Environment, on the advice of his or
her civil servants, may provide policy guidelines to An Bord
Plean~la, and advice to the local authorities, on planning and
related matters; the Minister appoints the members of An Bord
Plean~la,16 and also is the judge of appeals made under the
Housing Acts. However, the key control exercised at this level
is budgetary; all major infrastructural and housing invest-
ments involve central government financing and, therefore,
require approval at this level. Research related to !and-use
planning is undertaken on behalf of the Department of the
Environment by An Foras Forbartha; the latter also provides
advisory services to local authorities. The central government
is the chief utiliser of office space in Dublin; its preferences
in this respect are central to what is provided where in this
area. The: Industrial Development Authority is a major
developer of factories and a predominant influence on the
private sector in this area.
16From a list of names provided by designated organisations and groups under
provisions of the Local Government (Planning and Development) Act, 1983.
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Developers and their architects and engineers, as the major
"on the ground" changers of land in Ireland, are important
influences, as are their commercial, industrial and house-
buying clients. Banks and other financial institutions and
insurance companies can significantly affect both the nature
and location of development by the conditions they impose
on borrowings for development. Professional associations of
architects, engineers, planners, chartered surveyors, etc., can
influence the land-use planning process, as can more explicit
lobbying interests such as the Construction Industry Federa-
tion, the Living City Group, An Taisce, etc.
The general public play a role in making their choices as
consumers of housing. Members of the public also influence
land-use through their involvement in the revision of develop-
ment plans, as supplicants for a favourable zoning change (in
the case of some landowners) and as commentators on the
plan overall. They are involved in specific decisions, either as
requesters for planning permission or as third party objectors.
At the local level, residents’ associations represent the interests
of residents in the planning process.
Environmental interests are represented by a number of
organisations, of which by far the most prominent is An
Taisce. An Taisce is a nation-wide voluntary private conserva-
tion organisation which has as its aim:
To conserve and develop the nation’s physical heritage of land,
air and water, places of outstanding beauty or historical or
scientific interest, buildings, wildlife and flora.
It has around 7,500 members and plays a role in the revision
of development plans and in the evaluation of specific develop-
ment proposals. It puts primary emphasis on consultation as
a means of achieving development which is environmentally
harmonious, but as a last resort it appeals issues to An Bord
Plean~a. An Taisce was given a quasi-official "prescribed
body" status under provisions in the 1963 Planning and
Development Act, a status it shares with Bord F~lte, An
Comhairle Ealaion (The Arts Council) and the National
Monuments Advisory Council. This requires that local authori-
ties consult with these bodies in the preparation of develop-
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ment plans or in proposed variations of them, and with
regard to certain classes of application for p!anningpermission.
This very cursory overview of some of the institutional in-
fluences prominent in the Irish land-use planning process
shows the complexity of the system. However, some of
these are more central than others.
2. Key Centres of Influence
City and County Managers, An Bord Pleanfi.la and the
Department of the Environment arekey centres of influence.
The managers of local authorities are in a central position
at the local level. Although they ultimately must accede to
the desires of their council members, they can retain a large
measure of control because:
(a) They control the information on which decisions are
normally based. The manager can cite Department of
the Environment opinions, technical conditions, legal
precedent, budgetary constraints, etc., in favour of
his view; few Council members have the resources,
skills, aptitude or interest to challenge coherently a
well-argued managerial position and it is difficult
therefore to convince a majority of Council members
of their point of view. Of course, in particular instances,
a councillor’s view can be made to prevail v~z "Sec-
tion 4" and plan revisions.
(b) Managers can cite "good planning principles " in sup-
port of their decisions and there is still a residue of
respect for technocratic excellence and impartiality,
which extends even to areas wherethe decision turns
on conflicting values, rather than on engineering/
structural considerations.
(c) They are primarily responsible for ensuring excellence
and a high degree of motivation among the local
authority staff. They are in a position to provide sus-
tained leadership.
At the national level, An Bord Plean~ila’s influence flows
directly fromits statutorily defined position at theapex of the
decision-making pyramid. There appears to be strong institu-
tional incentives for planners at the local level to pass those
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cases which are likely to be locally contentious onto the Board.
The third key centre of influence is the Department of the
Environment. Its functions in the planning system have al-
ready been noted. However, its significance is as much
psychological as it is statutory and budgetary. This is so be-
cause of the deeply engrained tradition in Ireland of looking
to the central government for ideas, permission, funds and
action. This has continued for so long in so many areas, and
has been so institutionalised in statute and procedure, that it
is difficult for many local authorities to act creatively when
they are "given" a free hand, e.g., in the preparation of a
development plan. There is a tendency on their part to argue
that there is an insufficiency of funds to do the job, even
when existing local revenue-raising opportunities are not
being availed of. Unless the Department leads aggressively in
the land-use planning area, as much by example, advice, ex-
hortation and encouragement as by budgetary and legislative
support, it is unlikely that local authorities will play their full
potential role. After an initial burst of activity in the 1960s
to get the planning system operational, and another major
effort in the mid-1970s to update and improve the legisla-
tive framework, the Department seems to have confined itself
largely to a custodial role, rather than being at the "cutting
edge" of the planning system, constantly urging improvements,
showing the way and helping ensure that other governmental
units, such as the Office of Public Works, and the IDA, are
acting in a manner consistent with overall objectives.
However, the Department can hardly be accused of in-
activity in 1982 and 1983. In October 1982 the Department
issued Development Control: Advice and Guidelines. This is
a comprehensive compendium of advice as to how to imple-
ment the planning process. One might agree or disagree with
the interpretations recommended, but at least a firm basis
for debate has been provided and the Department is to be
commended for doing so.
Departmental resources have also been involved in the
preparation of numerous bills- The Urban Development
Areas Bill 1982, The Local Government (Building Land)
Bill 1982, The National Heritage Bill 1982, the Local Govern:
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ment (Planning and Development) Bill, 1982, the Local
Government (Planning and Development) Act, 1983 and the
Local Government Financial Provisions (No. 2) Act, 1983.
While only the last three of these have been enacted into
law, the background work involved in preparing these bills
combine with the possibility of a 3.4 year period of stable
government to provide a potentialbasis for sustained action.
A joint Oireachtas Committee on Building Land has been re-
established (March, 1983) to make recommendations for
measures to deal with the supply and cost of building land,
with a requirement that it report before 31 December 1983.
Finally, An Foras Forbartha has undertaken a review of the
planning system, with the objective, in part, of providing re-
search priorities and establishing a research agenda in this
area (Grist, 1983).
As long as the current institutional system is adhered to,
if the land-use planning process is to be changed, the lead
must come from the Department of the Environment, and
changes must be fully endorsed and vigorously supported by
the local authority managers and by An Bord Plean{la.
3. Emphasis on Discretionary Regulation
The system as implemented leaves a lot of discretion to
the bureaucrat. Apart from the rather broad specifications
contained in the zoning provisions Of the development plan,
developers are left with little except precedents--what has
been acceptable in the past - to guide them in preparing their
plans. "Let’s see’ what you have in mind and we’ll judge
whether iris acceptable" seems to be acommon operating
philosophy for planning authorities. There are cases where
planners and developers have worked together before a pro-
posal was submitted, to work out a mutually agreeable.
scheme which is inharmony with planning objectives, but
such pre-planning seems to be more the exception than the
rule. In the event that a proposal is not acceptable, there is
a reluctance to specify clearly which changes would result in
approval. It was pointed out to us that one of the problems
with consultation can be that local authority planners end
up doing the work which should be done by the developer’s~
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architect/consultant. However, experience should allow the
local authority to separate the "free-loaders" from those who
want genuine consultation, and this latter can be given
priority treatment.
Once permission has been granted, it appears to be almost
impossible in some cases to enforce compliance with condi-
tions imposed. A good example of the difficulties is provided
in a recent case where planning permission for a major retail
outlet was granted on condition that a house of considerable
historic significance on the property be retained. The house
was allowed to deteriorate. When the case was taken to the
High Court, the judge noted that (Irish Independent, Decem-
ber 17, 1981):
It appeared that the developer had been completely indifferent
to, or perhaps even welcomed the deterioration in the condition
of the building, and had virtually done nothing to halt it. The
developers had shown a complete disregard for the moral obliga-
tions which arose from their course of dealing with the Corpora-
tion on the planning applications, but he felt the Corporation had
also been extremely remiss in exercising whatever statutory
powers were open to them to cope with the situation.
However, he refused to make an order compelling the dev-
eloper to ensure the structural stability of the house because
the planning condition only required that it be retained, and
"He will not interpret that rather nebulous expression as
imposing a liability on the developers to preserve and main-
tain No. 40 in a condition of good repair referable to any par-
ticular period in the past."
However, when planning permission conditions are drafted
clearly and unambiguously, and there is a will to enforce the
regulations, then the system can be effective. The experience
in Cork was cited by a number of observers as a positive
example in this regard.
Pricing is rarely employed to encourage desirable behaviour
and to discourage the converse. We depend almost exclusively
on a regulatory system which allows for few gradations-
either a development is in compliance or it is not - and which
depends, on cumbersome administrative/legal procedures to
achieve compliance.
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\As we noted earlier, we feel that almost exclusivereliance
on this approach is unwise in the Irish context. Our attitudes
to regulation are much closer to the American than to the
European view. We tend to share the former’s insouciance
concerning some legal niceties. The mood is captured (per-
haps in an exaggerated form) in the following extract from a
Wyoming cowboy’s letter to a ranch owner wintering in the
East.
Dear Sir, We have brand 800 calves this roundup we have made
some hay potatoes is a fair crop. That Englishman you lef in
charge at the other camp got to fresh and we had to kiU the
s,o.b. Nothing much has happened since you lef. Yours truly,
Jim.
Enforcement of an administrative/regulatory system is
costly and difficult. When there is not a widespread inclina-
tion to comply, with societal opprobrium being bestowed on
those who do not, it can become almost totally ineffective.
4. Large Revenue Gains Crea~ed
As land goes from agricultural to development status, large
surpluses17 accrue. Their magnitude is a consequence of the
interaction of the demand for, and supply of, serviced land
in different areas. As (formerly) residential areas become
attractive for office development, surpluses are also gener-
ated. In a given area, the size of the surplus accruing is largely
determined by what the end-user is willing to pay for the use
of the area for ahouse, office, factory, etc., net of the inter-
vening costs of providing the structure in question. In the
longer term, expansion of the supply of serviced land will
diminish the size of the surplus accruing, but will not Usually
eliminate it. For example, in parts of south Dublin which
are highly prized as residential areas, the potential for ex-
panding the supply of serviced land in this vicinity is modest.
Owners of land for development in these areas will capture
17We use the term "surplus" to denote the gain in. land value in excess of the
minimum price which is needed to keep land in its highest revenue yielding
use. Economists define this as rent, but since the term rent also has popular
connotations, wc use surplus to convey this meaning.
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very large gains, almost regardless of the extent to which the
supply of serviced land is expanded elsewhere in the urban
fringe area. Analogous arguments apply to the surplus which
accrues in areas especially favoured for office or apartment
development. Likewise, when water and sewer lines are in-
stalled, the adjacent landowners receive a substantial appreci-
ation in value. This can be diminished by increasing the ser-
viced area, but a locational differential will still exist.
We estimated that, over a 50 year time period, about 3
per cent of the existing agricultural land area will be developed,
so that a relatively small number of landowners are likely to
share significantly in the gains resulting from development.
The creation of gains for some landowners implies lost oppor-
tunities for others; if the water and sewer lines create gains
for A, they imply gains forgone for B, in the sense that his
land now remains unserviced and therefore with only agri-
cultural use value.
Intermediaries who have more knowledge and/or influence
than the landowners may capture part of the surplus, but it
is important to note that in most cases the much maligned
"speculators" do not create the surplus; they simply try to
share in it.
5. Planning Authority Powers: Statutory and Procedural
The ability of local authorities to influence land-use rests
both on the relevant statutes - the Planning Acts, the Housing
Acts, etc., and on the ability to impose delay and procedural
requirements on developers. With regard to the latter, a dev-
eloper has to compare the often substantial costs - in terms
of delay - of appealing planning conditions, with the costs of
complying with them. When the procedurally imposed costs
exceed the compliance costs, a local authority has a margin
of influence which is in addition to its direct statutory powers.
6. Liability to Pay Compensation: A Dominant Consideration
in the Maintenance of Open Space
The fear of having to pay compensation if development of
open space is prohibited is a major factor shaping the actions
of planning authorities on this issue. We define open space in
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this context as any undevelopedland -- within the city or at
the urban fringe --which is attractive for development. The
pattern which has been followed generally is for a local
authority to cite non-compensatable reasons--e.g., traffic
hazard, prematurity of development by reason of inadequate
roads, and/or water and sewers -- as the basis for not allowing
development. If, on appeal, An Bord Plean~ila validates the
decision of the planning authority, but cites compensatable
reasons for so doing, e.g., the maintenance of a green belt,
the authority then typically negotiates with the landOwner in
an effort to achieve a form of development which is least
damaging to the former’s planning objectives. In doing so,
the planning authority depends on its procedural powers,
general negotiating skills and a spirit of noblesse oblige and
public spiritedness on the part of the landowners to encourage
the latter to indulge some of the public’s goals and not to
press their own statutory ,advantage to the limit. Compensa-
tion is only rarely actually paid.
7. Potential for Bribery is Great
While known instances of bribery are very rare, the oppor-
tunities in this regard’in the land-use planning,system are
great and operate at several levels. The first arises when the
Development Plan is being revised and the zoning boundaries
are therefore being reviewed. To achieve rezoning from agri-
cultural to development status can result in appreciation gains
in the order of £40,000 per acre; A landowner with as little
as 25 acres can become a millionaire in some circumstances
if the land is rezoned and proves attractive for development.
The second area where scope for bribery is great is at the
planning permission and by-law approval stage. Here, both
the permission itself and the conditions attached thereto can
involve very large gains or losses to the developer, and provide
a considerable incentive to attempt to assure a congenial
result. Since An Bord Plean~la is in most circumstances the
ultimate arbiter of decisions, the incentive to try to achieve
influence at this level is especially great.
Third party objectors comprises the final category where
potential for bribery is considerable. For a £30 fee, by
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appealing the permission to An Bord Plean~la, any citizen
can impose up to a year’s delay on a large development.18
We were assured by those involved in the planning process
that the amount of bribery, in the sense of cash changing
hands, was negligible, but that the doing of favours for con-
stituents, friends, etc., without a cash payment being required
was more common. We sense that the public’s level of con-
fidence in the integrity with which planning matters are dis-
posed of is diminishing, reflecting the scepticism embodied
in Kipling’s lines:
"Who can doubt the secret hid
Under Cheop’s pyramid
Was that the contractor did
Cheops out of several millions"
We do not doubt that in the vast majority of cases the
legendary integrity of the public servants involved has been
proof thus fa~ against the temptations and opportunities in-
herent in the current system. However, we feel that it would
be prudent and advantageous if the system could be designed
such that the scope for bribery were diminished.
8. Few Legal Precedents
There have been a number of precedent-setting court
cases in the planning area since 1977. However, they are in-
sufficient in number and diversity to provide a reliable basis
for predicting outcomes in some (but not all) situations.
Planning authorities find themselves therefore taking measures
to avoid litigation when they have very little basis for know-
ing what is and is not "legal." The decisions in some of the
cases which have been tried seem to have turned on narrow
definitions of legal terms; the wider societal implications of
issues have not been assayed. Where a judgment must be
made as to whether and to what extent the general right of
private property should be protected, and an individual’s
property rights protected from unjust attack, i.e., the degree
to which private property rights in a particular case should be
18In 1980 there were 874 third party appeals, comprising 22 per cent of the total.
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abridged in order to accommodate the common good, it
seems to us that it is necessary to be able to specify, at least
in approximate terms, what will be sacrificed interms of "the
common good" if the restrictions are not imposed: Few pri-
vate property rights are absolute. It would be wise to anti-
cipate the addressing of this issue in a variety of contextsby
undertaking scholarly analyses of the trade-offs involved be-
fore the matter:is brought to court. Ifthis is not done, the
justices will have to make decisions of enormous import for
national well-being, without adequate information on the
impfications.
9. Ambivalence Concerning the Role of Public Participation
Public participation in the land-use planning process is
allowed for in a number ofways. By requiring that an applica-
tion for planning permission must be advertised in .a news-
paper which circulates in the area, and by sending notice of
such an application to local residents, associations (this is
the custom in Dublin), public involvement is catered to at
this level. Likewise the draft development plans must be put
on display, and public commentary on them allowed for,
before the final plans are drawn up. The most potent provi-
sion for public involvement rests in the ability of any person
to appeal a planning permission to An Bord PleanAla. In
cases where the appeal is sustained, presumably this action
would be judged to have been in the social interest. In cases
where the original decision is upheld on appeal, very sub-
stantial financial and social costs canbe imposed, both on
the developer and those depending on the project for income
and employment.
There is ambivalence in these provisions, which arise from
two sources.-First, while the public are encouraged to learn
about applications for planning permission, there is no pro-
vision for conducting prior discussions with planning officials
and/or the applicant, in order to explOre modifications
which might accommodate public objectives. Some developers
do discuss their plans with interested members of the public
before applying for permission and attempt thereby to pre-
vent third party appeals, while An Taisce "negotiates" with
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developers at times at the pre-permission stage, concerning
the nature of the developments proposed. However, there is
no institutional mechanism for triggering this pre-permission
discussion between interested members of the public, the
developer and the planner.
The second source of ambivalence arises in the preparation
of the development plan. The draft plan is prepared as a single
proposal; no options are presented concerning which the
citizenry could make their preferences known. Public involve-
ment then tends to become one of either passive acceptance
of what is proposed, a self-interested effort to get a favourable
rezoning or other "favour," or opposition to some element(S)
in the plan. Creative and positive public participation,
addressed to the overall land-use outcomes desired, and the
means of their achievement, is not encouraged, although it is
not precluded.
10. Adequacy rather than Excellence in Layout and Design is
Encouraged
The planning permission process is viewed by most dev-
elopers as a series of hurdles to be overcome. Next to outright
refusal, time delay is the biggest penalty which can generally
be imposed. Layouts and building designs which are original
and do not have a "track-record" tend to be subject to special
scrutiny and therefore delay, and have an increased likelihood
of being rejected. Even if planners view the proposals with
enthusiasm, those concerned with by-law approval can stymie
them by adopting an inflexible attitude regarding implementa-
tion of regulations. There is a strong incentive therefore to
submit projects of a layout and design with which the review-
ing officials are thoroughly familiar, and which would not be-
come contentious and a source of controversy with council
members and the public. The system therefore encourages
the achievement of certain minima vis-h-vis structural per-
formance characteristics, safety, density, etc., but does not
reward innovation.
11. Dublin is Different
Developers, officials, architects, etc., all emphasised to us
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that Dublin (including the city, county and Dun Laoghaire)
differs Significantly from the rest of the country -- including
the large cities of Cork, Galway, Limerick and Waterford - in
the complexity of issues arising and the intensity with which
they are debated. This results because of the predominant role
of the city in the commercial, cultural and political life of the
country and the consequences that flow therefrom. These
include: the location of almost all office and apartment
developments, and about one-third of all housing construction,
in the Dublin area; the very high financial stakes riding on
planning decisions- in many cases these will exceedby an
order of magnitude those accruing outside the Capital; the
location in the city of the national media, parliament
, 
the two
largest universities and cultural centres.
Because of these scale and other particular influences, it has
been advocated that the Dublin area be treated differently to
the rest of the country in the land-usep!anning process. It
has been suggested, for example, that An BordPlean£la might
have a special division devoted exclusively to :dealing with
Dublin area cases. Others have proposed that the decision-
making process be broken down to much smaller, i.e., com-
munity scale, units.
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Chapter 16
Pricing, Incentives, Innovation and Enforcement
Pricing of lnfrastructural Services
The case for full long-run marginal cost pricing of infra-
structural services can be justified on the bases that: it
encourages development on the least-costly-to-service areas;it
discourages sprawl; it does not transfer resources from tax-
payers in general to segments of the property-buying public
(the latter "on average" are likely to he wealthier than the
former) ; regions with relatively little construction activity will
not subsidise those with a lot; funds are provided directly to
the exchequer of the local authority to finance the necessary
work; and supply of infrastructural services should be much
closer to effective demand, reducing the queueing and adminis-
trative rationing problem.
By long-run marginal cost we mean the replacement cost in
the future of providing these services. If there is excess capacity
in a particular system at a given time, then the immediate
cost (short-run marginal cost) of connection may be negligible.
However, in time, as expansion continues, the existing infra-
structural supply becomes fully utilised and new capacity
must be added. Efficiency in resource utilisation will be
enhanced if current developments are charged the full long-
run marginal costs of their infrastructural services.
To be set against the advantages of such pricing, it is
argued that, if it is implemented, the costs will be passed
through to the buyers of the properties; house prices will rise.
To what degree is this a valid argument? If it is known before
land purchase that such a cost will be imposed, then, in the
simplest case, in arriving at their estimates of price payable
for land, developers will deduct this infrastructure cost, just
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as they deduct other construction costs, from-the price they
expect to get for the structures to be built. Thus the "burden"
will tend to be passed back to,the landowner rather than be
passed forward to the housebuyer. However, in cases where
developers feel that some of these costs can be added to the
house price without losing sales, they will incorporate this
consideration in their bidding for the land. There will be land
at the margin- especially in high infrastructural cost areas
-which, with charges, will become unavailable for develop-
ment. There will be interaction between demand for housing
and other development, which is shaped very much by the
transactions in the existing Stock., and the supply of land,
to yield new sets of equilibrium prices for both~The burden
of infrastructural costs will be sharedby house purchasers
and landowners, with the share Of incidence depending on
demand and supply price elasticities. We feel that the bulk
of the ’~ourden" will, if certain conditions are met, be borne
by the landowner, for the followingreason: for much develop-
ment land, there is a big margin between the minimum
acceptance price needed to get the 1/ind into development
and the price which can. actually be achieved on the open
market. As long as there is a "reasonable" surplusachievable
above existing use value, the landownerswill supply the land
for development. Within this acceptance price range, supply
of land will be very price inelastic. Demand fornew housing,
on the~ other hand, is strongly influenced by the trade in
existing stock and tends to be "driven’" by factors such as
population growth and household formation, real incomes
and availability of mortgage finance land these exert strong
effects on price.19
Let Us take the extreme case, where all of the costs of infra-
structural services are passed through to the housebuyer. This
would mean that houses which have high infrastructural costs
will be relatively expensive, and, other things being equal,
will be less attractive to buyers than houses in areas which are
less costly to service. Affluent purchasers of expensive
19A study by Ian Irvine, which is in draft at the ESRI, will shed some light on the
relative significance of demand and supply influence vis-a-vis new house prices.
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houses will bear the full servicing costs, without the benefit
of a subsidy in this regard from the general taxpayer. We
therefore feel that, to the extent that it has validity, the
impact on house prices is not a convincing argument to set
against the advantages of long-run marginal cost pricing of
infrastructural services. For effective operation, the following
should characterise policy in this area:
(1) In so far as it is administratively possible to do so,
charges should reflect actual costs.
The use of an average cost for the entire jurisdiction
defeats an important purpose of the charge, which is
to encourage development in areas which are less
costly to service and to discourage the converse. Thus,
the charges for in-fill developments would amount to
the least cost long-run marginal costs for expanding
the system. Conversely, developments, for example,
in unserviced and costly-to-service mountain areas
would attract charges sufficient to cover the full
(high) costs applicable to such areas.
(2) There should be substantial political agreement among
the parties that the costs of infrastructural services
will not be transferred back to the general taxpayer
after the next election. If this is not done, then those
landowners who can afford to wait before selling will
do so; rather than take a capital loss now, they will
wait to see how the election turns out. This will drive
the price of development land up rapidly, thereby
exacerbating rather than ameliorating land-use plan-
ning problems.
(3) The central government should maintain the incentive
to assess charges, by making the amount of the lump
sum contribution to local government independent of
the extent to which a local authority charges for
infrastructural services.
(4) With the resources which such charges make available,
and utilising the rationing effect induced thereby, the
local authority should make every effort to ensure
that the services paid for are delivered in a timely and
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efficient fashion. Developers and house purchasers
should be seen to be getting what they have paid for
in terms of roads, water and sewers, effluent treat-
ment plant, etc. In fact, as noted above, a (probably
substantial) fraction of the infrastructure cost will be
reflected in lower land prices, rather than being added
to house prices. However, there is both Symbolic and
practical value in providing services efficiently when
they are being charged for explicitly.
Where there is a concern that low income individuals
will be unfairly burdened by this pricing approach,
grants can be made to such individuals directly. "Low
income housing" per se should not be subsidised, for
two reasons: (a) following on the reasoning outlined
earlier, much of the subsidy is likely to be transferred
tothe landowner on whose land they are built; (b) high
income individuals can (and do) buy ’flow income"
housing; to the extent that a subsidy is effective, they
capture itfi°
Pricing for Planning Services
Pricing opportunities also arise in the provision of planning
permission reviews, both at the initial decision and appeal
stages. Delay imposes very heavy costs on developments, but
the incentives in this regard are ’quite perverse in terms of the
planning system. We have argued that the ability to impose
delay is a major procedural weapon in the hands of officials.
Efficient and timely expedition of permissions couldreduce
their influence. We feel. that the ability of Officials to shape
events should not depend on this cumbersome, costly and
somewhat arbitrary power to delay; we are proposing a number
of approaches of which pricing is one - which would free
planners from thenecessity of having to depend so heavily on
procedural powers in the carrying out of their responsibilities.
20There are a variety of other mechanisms for addressing the housing of low
income families; these are discussed in Blackwell (1981).           ¯
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Gerry Henry, a prominent auctioneer in Dublin, was
quoted (Cook, 1981) as recommending that:
If the corporations cannot afford to substantially increase the
number of qualified planners, they should invoke a financial
levy on each planning development submission in relation to their
capital value so that the corporation can recruit the necessary
planners.
We strongly endorse this proposal. The funds generated
should be at a level sufficient to increase the number of
planners at both local and appeals levels and to contribute to
the preparation of development plans. In return, developers
should receive timely and competent treatment of their
applications. As one individual involved in property develop-
ment pointed out (Walsh, 1982):
Most developers, if they saw some speed of action being brought
to bear on new development areas, would be disposed towards
paying a realistic levy on the basis that their lands would be
immediately opened up for development.
The government introduced charges effective from March
7, 1983. The rates are as follows:
Planning Applications
Dwellings (including flats) £30.00 per dwelling
Domestic extensions and other
improvements
All other buildings
£15.00 per dwelling
£1.75 per square metre
of gross floor space
Submissions by persons other
than the applicant £10.00
Appeals
Written appeals £30.00 per appeal
Request for an oral hearing £30.00 per appeal
Submissions by persons who are
not formal parties to an appeal £10.00 per submission
The main concern in relation to the fee for planning applica-
tions is that the quid pro quo - quicker service -- will not be,
forthcoming. We feel that the logic of the pricing approach
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will be seriously vitiated if it is not accompanied by better,
more timely service. If necessary, the fee should be adjusted
so as to provide the necessary resources to function with full
effect both in preparation of the development plan and in the
handling of planning applications.
The introduction of charges for lodging an appeal and for
making submissions to planning authorities in relation to
planning applications have proved to be more controversial.
The flavour of the oppposition can be captured in the reaction
of the Dublin Civic Group, a voluntary conservation society
(cited by Frank McDonald in the Irish Times, March, 4, i983).
The ~30 fee was described as a "grave social injustice" which
would have the effect of "silencing the voices of those who
show serious commitment to the care and protection of the’
environment." Professor Kevin B. Nowlan, chairman of the
group, observed that almost 80 per cent of their work con-
sisted of making submissions to Dublin Corporation on current
planning applications, and comments "If we were forced to
pay £10 for every letter we write to them, we may have to
got out of business altogether."
With regard to the charge for making submissions to plan-
ning authorities, we agree with the point of view of .the
Dublin Civic Group: this submission process is designed to
improve the quality of decisions at the local level, by bringing
information on attitudes and implications to the notice of
a planning authority; to "penalise" the provision of such by
means of a charge cannot be justified on grounds of either
efficiency or equity.
The charge for lodging an appeal is not so easy to evaluate,
because there is a trade-off to be made between ease of access
on the one hand, and spurious, ill-considered, uninformed or
malevolent appeals on the other, which can impose very high
economic and social costs.
We feel that there is a case to be made in favour of impos-
ing a charge for third party appeals, but that it must be
accompanied by mechanisms for allowing access to those
who otherwise could not afford to lodge an appeal. The
following are of this nature:
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(i) Give the prescribed bodies, notably An Taisce- a
"quota" of free appeals, based on their normal appeal
record. Other non-prescribed bodies which have a
record of responsible activity in this area should be
allowed to apply for a similar quota.
(ii)Provide a loan fund for individual appellants which
could be used by them in cases of demonstrated
financial need.
It is important to bear in mind in evaluating charges in this
area that the objective should not be to raise sufficient funds
to finance the appeals system. Rather, the goal should be the
discouragement of undeliberated, spurious and mischievous
objections.
Pricing and Amenity Considerations
It is recognised that derelict, unused sites impose a cost on
society and that these costs grow as the period of dereliction
increases. It also takes time to put together the physical and
financial resources necessary to carry out a commercial
development. In order to encourage utilisation of such sites,
a charge should be assessed with increases over time, as long
as the state of dereliction continues. This approach was
recommended by the inter-departmental committee on the
inner city. Transfer of the property would also transfer the
assessment which was payable at the time of transfer. This
would encourage development. For those developers who, for
whatever reasons, were having difficulties getting work under-
way, it would encourage them to sell on to those who could.
If necessary, a local authority should use its powers of com-
pulsory acquisition so as to facilitate private development.
Local authorities are themselves owners of substantial
acreages of derelict areas. This is often caused by the purchase
of properties for road widening, which is then delayed because
of shortage of funds. It is important that the costs which
such dereliction imposes on the community also be reflected
in the local authority ’s own accounts, i.e., that they carry
the same level of charges as the private sector. It may be
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argued that this does not make sense, in so far as the local
authority would in effect be charging itself. However, it is
normal procedure in .vertically integrated private firms for
intra-company transactions to be "costed", so as to allow
evaluation of unit performance. The performance of local
authorities with regard to dereliction should likewise be
costed. If no overt "penalties" in this regard are shown, there
will be no pressure within the system not to hoard land
unnecessarily and mirror thereby the behaviour of the private
sector. The incentive facing local authorities at present appear
to be very strongly in the direction of "hoarding" sites for
road-widening, housing, etc., so that when central government
funds finally become available for these purposes, programmes
can be rapidly implemented. The very heavy social costs
which such a policy engenders are not apparently given great
weight, nor is the loss of credibility which the local authority
suffers vis-a-vis private dereliction. Change in this domain
probably depends on the ability to plan capital programmes
five years in advance, so that land requirements can be
reasonably matched against programme targets.
In areas where high-rise developments are judged to be
undesirable, an assessment could also be payable. Likewise,
strip development, development in areas of high amenity, etc.,
could attract a charge to compensate for the costs such devel-
opment imposed on society. How, and on what grounds, would
the charge levels ’be based? This would vary with time, place
and circumstances. The charge level must be sufficiently high
that it does act as an incentive to encourag~ socially beneficial
behaviour, but at a level where implementation is politically
feasible. Inevitably, a degree of experimentation will attend
the initial applications of the concept, but experience should
soon indicate the price range which is effective and feasible.
It is sometimes difficult to convince people that a pricing
approach along these lines is appropriate, This is so because
it is conventional to view Western governments as leaving the
private sector unhindered except for applying certain regula- ¯
tions to achieve the public welfare. These then exceptional
interferences are seen as asbolute necessities. Their very
legitimation for existence is their unique necessity. If the
174
public justifies its rights to regulate from extreme necessity,
it then seems strange to be willing to trade some of these for
other things of value. For example, a public health regulation
which would cause death could not be sold for money (may-
be even if used to build a hospital). At the most, if the public
changes its mind in the particularinstance, it relinquishes the
regulation entirely and nothing is expected in return.
It is not clear if the above is a conscious ideological under-
pinning for current govemmental behaviour or not, but the
fact remains that governments reserve rights for the public
and seldom ask anything in return if they are abandoned.
This puts the government in an all or nothing regulatory
posture where it either applies the rule to some degree or lets
it fall by the wayside. Perhaps some of the current unpopu-
larity with regulations in general is this inflexible application
or abandonment in the face of pressure and favouritism rather
than offering them in exchange for other valuable considera-
tions in open competition.
At one time in Dublin there was a practice whereby the
local authority relaxed its on-site parking requirements for
a fee. The fact that this practice required the subterfuge of
promising eventual public construction of parking facilities
nearby to serve the building is testimony to the reluctance
to see the government in the trading mode. Current thinking
requires government to say it absolutely needs the parking
space or give up the rule entirely.
When the public rights are clearly expressed in standards
such as those limiting density, height, or property line
setbacks,, there are some opportunities for trading (at least
in-kind if not for money). Thus it is common for a local
authority to negotiate with a developer to achieve a given
density by a building siting or height or floorspace arrange-
ment more conducive to the public’s preference than originally
proposed by the developer. Some might even be willing to
increase the density in return for including some apartments
in an otherwise entirely office or commercial building. Some-
times, local authorities try to get more than the past standard
of internal open space on an estate development, in return
for simply its development permission (or at least an implied
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less time consuming approval process). Some examples of this
have failed upon appeal.
It "is clear that to apply pricing approaches in certain cir-
cumstances will require a re-orientation in attitudes.
Incentives for Conservation
Thus far, we have discussed some of the uses of price as a
means of inhibiting socially undesirable land-use behaviour.
The mirror image of this approach is the use of pricing and
other incentives as a means of encouraging desirable land-use.
The use of grants, loan subsidies and tax incentives is the norm
in Western European cities to encourage the maintenance Of
buildings of some cultural/architectural distinction and his-
torical value. The approaches used are summarised by Robin-
son (1980). In Ireland, with the exception of occasional
grants to institutions such as Trinity College and Kings Inns,
no ear-marked incentives of this nature have been made
available. Home improvement grants have been provided in
the past, but no effort has been made to target these, either
to lower-income homeowners, or to discriminate among
housing types on the basis of age, structural condition or
architectural/cultural/historical distinction.
One notable advance has been made in encouraging the
conservation of buildings which are of either scientific,
historic, architectural or aesthetic significance. This is the
provision in the Finance Bill, 1982 (Section 19) which allows
expenditure on the repair, maintenance and restoration of
approved buildings to be deducted in the estimation of
taxable income. For owners or occupiers who pay a relatively
high marginal tax rate, and who can comply with the require-
ment that public access be provided, this is an attractive
incentive (more details are provided in Chapter 12).
Another small advance in this respect is represented by the
cultural/environmental awards by Dublin Corporation for
1983, which are to those who have set a standard of taste in
the way they have maintained, repaired, restored or refur-
bished their shops, pubs, banks, garages, etc.
We feel that a package of incentives, targeted to encourage
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the achievement of particular conservation objectives in a
cost-effective manner, should be provided. It should reinforce
in a positive manner regulatory efforts to maintain what we
most value from our past in terms of land-use, and would
include, for example, incentives for the maintenance of inner
city residential structures, which might have little architectural
distinction but be of great social significance. A wide-ranging
number of options in this regard are discussed by Davis et al.,
(1980).
Incentives for Innovation
We have noted elsewhere the institutional incentives which
encourage adequacy rather than excellence in layout and
design. There are a number of incentives worthy of considera-
tion as a means of tipping the balance in favour of excellence.
Mr Paul Burke-Kennedy, an architect, commented (quoted
in McDonald (1981)):
I could have a small watercolour exhibition in a Dublin gallery or
write a play and I would receive critiques in all the daily news-
papers. However, if I am involved in the design of a building on a
prominent site in the city, I get not a word of criticism or analysis.
This -- perhaps exaggerated -- statement implies that archi-
tects would respond favourably to critical evaluation of their
work, and to public acclamation (or opprobrium). It should
be possible to draw on these tendencies by using rewards,
awards, publicity, etc., much more frequently and vigorously
than has heretofore been the case, so as to recognise work of
distinction and excellence. In the same manner that the
builder’s name was engraved on Swiss lodges of old, we feel
that all those involved with major developments, (including
those who gave planningpermission), should have their names
prominently and permanently displayed thereon. This would
provide them and their posterity with continuing, enduring
public testimony to the calibre of their achievement. Con-
sideration should be given to setting up a special unit within
local authorities with the objective of fostering and encourag-
ing excellence, and expediting the passage of original and
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noteworthy proposals through the planning/by-law labyrinth.
Thus, such proposals would be encouraged by the process
rather than the reverse.
Enforcement
Action on the above proposals would create an environ-
ment wherein the incentives facing private decision-makers
will encourage socially desirable outcomes and discourage the
converse. We believe that it is essential that the current
mechanisms be reinforced in this fashion, if the .land-use
planning process is to aspire to produce the outcomes desired.
The present almost exclusive dependence on regulatory and
procedural mechanisms willprove increasingly inadequate
and inappropriate in the future. Given Ireland’s history, and
the resulting cultural, social, political and economic tradition,
an intensification of the regulatory approach- more rules,
planners, dependence on court action for enforcement, heavier
fines, etc.,- will avail little. There must be a fundamental
and conscious effort to design incentives such that people
and institutions tend to do in their own self-interest what is
also in the societal’ interest. Enforcement in such an environ-
ment will cease to be.the Achilles heel which it tends to be at
present.
If goals, and the means of their achievement, are clearly
stated in the Development Plan, and if the latter is Used
effectively to develop a consensus concerning the aspirations
of the community, this will greatly enhance the effe’ctiveness
of any enforcement system.
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Chapter 17
Capturing some of the Surplus
That very large gains in market value are associated with
land as it goes from undeveloped to developed state was
demonstrated in a previous chapter. It was argued that the
magnitude of this value derives from the anticipated price
received for the structure(s) in question, net of all non-land
costs, including an allowance for "normal" profit. For a
given level of construction costs, the magnitude of the gain at
a site then is largely (but not exclusively) determined by the
price buyers are willing to pay for a property in that location.
The size of the surplus per unit area varies sharply with loca-
tion, but the data presented in the Kenny report and by
Jennings (1981) show that over the past 20 years it has grown
at an annual average rate which far outstrips the rate of
inflation. Under the existing taxing, subsidy and institutional
arrangements, while there may be occasional, temporary
drops in real value, undeveloped land which achieves developed
status has been as close to a high yielding, risk-free invest-
ment as one can find in Ireland. It is widely accepted that a
portion of this surplus should be captured by the general
public, on the grounds both that it is largely "unearned", in
the sense that it arises .from general economic and demo-
graphic growth on the one hand, and is "created" by the
infrastructural investments ,undertaken by governments, on
the other. In cases where it is desired to maintain open space,
it also provides a substantial and often irresistible degree of
incentive to thwart such desires, and results in wasteful use
of infrastructural investment.
The debate has turned on how, and to what extent, the
difference arising in land value as it goes from undeveloped
to developed status should be captured.
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+Before addressing this topic, it is as well to point out that
British experience in this respect is virtually without value
as a source of information on alternatives. This is so because
of two interrelated factors: the price of land and the willing-
ness to trade today are very largely determined by expectations
concerning the future; for several decades Britain hashad
alternating govemments with ideologically based, strongly
opposing views on this topic. Thus, what one government
would propose and legislate for, the opposition partywould
promise to undo Once in government. The majority of
individuals, faced with selling land now and losing the bulk
of the surplus, or waiting for a change of government which
will result in reduction or elimination of the government
take, will wait. Behaviour under such circumstances will be
quite different to that which can be expected in a situation in
which the decision-making environment is likel)r to remain
unchanged indefinitely. The general lesson which the British
experience does yield is that, so long as we retain the principle
and practice Of private land ownership in Ireland, every effort
should be made to arrive at a system of capturing the surplus
which commands general popu!arsupport and which will not
be overturned with a change of government.
Approaches
Broadly, there are three approaches
‘ 
to capturing the
surplus. They each have advantages and disadvantages T there
is no perfect solution to this problem.
In addition to the characteristic noted above, i.e., robust-
ness over time, the surplus-capturing method should also
aspire to share only in the rent, i.e., the amount between the
minimum which the landowner would accept (if there were
no market per se in land) and the actual market price. For
example, if the minimum a landowner would accept were
£10,000 per acre (this might be substantially above the use
value price) and the market value were £40,000, this dif-
ference of £30,000 comprises rent; this should be the focus
of attention. If there is an attempt to capture value beyond
the minimum acceptance threshold, there will be a (probably
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very substantial) reduction in the supply of land becoming
available.
1. Compulsory Acquisition by the Government at Existing
Use Value plus Some Premium
This is the approach advocated in the majority report by
the Committee on the Price of Building Land (1973); here-
after the latter is referred to as the Kenny committee. It is
recommended that, on application by a local authority, the
High Court would designate areas in which (p. 36):
in the opinion of that Court the lands will probably be used during
the following 10 years for the purpose of providing sites for
houses or factories or for the purposes of expansion or develop-
ment and in which the land or a substantial part of it has been or
will probably be increased in market price by works carried out
by a local authority which were commenced not earlier than the
first day of August 1962 or which are to be carried out by a local
authority.
It is envisaged that all land within the designated area would
be purchased by the local authority at use value plus some
percentage of it; 25 per cent is suggested for the latter. Part
of the land would then be used by the local authority for its
own purposes and the balance would be leased or sold to
private users. With regard to the latter, the committee (majority
report) says that (p. 41):
We would expect local authorities when leasing land to seek the
highest price or rent for commercial developments such as offices
or factories, but for social purposes, such as housing or schools,
we would expect land to be made available on terms which covered
costs only.
Land disposed of by local authorities to the private sector
will involve stipulations as to type of building and its price.
It is noted that (p. 41): "the scheme will strengthen the
powers of local authorities and will, we think, enable them to
introduce some element of price control of new houses".
Lands within the designated areas can also be traded pri-
vately, but since the local authority will have the authority
to "re-purchase" it again at use value plus 25 per cent, this
(they argue) defines the ceiling which any rational person
would pay.                 181
It is clear that price control was envisaged as an inherent
element in this scheme. This arose out of the terms of reference
given to the committee, which were to consider, in the
interests of the common good, possible measures for "con-
trolling the price of land required for housing and public
development", and also for "ensuring that all or a substantial
part of the increase in the value of land attributable to the
decisions mad operations’ of local authorities.., shall be
secured for the benefit of the community".
Thus, the committee was’not Simply asked to explore
means whereby some portion of the surplus arising as land
goes from undeveloped to developed status could be captured
for the public: it had to consider how the price of land might
be controlled and how the surplus "attributable to the
decisions and operations of local authorities" (italics added)
could be secured for the public. It is unfortunate that the
committee’s terms of reference were thus defined, because it
skewed their deliberations in an unhelpful direction. In our
view, because it is largely derived from demand, it is not the
price of land which is the problem, but the equity andincen-
rive implications of the large surplus which the process of
development generates.
By being confined to consider only those gains attribUtable
to the decisions of local authorities, two problems were
created for the committee. The first was the pragmatic ad-
ministrative problem of defining the lands and value increment
so attributable; the second was the fact that the misgivings
which are expressed about large "unearned" capital gains on
land transactions apply with equal and sometimes greater,
force to land where the value is not wholly attributable to
the decisions of local authorities. The equity and incentive
arguments for capturing some of the surplus for the public
apply with equal force to all land. For example, a case arose
in Dublin where it was claimed that a 4 acre site at Earls-
fort Terrace, which has been derelict since 1971, would yield
a capital gain of £8 million (McDonald, 1981); such land
value gains would not be included in the Kenny report
proposals.
The necessity of making price control of housing an
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element in the proposals of the majority report is, in our
view, a serious limitation, for a number of reasons:
(i) It will transfer the land-value "gain" from landowners to
the initial house buyer. House purchasers are already among
the most indulged groups in the country; they receive house
purchase grants in the case of first time buyers, they typically
pay a negative real rate of interest to lenders, which is further
reduced by the fact that interest payments are allowed as a
deduction for income tax assessment purposes, and they pay
no rates to support domicile-related expenses such as garbage
collection and neighbourhood and infrastructure maintenance.
It is not clear to us that a further transfer- which could
instead be captured by tax-payers in general -- is warranted.
(ii) Non-price rationing will be introduced, as people "queue-
up" to buy these houses which have an implicit capital gain
associated with them. A two-tier market will develop, com-
prised of houses which are traded in the open-market at the
market-clearing price, and those with price control. The former
will consist of houses which are already part of the existing
housing stock, and those which are built on sites outside the
designated areas. Criteria will have to be established to decide
who gets a price-controlled house and in what sequence.
These criteria, no matter how well intentioned or ingeniously
structured they are, will be subject to manipulation by
applicants, as they attempt to maximise their prospects of
selection. The experience with the allocation of local authority
housing provides eloquent testimony to the potential pro-
blems in this regard. Allegations of political influence will be
heard.
(iii) The supply will tend to be unresponsive to changes in
taste. With a queue waiting to buy, builders will have little
incentive to be responsive to evolution in taste. For example,
the recent interest in apartment living in Dublin would pro-
bably not have been adequately reflected in builders’ decisions
under a house-price controlled regime.
(iv) As long as costs are allowable in computing the sale
price, there will be little incentive for builders to pursue
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aggressive cost-reducing uses of labour, machines and materials,
or to improve the quality of design and st=’uctures. With rapid
inflation and changing technology, it is impossible for a
bureaucracy to enforce adequately appropriate Standards in
those regards.                        ,
(v) There is an incentive for builders to try to capture some
of the surplus by creative use Of accounting methods and pro-
cedures vis-&v/s costs. If thesurplus is 7¢ery large, the incentive
will be correspondingly large, and we can expect considerable
effort to be expended in this regard, both by the builders and
the detectors. In both the private and thepublicsectors, this
can represent a substantial wastage of inteUectual andfinancial
resources.
(v) With rapid inflation, a relatively slow-moving bureaucracy
and a political situation wherein kudos can be eamed by
obeisance to slogans such as "keep thelid on prices", ,cut
out profiteering by unscrupulous developers", etc., it is likely
that the prices will be kept sufficiently low that the construc-
¯ tion sector will shift resources into non-price controlled
activity, such as domestic office and industrial development,
overseas construction, work, or, in the longer term, non-
construction activity in Ireland and, elsewhere. This will’
exacerbate the shortage and the tensions in the system.
For all these reasons, we feel Very strongl
~ 
that the price
control element in the majority report of the Kenny com-
mittee should not be acted upon. The construction industry
is reasonably competitive, and we can see no substantial
grounds for intervention in this fashion. Our rejection of this
concept is not a criticism of the committee per se, since this
proposal is a logical outcome of theterms of reference which
they were given. ’
There are three :potential difficulties~I which arise in
practice: the first is the technical/administrative one of desig-
nating the areas, purchasing the land, selling on the land, etc.
21Many observers feel that the designation of areas, and their compulsory acqui-
sition at use value plus some percentage, would, if implemented, contravene
pr0visiom of the Comtitution. We do not address this issue,
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To do it in a timely and efficient fashion will require con-
siderable technical expertise, courage, initiative, entrepre-
neurial skills and leadership, and it is not clear that all of the
local authorities will have a sufficiency of these qualities.
The second problem is that land outside the designated
areas will be traded on the open market, presumably for a
price which is often very much in excess of that paid within
these areas. This will give rise to comparisons which may
well make the proposal politically impossible to implement.
It will also give rise to enormous pressure to influence the
location of the boundaries of the designated areas. It is for
this reason, among others, presumably, the Kenny committee
recommended that this task be assigned to a justice of the
High Court. We discussed earlier the political difficulty in
issuing a Special Amenity Area Order, which would mean
that those within the boundary of such an area could be
refused development permission without compensation being
payable. Those inside -and especially perhaps those at the
boundary- will resent being thus constrained while they
observe neighbours making large "windfall" gains, made all
the larger by the fact that development is constrained in an
adjacent area. Analogous considerations arise in the case of
the Kenny designated-area scheme. It would be possible to
ameliorate the situation if a substantial portion of the gain
in the non-designated areas were to be taxed away.
The third potential difficulty arises from the fact that local
authorities will be able to buy land for their own purposes at
a relatively modest price. Paradoxically, this could result in
inefficient use of the resource if the local authorities tend as
a result to be "wasteful" in their use of it, by increasing lot
sizes, buying land and then letting it sit idle, increasing road
margins with very modest improvements in appearance or
performance, etc. It would be wise to use the full opportunity
cost price - what the land could fetch on the open market -
in internal transfers to the local departments of housing,
transportation, sanitat’~n, etc., so as to encourage parsimoni-
ous use of land.
If the price control provision now implicit in the "designated
area" proposal were dropped, so that the local authorities
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dealt inland primarily as a means Of capturing "the surplus",
then this approach has merit in principle. It has the not
inconsiderable advantage that, compared to less direct
approaches (see below), the opportunities to avoid trans-
ferring the surplus to the public are diminished. In addition,
if local autonomy and self-reliance are to be encouraged, it
presumably is an advantage that the local authorities will
have their own source of funds. However; the practical
political/administrative difficulties outlined earlier are real
and substantial, while we have doubts that a local authority
would be able to resist the temptation to control land and
house prices, and thereby pass on favours-inthe form of
"cheaper" land ± to the more effective interest groups.-We
therefore recommend against adoption of. this means of
capturing the surplus at this time. If other approaches (see
later) are tried and found to be seriously wanting, this
method might then be tried.
This is the most ambitious of the three approaches we
examine and would require Substantial institutional resources.
Those which we now address are less demanding in this
respect.
2. Tax the Capital Gain on Land Transaction
As we noted earlier (Chapter 13), for "once-off" sellers of
development land, there is already a capital gains tax at the
rate of 60 per cent on all short-term (less than 1 year) gains
resulting from disposal of development land. This falls to
50 per cent in the case of land heldmore than 1 year and 40
per cent when the land is purchased compulsorily, having
been owned for at least 3 years. For corporations trading in
land, and individuals and companies dealing.in land for profit,
the rate is 50 per cent, i.e., the current corporate tax rate.
Since these provisions were enacted only in 1982, we do
not have sufficient experience to judge their impacts and
effectiveness.
Where capital gains tax applies, there is a provision for
indexation,22 (using the consumer price index) of the base
22Adjustment of the value to account for the effects of price inflation.
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land value, but only use value is allowed in estimating the
base to which indexation applies. No indexation is allowed in
those cases where corporation tax applies.
In addition to the advantage of being readily integratable
into the existing tax collection framework, the capital gains
method also has another advantage, since it is desigued to
capture only a portion of the surplus,23 it should have very
little effect on the supply of land to development. We add
the very important caveat which we entered earlier, namely,
that this will only obtain if landowners are sure that the tax
will continue to apply in the future; if they feel, for what-
ever reasons, that it is likely to be reduced or eliminated,
then supply will be constricted and consequently the price of
that which is traded will escalate.
In the majority report of the Kenny committee, three
objections to this proposal are raised: it would be difficult to
define the land whose disposal gives rise to liability; it is
argued that it "is highly probable that it would increase it
[the price of land] and in our view, any proposal which we
make must offer a reasonable prospect of reducing or, at
least, stabilising the price of serviced and potential building
land"; finally, it is averred that "methods of arranging the
transactions so that tax will not be paid will be discovered".
With regard to the first point, it has been overcome by
making the tax apply to all land transactions where the gain
exceeds the current use value, as the capital gains tax24 now
in force does. The second difficulty is a manifestation of
being hoist by the petard of one’s terms of reference. As we
have argued elsewhere, we feel that the bulk of the tax will
be borne by the landowner. However, to the extent that there
is a price effect, we do not feel that this should be a deter-
mining consideration.
The third objection is one of considerable substance.
The yield to the Exchequer from the existing capital gains
tax has been modest, considerable creativity being displayed
23Defined as the return yielded in excess of the minimum acceptance threshold
price.
24Section 35 of the Finance Bill, 1982.
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in developing methods of avoidance. Experience in the UK
seems to bear out the difficulties in this respect. There is a
Development Land Tax applicable in the United Kingdom.2s
The tax is charged on real and deemed realisations of develop-
ment value after the 31st July 1976. The start of a develop-
ment is a deemed realisation for tax purposes. The rate of
tax is 60 per cent for all taxpayers, whether individuals,
partnerships, trusts or companies. In assessing the taxable
gain, a number of deductions are allowed, the main one
being £100,000 for a married couple on gains in any one
year. The tax is assessed on the difference between develop-
ment value and a base derived by formula from cost (if
relevant) and current use value. Current use value is defined
as the value of the property on the assumption that 0nly
development which is "not material" can be carried out.
This is roughly equivalent to "existing use value" in the
Kenny terminology, although again, s6me exemptions,
including specified use changes
, 
are allowed. The yield
to the Exchequer from this tax in the UK in 1980-1981
amounted to about £25 million (sterling). This seems modest,
but the relatively low yield may be explained in part by the
fact that some categories of gifts and other taxes can be
used as a credit against the Development Land Tax, reducing
thereby the nominal yield of the latter.
If such taxation can be made effective (a not insignificant
caveat), we are in favour of this approach.
3. Impose,a Direct Tax on Land ProportiOnate to its Value
in its Highest net Revenue Yield Use
There are several variants of this approach:
(i) Impose a charge when land is rezoned from open space to
developed: This charge can be payable at the time of re-
zoning, or when the development takes place, or some
combination. The level of the charge could be varied to
reflect the magnitude of the appreciation gain accruing
25AU information which we include on this tax is taken from Silke and Sinclair
(1981), pp 142-145.
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to the landowners. This approach has the great advantage
from the Exchequer’s point of view that it is difficult to
avoid payment. If some portion is payable at the time of
rezoning, it has the further advantage that it will discourage
the ubiquitious pressure from landowners for rezoning.
This pressure is especially prominent at the time when the
development plan is being revised. The ad hoc indulging of
these requests thwarts efforts to develop a cost-effective
and environmentally satisfactory pattern of development
and undermines the credibility of government and the de-
mocratic process by presenting elected representatives
in the guise of advocates for special interests.
This issue was raised with considerable force in County
Dublin throughout 1982. As part of the revision of the
Development Plan, a majority of councillors voted at Council
sessions during the year to rezone substantial tracts of land
from agricultural to residential, commercial or industrial
uses. These rezonings were generally opposed by the planning
officials, on the grounds that they did not comprise part of a
coherent overall plan, and as such would be costly to service,
environmentally deleterious and socially disruptive and
destroy the character and separateness of communities.
They argued further, that a long-term plan for the greater
Dublin area had been prepared in 1969 to which the Develop-
ment Plan of 1972 adhered and that maintaining the thrust
presented therein will provide plenty of land for all uses.
The councillors, in presenting the case for particular re-
zonings, tended to take a more local view. Thus, in arguing
the case for the rezoning of 150 acres in the Stepaside area
of south County Dublin, a councillor argued that (quoted
in Southside, June 16, 1982):
The owner of the land suffers from vandalism. He can’t grow
crops and I wouldn’t describe some of the things that go on
up there -- some of you wouldn’t be able to eat your dinners.
In proposing a rezoning of 24 acres at Sandyford to re-
sidential, another councillor noted that (Southside, June
16, 1982):
Other land in the area is residential. The owner of this bit seems
to have missed the boat.
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However, the case for rezoning was also made26 on the more
general grounds that the initialDraft Development Plan for
County Dublin did not adequately providefor the residential
and work requirements of a burgeoning population.
The imposition of a charge whenland is rezoned has the
disadvantage that, since it is payable on all land being de-
veloped, "entry" into development by land which yields
a surplus below the level of the tax will be discouraged. A
profits tax will not have this effect; any land which can
with profit be developed will not be held back, since only
a share of the profit is taken. The fixed amount require-
ment, on the Other hand, will prevent development of that
land which cannot with profit be developed once the tax
is payable.
(ii) A sales tax, payable by the vendor: on the transfer or
lease of lands suitable for building, a fixed percentage of the
sale price, or a progressive rate varying with value, would be
payable by the vendor. There already is a tax of this sort -
called stamp duty- but it is paid by the buyer. In the
majority report of the Kenny committee, this approach
is dismissed, primarily on the grounds that its main effect
would be to increase prices. It is argued that "in cases where
the duty was paid, we would expect it to be passed on so that
it would ultimately be borne by the purchaser of the buildings
on the land."
We do not share the Committee’s certitude of Conviction
that the taxwould be borne entirely by the buildings’ pur-
chasers. As we outlined earlier, economic theory would
indicate that a substantial proportion of the burden will be
carried by the landowner in the form of reduced (net of
tax) land prices. Since the Kenny committee does not provide
the evidence to justify its assertions in this respect, we cannot
evaluate them further.
In the minority report of the Kenny committee, a sales
tax was also suggested as a means of capturing a portion of
268¢e Michael Green, "Naive notions from critics of renewal," Irt’sh Times,
April t5, 1982.
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the surplus. The concept of a designated area, as presented
in the majority report, was accepted. For any sale of land
within this area, the local authority would have to be given
offer of first refusal. If the local authority accepted the
offer, it would pay full market value, as determined under
the rules for assessment of compensation in compulsory
acquisition cases. A sales tax (levy), i.e., a percentage of the
amount realised on the transaction, would be charged,
payable by the vendor: a 30 per cent levy is suggested as
being appropriate.
In the majority report of the Kenny committee, this
approach is discounted (p. 35):
The levies which are proposed would be payable by the vendor
but they would probably be passed on to the purchaser and
they would therefore increase the price of serviced and potential
building land... The history of the levies and taxes in Britain
since 1947 shows that all types of levies and development changes
invariably increase the price of land.
We view the minority report more sympathetically. As we
argued earlier, the British experience since 1947 yields no
generalisable lessons vis-a-vis price effects, because of the
inconsistency of commitment from one govemment to the
next in the post-war period. The price effects observed are
what one would expect in this institutional environment.
In the March 1982 budget, a provision was made vis-d-vis
the capital gains tax on development land, whereby the pur-
chaser of such land was to be obliged to deduct 30 per cent
of the consideration at the point of payment and to hand
it over to the Revenue Commissioners; the vendor was to
receive 70 per cent of the sale price. It was to apply to all
property with development potential where the total con-
sideration was over £50,000. The cash so received by the
Revenue Commissioners would be treated as a payment on
account, pending determination of the final liability for
capital gains tax.
Unfortunately this ,tax was introduced at a time of high
interest rates and stagnant land values. In this situation a 30
per cent "take" from the transactions value could cause
severe cash-flow problems for large land-holding companies.
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The provMon was subsequently Withdrawn. It is unfortunate
that this form of collecting the tax was not tested in practice.
It overcomes the primary drawback of the capital gains tax,
namely the difficulty of ensuring its collection,’(Cynics might
argue that this is why it was dropped!)It would "penalise"
those land sales where the gain is relatively small; in such
cases, the transfer of the land in question to development
could be inhibited.
We recommend that, when economic circumstances make
it feasible to do so, some form of collection of the capital
gains tax be re-introduced- such as the percentage of sale
value approach discussed above -- which reduces the possibility
for tax avoidance. It cOuld be phased in over two years to
allow time for adjustments to the new circumstances. As we
have argued elsewhere, we feel that if such a tax were seen
to be a permanent feature of the !and market, much of the
tax would be reflected in lower prices to vendors.
(iii) An annual tax assessment - the level of which is based
on the value-of land: in itsmost remunerative potential
use - is termed site valuing.
In their analysis of local authority expenditure and finance,
Copeland and Walsh (1975.) comment (p. 91):
We judge that.., the effect of site value rating would be a more
efficient use of scarce urban land. In any general revaluation we
therefore recommend that the value of sites (as defined by the
planning authorities) be raised relative to that of structures on
the sites.
If the level of rates assessed were sufficiently high, the
bulk of the surplus or rent accruing to landowners as the
property goes into development and thereafter, could be
captured for the public. Again, most of the burden of such a
tax is likely to be borne in the form Of reduced land values.
This approach has much to recommend it on both grounds
of efficiency and equity. However, in view of the public
antipathy torates, and the reflection of this in political
decision-making, it is not likely to be acted upon in the near
future.
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Conclusions
Each technique for capturing a portion of the surplus has
advantages and disadvantages. Taxing the capital gain accruing
from development is the most readily undertaken in terms
of existing tax-collection procedures, but it appears to be
difficult to limit tax-evasion and demands for exemptions.
A sales-tax or levy approach is more certain in its yield to
the Exchequer, but can distort land-use behaviour in un-
desirable ways. Compulsory purchase by local authorities
at use value plus some percentage would be effective in
capturing the rent, but raises major questions relating to
constitutionality, administrative and political feasibility,
and the degree to which it can be applied to areas already
serviced.
Since the government has recently (June 1982)introduced
increased capital gains taxes on land transactions, we recom-
mend that this be carefully and publicly monitored, to de-
termine, as rigorously as possible, the effects of this tax on
land prices, tax yield, etc. Such studies should accompany
any initiatives in this field. In the past, the degree of certitude
which has characterised assertions in this area seems to be
inversely related to the amount and quality of evidence
available to support them.
We feel that the use of some combination of direct tax
approaches should be seriously considered, because they
combine feasibility of implementation with reasonable
certainty regarding yield. They also are more consistent
in character with other local charges. The use of a "sales
tax" as a payment on account for capital gains tax deserves
consideration in this respect.
Taxation is inextricably tied to the question as to who
collects and who gets the tax revenues. Evaluating the benefits
of local autonomy versus central government control is a
task which far transcends our brief. However, if there is a
conviction that diminishing local dependence on central
government is worthwhile, then allowing the local authorities
to retain all, or some share, of the capital gains tax would be
a very effective means of advancing that goal. At present all
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of the capital gains tax accrues to central govemment. We
feel that "automatic" disbursement to the local authority,
perhaps for specified purposes, of some or all of the tax,
would help develop public support for this approach.
We are of the opinion that the uncertainties and potential
difficulties attending the implementation of the more am-
bitious Kenny proposals (majority report) are such that it
would be wiser at this stage to concentrate attention on
getting an effective capital gains tax operational alongthe
lines outlined. A key element in evaluating performance in
this regard is knowing the amounts collected per period by
local authority jurisdiction. This information should be
published by the Revenue Commissioners. These data will
provide some basis for evaluating the effectiveness of the
tax as a mechanism for capturing part of the surp!us.
If the Kenny proposals are taken up, we urge very strongly
that the house price control element be eliminated. The land
being returned to the private sector should be auctioned off
to the highest bidders, with a steady, reasonably predictable
amount being s01d perperiod.
Our attention in this chapter has been concentrated On
capturing the surplus value yielded by the development
process. In doing so, we have argued that the demand for
land is a derived demand, and that the price which land
for development fetches in the open market is largely de-
pendent, other things being equal, on the price which can
be received for the development in question. However, we
also wish to note that there is a land supply effect on land
price; restrictions in the supply of serviced land will tend
to push up the price of serviced properties. Local authorities
should therefore ensure that Serviced land in requisite quantity
is coming on the market. The revenues yielded by long run
marginal cost pricing of infrastructural services should give
them both the resources to do so, and some guidance as to
where to allocate them.
Capturing a portion of~ the rent or surplus, in addition
to its equity dimensions, will help in the achievement of
cost-effective use of infrastructure and in the preservation
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of open space. Other countries, with different traditions,
do not appear to need such assistance. For example, in West
Germany it has proved possible to simply define areas-
the "Aussenbereich"-and prohibit development there,
without any liability on the part of the state for compensa-
tion.27 Most of the country’s land is formally classified
in this non-development zone (Reilly, 1978). In Ireland it
does not appear to be possible politically to impose large
’qosses" on landowners by a total ban on development,
except in few clearly specified cases; a diminution of the
gain to landowners from development is socially desirable
therefore in so far as it will help relieve the pressure. It would
also reduce substantially the very large incentive for bribery
which exists in the present system.
27Germany’s constitutional provisions vis-a-vis the rights of private property
axe very similar to Ireland’s. The discrepancy in practice seems to bear out the
familiar saying that a Constitution means what the courts say it means.
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Chapter 18
The Development Plan and
Institutional Aspects
To a degree unusual inthe Western world, Ireland has a
highly centralised government. What were already relatively
modest powers of taxation and decision-making at the local
level have been steadily diminished in recent years. Planning’
remains one area where a significant residue of authority
still resides locaLly. However, we have seen that a growing
number of the most significant decisions are being shifted
to An Bord Plean~ila and existing institutional incentives
imply that this tendency -:rill intensify. The Department
of the Environment and the Industrial Development Au-
thority are the major arbiters in terms Of new infrastructure.
We will discuss the national level role later in this Chapter.
Here we wish to address the one poficy instrument which is
unique to the local authority, namely, the development plan.
The Development Plan
¯ The Development Plan provides an opportunity for local
authorities to articulate the community’s aspirations for the
future, to outline means of their achievement, and to mobilise
public support and involvement to this end. To be successful
in this role, the public must be actively involved in the
consideration of choices. This means that people need to
have a sense of what outcomes to expect with different
land-use policies, both in terms of appearance and quality
of life, and have a realistic sense of the policy measures
needed to achieve various outcomes, and their cost. In order
to get members of the public to devote their time to this
effort, they must have a Sense that they are contributing
in more than a cosmetic fashion to the decision-making
process.                    196
Developing alternatives and presenting them to the
public in an intelligible fashion is difficult and costly, and
it demands serious intellectual effort to think things through,
and financial and human resources and creativity to engender
useful involvement. Likewise, discussing policy instruments,
and their costs, effectiveness and overall implications with
the public in a coherent fashion imposes great demands
on planning resources. In this process, the review of policy
instruments should convey clearly the limitations of these.
For example, the weaknesses of zoning as a means of main-
taining open space should be clearly specified.
However, we feel that if local authorities are to have any
substantive role in the planning process -- and we feel strongly
that they should - the preparation, presentation and use of
the Development Plan should be central in this effort. The
following measures can help in this undertaking:
(i) Capturing a substantial portion of the surplus accruing
to landowners from development will reduce the magnitude
of the gain to be made, and reduce thereby the pressure for
zoning changes, outline planning permissions, etc. This in
turn should simultaneously reduce the "messenger-boy"
assignments which now consume a disproportionate amount
of local legislators’ time, and instead allow them to look
at land-use more from a community welfare perspective; in
so doing, their prestige and credibility will be enhanced.
(ii) Charging the full costs to development for infrastructural
services will tend to result in a cost-effective pattern of
development, wil! :,-~en "~.courage environmentally damaging
proposals and will .alminish the magnitude of the surplus
gained by some landowno-
(iii) By putting a lot of effort into deciding what the com-
munity wants, it should be possible as a result to provide
much more guidance to developers as to what will and will
not be acceptable in particular areas. Furthermore, in cases
where permission is refused, the developer should be given
clear instructions as to which changes would make approval
likely. These actions would reduce the demands on existing
197
planning personnel
, 
thereby freeing them for work on the
Development Plan.
(iv) By utilising community organisations
, 
residents’ asso-
ciations, interest groups, etc., it should be possible to draw
systematically on pools of knowledge, expertise and values
.which are outside the "official" channels. The Universities,
regional colleges, schools, local newspapers, radio, etc.,
can all be mobilised in these efforts.
(v) A review of successes and failures vis-~-vz’s what was
aspired to in the previous five year plan will provide a reralistic
context from which to commence revision.
(vi) The fact that values -- the Weight given to various out-
comes -- is central to the land-use planning process needs to
be emphasised.
We encountered a tendency to mask this fact by appealing
to "good planningprinciples" as a means of making a decision,
as if planning per se could resolve value judgements in the
same way that an engineer, for example, decides on the tech-
nical specifications for a bridge. This recourse to technocratic
judgement is understandable in a decision-making environ-
ment where most of the existing pressures operate in a fashion
inimical to cost-effective use 0fresources and the preservation
of environmental amenities, where engineering is the dominat-
ing professional influence and where authoritarian decision~
making modesare deeply ingrained. However, if the incentives
are adjusted in the manners we suggest, planners will be able
to come out from behind the intellectual barricades, and
fulfil their vitally important functions of outlining alternatives
and their implications, and structuring the terms and tone of
the land-use debate. In doing so, it would also be helpful if
the uncertainty of outcomes were discussed. Understanding
of the urban organism is at an early stage; predicting overall
outcomes from interventions in the transport and housing
Systems, for example, is still an inexact science. Such a situ-
ation is susceptible to waves of fashion as to what will achieve
desirable results. It is the planners’ task to educate the decision-
makers and the public as to what is known in these areas and
what is merely plausible hypothesis. An Foras Forbartha, with
198
its expertise in both planning and communication, could
play a central role in this regard.
(vii) Many of the existing Development Plans typically suffer
from two further serious limitations: they do not adequately
cost-out their proposals and the sources of funds, and they
suffer from an unwillingness of some of the national state
development agencies to indicate of what their plans for the
future consist. Of these, the former is more serious. Once
there is a weak connection between aspirations and the costs
of fulfilling them, and who bears these costs, priorities remain
unspecified; in the worst cases, the Development Plan can
degenerate to the level of a meaningless wish list, lacking all
credibility. It is important that costs of proposals be fully
and realistically presented, together with the sources of pro-
jected expenditure.
While a few local authorities have made some attempt to
utilise the Development Plan along the lines we suggest, in
general, "they have not. The seeking of public input has often
been passive. Rather than going actively in search of views,
there has been a tendency to comply with the letter but not
the spirit of the law. Many Plans have little policy content;
what is desired, why, and how what is proposed is to be
achieved is only cursorily addressed. Attention is often drawn
to the zone boundaries, rather than to what the hopes and
aspirations are within zones. Alternatives are rarely canvassed.
We feel that the Development Plan should focus particular
attention on the planning process, and, in particular, how to
structure the decision-making environment, both for local
authorities themselves and for private sector decision-makers,
such that socially desired outcomes are encouraged. It is
much more important to have decisions being made which
are in the general direction of what is desirable, than to have
a finely wrought set of definite aspirations, but without a
framework which encourages action towards their achieve-
ment. Costs of alternatives, and the sources of funds for
projected expenditure, should be clearly specified.
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The National Level
The Department of the Environment
Given Irish governmental structures and attitudes, it is
clear that, if initiatives are to be taken which are widespread
in application and effect, the Department of the Environment
will have to provide sustained leadership and support. How-
ever, such leadership has not been provided in recent years;
the Department has fulfilled a mainly custodial role, with
occasional amendments of a relatively minor nature being
made from time to time. However, in 1982 Departmental
personnel were involved in the preparati0n of a number of
bills. In spite of the changes of government in the period,
two of these -- the Local Government (Planning and Develop-
ment) Act, 1982, and the Local Government (Planning and
Development) Act, 1983 -- were enacted into law. In addition,
a set of advice and guidelines concerning development control
was published.
The lack of sustained leadership from this source prior to
1982/83 arises perhaps most fundamentally from the absence
of political interest; land-use planning does not feature pro-
minently on party political election manifestoes. In spite of
great public interest in the particular, the system as a whole
does not yet command attention. The Department has also
had its mandate broadened to include responsibility for
environmental policy, and this may havediluted the attention
senior management have been able to devote to land-use
planning per se. There may also be a sense that diminishing
returns has set in to the regulatory approach, and that there
is relatively little to be gained by further refinements, while
the use of pricing approaches is unfamiliar, unproven (in the
civil service context) and possibly contentious. Finally, a
number of commentators (usually natives of Dublin) claimed
that civil servants were drawn mainly from rural areas of
Ireland, and had little interest in, understanding of, or sym-
pathy with, urban areas. This is a line of argument which it is
impossible to substantiate or evaluate.
The Department also has responsibility for allocating infra-
structural investments at the national level, and,-to a lesser
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degree, for developing regional policy. In practice, the
Industrial Development Authority plays a central role with
regard to the latter. Our brief did not extend to a consideration
of policy in these areas. However, we do endorse the recom-
mendations by Foster and in their report for the National
Economic and Social Council, namely, that investment
appraisal techniques be employed to evaluate and rank infra-
structural expenditure proposals. We recommend that the
Department acts on this and also takes the lead in encouraging
the use of pricing approaches to land-use by local authorities.
If it does so, it will be necessary to employ economists trained
in techniques of micro-economic analysis, econometrics and
investment appraisal. The technical planning group in the
Department would also need to be expanded, while An Foras
Forbartha could play a very important supporting role.
An Bord Plean~la
The role of the Board - in conjunction with Ministerial
directives --as a setter of national policy for land-use decisions
needs to be frankly recognised; such recognition might have
to be given statutory expression. If this were done, the guide-
lines and criteria which are followed in reviewing appeals
could then be laid out. This would serve two purposes: it
would facilitate a coherent debate on their appropriateness
(or otherwise) and it would also provide guidelines for both
developers and local authorities which could significantly
reduce the number of appeals.
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APPENDIX A
ENA CTMENTS AND REGULATIONS DIRECTLY
RELEVANT TO PHYSICAL PLANNING
Planning A c ts
Local Government (Planning and Development) Act, 1963
(No. 28 of 1963).
Local Government (Planning and Development) Act, 1976
(No. 20 of 1976).
Local Government (Planning and Development) Act, 1982
(No. 21 of 1982).
Regulations, Rules and Policy Directive
Rules of the Superior Courts (No. 1), 1976 (S.I. No. 286 of
1976).
Local Government (Planning and Development)Regulations,
1977 (S.I. No. 65 of 1977).
Local Government (Planning and Development)(Amendment)
Regulations, 1980 (S.I. No. 231 of 1980).
Local Government (Planning and Development) (Amendment)
Regulations, 1981 (S.I. No. 154 of 1981).
Local Government (Planning and Development) General Policy
Directive, 1982 (S.I. No. 264 of 1982).
Enactments which Amend or Affect the Planning Acts
Housing Act, 1969 (No. 16 of 1969) S. 10 and 12.
Gas Act, 1976 (No. 30 of 1976) S. 42.
Wildlife Act, 1976 (No. 39 of 1976) S. 21(8).
Casual Trading Act, 1980 (No. 43 of 1980) S. 7(3).
Fire Services Act, 1981 (No. 30 of 1981) S. 13.
Litter Act, 1982 (No. 11 of 1982) S. 19.
Source: Taken directly from Department of the Environment
(1982).
208
Appendix Table 1 : Permissions and refusals by the local authority and the Minister, County
Dublin, 1975
Grand total
Residential
Group 269 135 50
Single 376 151 40
Total 645 286 44
Factories 33 38 115
Offices 16 12 75
Shops, Pubs, Restaurants 18 25 139
Garages 9 10 111
Warehouses/Stores 33 11 33
Schools 17 -- 0
Conversion of dwelling to
Pubs
-- 2
Offices/Shops 5 4 80
Factory 3 5 167
Extensions/Alterations to:
Houses 1116 33 3
Offices 10 5 5i }
Sh ops/Restaurants/Pubs 16 14 8
Schools 13 --
Garages 5 3 60 ’~
Warehouses 8 1 13
Factories 14 5 36
Local authority Minister
No. of Refusals
Decisions Decisions Decisions notplanning Permissions Refusals as % of not upheld as %
applications Permissions upheld upheld of those upheld
2808 2149 461 21 78219 171
64 42
55 61J
119 103
n.a. n.a.
26 25
n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a.
66
110
87
96
1 -- 0
2 1 50
n.a. n.a.
31 11 35
8 11 137
6 2 33
Note: Some minor applications have been omitted, so that number of entries will not sum to grand total.
Source: McKone (1976), p. 9.
APPENDIX B
Area
County
Carlow
~avan
Clare
Cork
Donegal
Dublin
Galway
Kerry
Kildare
Kilkenny
[aois
Leitrim
Limerick
Longford
Louth
Mayo
/death
Monaghan
Offaly
Roscoromon
81igo
"I;ipper:iry NR
Tipperaw SR
Water ford
Westroeath
Wexford
Wicklow
Planning dec~’ons
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
% refusals
977 1978 1979 1980 1981
398 406
958 918
1384 ,1230
4262 4674
2689 2299
3915 4050
3302 3476
¯ 2318 234O
1352 1408
983 1029
727 755
560 461
1566 1566
" 508 513
698 798
2032 1764
1756 2274
665 662
593 615
1135 1175
744 868
768 818
2.28 6.62 9.79 4.92
10.44 9.61 10.54 14.92
2.02 2.83 3.39 3.25
17.48 17,10 i7.03 22,20
6.48 8.49 6.91 7.65
17.67 15,87 18,95 19.14
16.46 13.03 11.72 14.32
7.84 9.03 6.77 8.97
16.71 23,11 19.60 19,31
3.11 4.40 4.78 7.96
6.83 4.38 6.18 7.94
5.43 8.19 8.57 7.80
5;18 6.15 6.19 9.45
4.00 6.01 8.66 9.16
18.52 17.93 18.19 17.16
4.36 5.69 4.67 5.38
8.91 10.14 16.51 22.42
8.45 7.67 10;07 14.95
7.73 7.33 5.56 8.29
4.06 5.90 6.07 7.14
14.85 15.36 19.89 14.63
5.76 7.83 8.59 1L24
312 394 543 2.56
782 957 1134 11.89
1060 1184 1589 1.03
3578 4153 5303 13.24
2345 2437 2626 8.57
3103 3485 4446 19.14
2827 3504 4042 13.51
1796 2243 2800 8.24
956 1340 1553 9.93
782 1093 1248 3.45
573 732 1003 6.63
449 405 549 8.46
1485 1718 1998 4.78
495 600 615 4.04
767 826 881 16.03
1688 1926 2299 4.91
1688 1672 2199 10.84
653 781 795 7.19
528 608 736 5.30
931 1008 1338 3.00
719 821 859 18.63
593 815 881 4.72
537 761 882
827 821 1125
875 1015 1048
1392 1533 1849
975 1127 1168
687 646 2.04 5.51
787 744    11.97 15.46
5.21 4.94 6.19
19.11 16.01 16.26
9.82 9~5 10.40 12.44 12.57
15.01 14.41 17,19 16.06 14.34
25,84 27,41 27,56 30,68 30.13
892 795
1562 1617
1131 1251
Sub-total 32716 37959 45509 88372 39152 10.73 11.41 11.83 12.23 14.31
County Borough
Cork 620 741 846 610 656 13.70 14.17 15.72 11.63 15.09
Dublin 2611 2621 3116 3076 3004 18.07 21.17 20.31 20.38 23.56
Limerick 233 274 310 273 280 17;16 11.67 11.93 12.45 21.42
Waterford 175 203 240 311 354 9.14 10.83 5.00 11.89 7.90
Sub-total 3639 3839 4512 4270 4294 16.84 18.59 18.06 18.00 20.84
Source: Taken directly from the Department of the Environment (1982).
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APPENDIX C
Area Appeals as % of decisions
1978 1979 1980 1981
County
Carlow 3.21 4.17 7.50 5.01
Cavan 6.16 5.59 6,38 7.10
Clare 3.02 3.59 4.05 3.25
Cork 9,90 7.55 9.41 11.70
Donegal 3.19 2.47 3.38 2.55
Dublin 15.52 11.45 14.00 16.44
Galway 7.87 6.86 6.14 6.50
Kerry 3.96 3.84 4.86 5.55
Kildare 10.03 10.10 11.29 12.86
Kilkenny 2.30 2.76 3.52 3.33
Laois 3.55 3.35 4.26 5.03
Leitrim 4.20 2.91 5.00 4.77
Limerick 2.62 1.95 3.86 4.53
Longford 3.21 2.99 7.04 8.64
Louth 10.19 8.49 11.23 9.50
Mayo 2.71 3.45 3.66 5.41
Meath 5.45 6.27 8.84 8.61
Monaghan 4.50 5.58 6.41 9.08
Offaly 4.81 5.19 5.00 6.46
Roscommon 3.97 4.04 3.08 3.57
Sligo 7.22 6.07 8.84 7.37
Tipperary NR 3.48 4.73 5.62 9.13
Tipperary SR 4.20 2.94 3.44 4.30
Waterford 6.70 7.38 8.79 7.64
Westmeath 4.88 4.50 5.26 7.91
Wexford 5.57 4.77 6.27 5.57
Wicklow 17.77 13.66 19.71 19.04
County Borough~Borough
Cork 10.80 8,98 10.66 11.74
Dublin 17.21 16.88 18.76 20.67
Limerick 5.47 9.68 7.69 14.64
Waterford 5.42 3.33 9.65 8.78
Dun Laoghaire 20.88 24,26 26.76 25.86
National Average 7.65 6.82 8.44 9.39
Source: Taken directly from the Department of the Environment (1982).
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